United States v. Raymond Camacho , 612 F. App'x 437 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 13 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-30008
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:11-cr-00298-BLW-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RAYMOND CAMACHO, AKA Jesus
Mendoza-Nunez,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 8, 2015**
Seattle, Washington
Before: WALLACE, KLEINFELD, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Raymond Camacho pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute a
controlled substance after he was arrested driving a car with over 50 grams of
methamphetamine hidden in the car. In exchange for pleading guilty, the remaining
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
charges in his indictment were dismissed, and he waived his right to appeal the
sentence imposed. Camacho subsequently filed a motion to dismiss his counsel,
which the district court granted, and to withdraw his plea agreement, which the
district court denied. The district court sentenced Camacho to thirty years in prison.
Camacho appeals, arguing that he is innocent of the charge, and that intimidation
and misrepresentations of the law by his attorney rendered his guilty plea invalid.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
The “circumstances surrounding the signing and entry of [Camacho’s] plea
agreement” indicate that Camacho knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
appeal the denial of his motion withdrawing his guilty plea. United States v.
Anglin, 215 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d
1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011). Camacho’s statements made “during a guilty plea
hearing carry a strong presumption of veracity in subsequent proceedings attacking
the plea.” United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008).
At his first change of plea hearing, Camacho stated that he did not know
what kind or quantity of drugs were in the car, contrary to the written guilty plea.
Based on those statements, the magistrate judge would not accept the guilty plea at
that time. At the second change of plea hearing, the court explained to Camacho in
detail, through an interpreter, the nature of the same guilty plea and what would
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occur at a trial. The court asked Camacho several times whether he understood his
options and the terms of the plea agreement. Camacho confirmed that he had read
the plea agreement and discussed it with his attorney, and agreed with the court
that he had been caught with drugs. The court asked Camacho whether he “knew
that there was methamphetamine in the vehicle,” and Camacho answered
affirmatively. When asked if he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation,
Camacho replied, “Yes.” In signing his plea agreement, Camacho acknowledged
that no one had made any threats or promises to him, or had forced him to plead
guilty.
Camacho now asserts that he did not understand the plea agreement and that
his attorney intimidated him which resulted in his guilty plea. These claims directly
contradict the record. When an inconsistency exists in the record regarding a
defendant’s plea colloquy and his subsequent claims that the plea is invalid, there
are sufficient grounds to consider the latter statements incredible. See United
States v. Erlenborn, 483 F.2d 165, 167 (9th Cir. 1973).
The district court’s findings that there is a factual basis for Camacho’s guilty
plea and that he entered it voluntarily with full knowledge of the consequences
were not clearly erroneous. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to withdraw the plea.
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AFFIRMED.
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