Armando Aros v. Unknown Fansler , 548 F. App'x 500 ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 10 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARMANDO ROBERTO AROS, No. 12-15339
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:04-cv-00306-SRB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
UNKNOWN FANSLER, CO, III; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 19, 2013**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Armando Roberto Aros appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging denial of
equal protection related to his reclassification and placement in a maximum
security facility. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
novo summary judgment, Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003), and
for an abuse of discretion the district court’s pre-trial rulings, Ahanchian v. Xenon
Picutres, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 2010); (enlargement of time); Hallett
v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (discovery); Chodos v. West Publ’g
Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (leave to amend). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Aros failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants singled out
Aros for administrative reclassification or whether reclassifying absent a
disciplinary charge based on security concerns was irrational. See Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (“class of one” equal protection claim requires
arbitrary discrimination); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986) (prison
officials are given wide-ranging deference in trying to maintain institutional
security).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Aros’s motions to
compel because Aros failed to establish that the discovery he sought was relevant
and subject to disclosure despite heightened privacy and security concerns, or that
its denial caused substantial prejudice. See Hallett, 296 F.3d at 751 (decision to
deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing of actual
and substantial prejudice).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Aros’s motion for
leave to amend his third amended complaint because it was untimely and relied on
information discovered much earlier, and amendment would have been both futile
and prejudicial. See Chodos, 292 F.3d at 1003 (discretion to deny leave to amend
is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously obtained such leave).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by partially denying Aros’s
repeated requests for extensions of time to oppose summary judgment because
Aros failed to establish good cause for such lengthy extensions or excusable
neglect for filing his opposition more than a month after the twice-extended
deadline. See Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1258-60 (discussing factors to consider in
ruling upon a motion to extend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)).
Aros’s contention regarding defendants’ alleged retaliation involving his
recent validation as a gang member are unsupported by the record and beyond the
scope of this action, and his contention that the district court should have
conducted an in camera inspection of documents subject to his discovery motions
is unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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