Ullysses Cuen v. M. Evans , 390 F. App'x 721 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                AUG 02 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ULLYSSES PAUL CUEN,                              No. 08-16197
    Petitioner - Appellant,             D.C. No. 3:05-cv-04569-JSW
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    M.S. EVANS,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 12, 2010
    San Francisco, California
    Before: HUG and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and HOGAN, Senior District
    Judge.**
    Petitioner Ulysses Paul Cuen was convicted of arson in California Superior
    Court. Before trial, the court held a hearing on Cuen’s competency and concluded
    he was indeed competent to stand trial. The California Court of Appeal affirmed
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan, Senior United States District Judge
    for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.
    the trial court’s competency determination. In a petition for the writ of habeas
    corpus, Cuen now claims that the California courts’ competency determination was
    erroneous. The district court denied Cuen’s petition. We affirm.
    Whether Cuen was competent to stand trial is a factual question. See Dennis
    ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 
    378 F.3d 880
    , 891 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we review
    whether the California courts’ decision was “an unreasonable determination of the
    facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
    § 2254(d)(2). Moreover, the California courts’ decision is “presumed to be
    correct[,]” and Cuen has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness
    by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
    In Indiana v. Edwards, the Supreme Court recognized that two of its cases
    set forth the Constitution’s mental competence standard. 
    128 S. Ct. 2379
    , 2383
    (2008). The first, Dusky v. United States, 
    362 U.S. 402
    (1960), defines the
    competency standard as including both “(1) whether the defendant has a rational as
    well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him and (2) whether the
    defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
    degree of rational understanding.” 
    Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2383
    (internal quotation
    marks and emphasis omitted). The Indiana Court further recognized that Drope v.
    Missouri, 
    420 U.S. 162
    (1975) “repeats that standard,” stating that “it has long
    -2-
    been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the
    capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to
    consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to
    a trial.” 
    Indiana, 128 S. Ct. at 2383
    (emphasis omitted).
    Cuen does not dispute that he understood the nature and the object of the
    proceedings against him. Instead, he contends that he lacked the capacity to
    consult with counsel and assist in preparing his defense.
    The California courts’ finding that Cuen was capable of assisting his lawyer
    is not unreasonable. The State’s witness, Douglas Harper, was a psychiatrist who
    had more experience than the defense witness, David Echeandia. Harper had also
    conducted more competency evaluations than Echeandia under California Penal
    Code sections 1368 and 1369. Further, although the experts came to different
    conclusions concerning Cuen’s competency, Echeandia admitted that his
    assessment that Cuen was incompetent was a “close call.” Harper, on the other
    hand, testified that he was “95 percent sure” of his judgment that Cuen was
    competent. He also testified that Cuen’s past behavior indicated a pattern of not
    accepting responsibility for his actions. Although the California courts were faced
    with conflicting evidence, their decision to credit Harper’s testimony was not “an
    -3-
    unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
    State court proceeding.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
    Cuen’s remaining contentions are without merit.
    AFFIRMED.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-16197

Citation Numbers: 390 F. App'x 721

Judges: Hogan, Hug, Smith

Filed Date: 8/2/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023