Stephanie Lazarus v. Leroy Baca , 389 F. App'x 700 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 28 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHANIE ILENE LAZARUS, No. 10-55439
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-01423-GHK-
FFM
v.
LEROY D. BACA, Sheriff of Los Angeles MEMORANDUM*
County; SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. King, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 16, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: FARRIS and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges, and ROBART, District
Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable James L. Robart, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
Petitioner-Appellant Stephanie Ilene Lazarus is held on bail of $10 million
while awaiting her trial for murder in California state court. She appeals the
district court’s dismissal of her petition for writ of habeas corpus, which
challenged her detention as a violation of the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and due process. The district court
concluded that the Younger abstention doctrine required dismissal. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and review de novo the district court’s
decision to apply Younger abstention. Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106,
1109 (9th Cir. 2005). For the following reasons, we affirm.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court established
that a federal court generally must abstain from hearing a case that would enjoin or
otherwise interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings. Absent limited
exceptions, Younger abstention is required if four elements are met: (1) state
proceedings are ongoing; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state
interests; (3) the state proceedings provide the federal litigant an adequate
opportunity to raise the federal claims; and (4) the federal proceedings would
interfere with the state proceedings in a way that Younger disapproves. San Jose
Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose,
546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008); AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d
1143, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2007).
The district court correctly found that Younger abstention required dismissal
of Lazarus’s habeas petition. First, the parties agree that the state criminal
proceedings are ongoing. Second, the state criminal proceedings implicate
important state interests. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986); Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 585 (1979); Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Third, Lazarus
“had an ‘adequate’ or ‘full and fair’ opportunity to raise [her] federal claims in the
state proceedings.” Commc’ns Telesys. Int’l v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 196 F.3d
1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1999); see Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425 (1979); Dubinka
v. Judges of the Superior Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 224-25 (9th Cir. 1994). “Younger
requires only the absence of ‘procedural bars’ to raising a federal claim in the state
proceedings.” Commc’ns Telesys. Int’l, 196 F.3d at 1020. The parties agree that
Lazarus was permitted the opportunity to raise her federal constitutional claims
before the California Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal, and the
California Supreme Court. There is no suggestion that the state proceedings did
not afford Lazarus an adequate opportunity to assert the legal claims presented in
her habeas petition. Fourth, Lazarus’s habeas petition threatens to interfere with
the state criminal proceedings in a manner that Younger disapproves by inserting
federal courts into the ordinary course of state criminal proceedings, with the
attendant risk that Lazarus, if released on lower bail, may not appear at trial. Cf.
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500-02 (1974); Suggs v. Brannon, 804 F.2d 274,
279 (4th Cir. 1986); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. Unit A June
1981); Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400, 405-06 (2d Cir. 1975).
Additionally, Lazarus has neither argued nor shown that an exception to
Younger abstention applies. Exceptions to Younger abstention exist where there is
a “showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that
would make abstention inappropriate.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982); see Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd.,
332 F.3d 613, 621 (9th Cir. 2003). Without more, we decline to fashion an
exception to Younger abstention on the facts of this appeal.
In sum, on our de novo review, we conclude that Younger abstention
requires dismissal of Lazarus’s habeas petition.
AFFIRMED.