The Save the Peaks Coaltion v. Usfs , 683 F.3d 1140 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                   FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    THE SAVE THE PEAKS COALITION;          
    KRISTIN HUISINGA; CLAYSON
    BENALLY; SYLVAN GREY; DON
    FANNING; JENEDA BENALLY;
    FREDERICA HALL; BERTA BENALLY;               No. 10-17896
    RACHEL TSO; LISA TSO,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    3:09-cv-08163-
    v.                               MHM
    UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE;              District of Arizona,
    JOSEPH P. STRINGER, Acting Forest                Phoenix
    Supervisor for the Coconino                     ORDER
    National Forest,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    ARIZONA SNOWBOWL RESORT LP,
    Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.
    
    Filed June 21, 2012
    Before: J. Clifford Wallace, John T. Noonan, and
    Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.
    ORDER
    Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee Arizona Snowbowl Resort
    Limited Partnership (Snowbowl) has moved for attorney’s
    fees and costs. The court is well aware that Plaintiffs-
    Appellants and Howard M. Shanker (Shanker), their counsel,
    grossly abused the judicial process in prosecuting this second
    case. However, a majority of the panel has concluded that an
    award of attorney fees would be inequitable because
    7297
    7298          SAVE THE PEAKS COALITION v. USFS
    Plaintiffs-Appellants appear to have been misled by their
    counsel concerning the issues that remained part of the
    appeal, and Shanker was acting in a pro bono capacity. Never-
    theless, the panel unanimously concludes that some sanction
    against Shanker personally is appropriate.
    Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, any attorney “who so multiplies
    the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously
    may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess
    costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
    because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Section 1927
    provides us with authority “to hold attorneys personally liable
    for excessive costs for unreasonably multiplying proceed-
    ings.” Gadda v. Ashcroft, 
    377 F.3d 934
    , 943 n.4 (9th Cir.
    2004). “Sanctions pursuant to section 1927 must be supported
    by a finding of subjective bad faith.” New Alaska Dev. Corp.
    v. Guetschow, 
    869 F.2d 1298
    , 1306 (9th Cir. 1989). “Bad
    faith is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly
    raises a frivolous argument or argues a meritorious claim for
    the purpose of harassing an opponent.” Id. (citation omitted).
    “Tactics undertaken with the intent to increase expenses, or
    delay, may also support a finding of bad faith.” Id. (internal
    citations omitted). Indeed, “[e]ven if an attorney’s arguments
    are meritorious, his conduct may be sanctionable if in bad
    faith.” Id. (citation omitted).
    We also have the inherent power to sanction a losing party
    who “has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
    oppressive reasons, delaying or disrupting litigation, or has
    taken actions in the litigation for an improper purpose.” Fink
    v. Gomez, 
    239 F.3d 989
    , 992 (9th Cir. 2001). Under a court’s
    inherent power, “a court ‘certainly may assess [sanctions]
    against counsel who willfully abuse judicial processes.’ ” Id.
    at 991 (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 
    447 U.S. 752
    ,
    766 (1980)). “Before awarding sanctions under its inherent
    powers, however, the court must make an explicit finding that
    counsel’s conduct ‘constituted or was tantamount to bad
    faith.’ ” Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d
    SAVE THE PEAKS COALITION v. USFS            7299
    644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “A finding of bad
    faith is warranted where an attorney ‘knowingly or recklessly
    raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for
    the purpose of harassing an opponent.’ ” Id. at 649; see also
    In re Itel Sec. Litig., 
    791 F.2d 672
    , 675 (9th Cir. 1986).
    Here, we find that Shanker’s conduct merits sanctions
    against him personally. As detailed in Save the Peaks Coali-
    tion v. U.S. Forest Service, 
    669 F.3d 1025
     (9th Cir. 2012),
    Shanker grossly abused the judicial process in bringing this
    case solely “to ensure further delay and forestall develop-
    ment” at Snowbowl. Save the Peaks Coal., 669 F.3d at 1028.
    Shanker acted with subjective bad faith. He engaged in tactics
    with the intent of increasing expenses and delaying develop-
    ment at Snowbowl, unreasonably multiplying proceedings
    after losing in Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 
    535 F.3d 1058
     (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). His intent was to harass
    Snowbowl. Therefore, we conclude that Shanker is subject to
    sanctions under § 1927. See B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 
    276 F.3d 1091
    , 1107 (9th Cir. 2002); New Alaska Dev. Corp., 869
    F.2d at 1306.
    We also find that sanctions are appropriate under our inher-
    ent power because Shanker acted in bad faith and for oppres-
    sive reasons. See Fink, 239 F.3d at 992. Shanker’s “conduct
    ‘constituted, or was tantamount to, bad faith.’ ” Primus Auto.
    Fin. Servs., 115 F.3d at 648. He willfully abused the judicial
    process by acting with the improper purpose of imposing
    delays and costs on Snowbowl. Therefore, we exercise our
    inherent power to sanction Shanker. See Fink, 239 F.3d at 991
    (noting a court’s inherent power to impose sanctions against
    counsel who willfully abuse the judicial process).
    As an appropriate remedy, we hold Shanker “personally
    liable for excessive costs for unreasonably multiplying pro-
    ceedings.” Gadda, 377 F.3d at 943 n.4. Because this entire
    case was designed to harass Snowbowl, we conclude that
    Snowbowl is entitled to an award of all costs other than attor-
    7300          SAVE THE PEAKS COALITION v. USFS
    ney’s fees that it incurred in litigating Save the Peaks Coali-
    tion v. U.S. Forest Service before both the district court (D.C.
    No. 3:09-cv-08163-MHM) and our court (No. 10-17896.) We
    hereby award these costs to Snowbowl against Shanker per-
    sonally. The case is hereby referred to the Appellate Commis-
    sioner to determine the monetary amount of costs to award in
    Snowbowl’s favor against Shanker.
    Therefore, the court awards costs in litigating Save the
    Peaks Coalition v. U.S. Forest Service before both the district
    court (D.C. No. 3:09-cv-08163-MHM) and our court (No. 10-
    17896) to Snowbowl, to be paid entirely by Shanker, counsel
    for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Thus, Snowbowl’s Motion for
    Attorneys’ Fees is DENIED, and its accompanying motion for
    costs is GRANTED, as modified by this order.
    SO ORDERED.
    PRINTED FOR
    ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE—U.S. COURTS
    BY THOMSON REUTERS—SAN FRANCISCO
    The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, is copyrighted
    © 2012 Thomson Reuters.