Natalia Sidiakina v. James Bertoli , 612 F. App'x 477 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 09 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NATALIA A. SIDIAKINA, No. 12-17235
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-03157-JSW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JAMES G. BERTOLI, Judge; ROBERT S.
BOYD, Judge; SUPERIOR COURT OF
SONOMA COUNTY; IGNAZIO
RUVOLO, Judge; CALIFORNIA COURT
OF APPEAL, First Appellate District,
Division 4; JUDICIAL BRANCH OF
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT; STATE
OF CALIFORNIA,; JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 12, 2014
San Francisco, California
Before: FISHER, RAWLINSON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Natalia Sidiakina (Sidiakina) appeals the district court’s dismissal of her
action under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against the
Superior Court of Sonoma County and related defendants. The district court
dismissed Sidiakina’s entire complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1
Sidiakina appeals the dismissal of her claim that the California state courts’ policy
of refusing to appoint counsel as an accommodation for qualified individuals with
cognitive disabilities violated the ADA. Sidiakina concedes that the district court
properly dismissed a majority of her allegations under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. However, Sidiakina contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
preclude her prospective challenge to the state courts’ policy.
Even assuming the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude Sidiakina’s
prospective challenge, we affirm the district court’s order of dismissal because
Sidiakina lacks standing to bring this claim. Dismissal was proper because
Sidiakina lacks standing to challenge the alleged policy against appointment of
counsel. It is a well-established principle of law that a party seeking to
demonstrate standing must assert an injury that is “actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.” McCormack v. Herzog, 788 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir.
2015) (citation omitted). Here, the record reflects that Sidiakina’s divorce
1
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 463-64 (1983).
2
proceedings concluded in 2011. Because Sidiakina is challenging a court rule and
its accompanying policies, she “must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a
direct injury as a result of the [rule’s] operation or enforcement.” Id. (citations
omitted). This she cannot do because she no longer has any matter pending in the
Sonoma County courts.
In an effort to preserve standing, Sidiakina proffered on appeal that she may re-
engage with the state court system at some point in the future “to either enforce or
modify a court order in her divorce proceedings,” at which point she will be denied
counsel as a disability accommodation. Even if Sidiakina were permitted leave to
amend her complaint to include this allegation, the threat of injury she alleges is too
remote and speculative to confer standing. Cf. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal. v.
Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that injury
was “too speculative” where “there was . . . little indication in the record that the
plaintiffs had firm intentions to take action that would trigger the challenged
governmental action.”). Because Sidiakina lacks standing the district court correctly
concluded that it was without jurisdiction to adjudicate her case. See Braunstein v.
Ariz. Dept. of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2012). We therefore affirm
the district court’s judgment. See id.
AFFIRMED.
3