United States v. Mark Skiles , 515 F. App'x 682 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                                FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               APR 16 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                 )      No. 12-30055
    )
    Plaintiff – Appellee,               )      D.C. No. 3:11-cr-05232-BHS-2
    )
    v.                                  )      MEMORANDUM *
    )
    MARK SKILES,                              )
    )
    Defendant – Appellant.              )
    )
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 5, 2013
    Seattle, Washington
    Before:        FERNANDEZ, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    Mark Skiles appeals his conviction for unlicensed dealing in firearms 1 and
    for conspiracy to so deal.2 We affirm.
    (1)      Skiles first asserts that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    1
    See 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (a)(1)(A).
    2
    See 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    .
    verdict. We disagree. We have carefully reviewed the record, and it is apparent
    that the evidence was sufficient to establish the elements of the offenses of dealing
    in firearms without a license3 and conspiracy so to do 4 beyond a reasonable doubt.5
    Simply put, there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate beyond a reasonable
    doubt that Skiles willfully engaged in the business of dealing in firearms without a
    federal firearms license, and that he conspired to do so. It is apparent that the jury
    credited the testimony of his former partner and the agents, together with the other
    evidence, rather than his testimony. We reject his invitation to reject that jury
    determination. See United States v. Alvarez, 
    358 F.3d 1194
    , 1201–02 (9th Cir.
    2004); Leonard v. United States, 
    324 F.2d 911
    , 913 (9th Cir. 1963). There was no
    error, much less plain error.
    3
    See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 921
    (a)(11)(A), (a)(21)(C), (a)(22), 922(a)(1)(A); Bryan v.
    United States, 
    524 U.S. 184
    , 191–92, 
    118 S. Ct. 1939
    , 1945, 
    141 L. Ed. 2d 197
    (1998); United States v. Breier, 
    813 F.2d 212
    , 213–14 (9th Cir. 1987); United
    States v. Angelini, 
    607 F.2d 1305
    , 1309 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Van
    Buren, 
    593 F.2d 125
    , 126 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
    4
    See supra note 3; 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    ; United States v. Rizk, 
    660 F.3d 1125
    ,
    1134 (9th Cir. 2011).
    5
    See Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789, 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
     (1979); United States v. Nevils, 
    598 F.3d 1158
    , 1163–65 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (en banc). We note that because the issue was not properly preserved at trial, our
    review is for plain error. See United States v. Cruz, 
    554 F.3d 840
    , 844 (9th Cir.
    2009); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).
    2
    (2)    Skiles also claims that § 922(a)(1)(A) is unconstitutionally vague. On
    this record,6 we are unable to say that as applied to the facts and circumstances of
    this case,7 the statute is unduly vague. Skiles was sufficiently informed of its
    standards; indeed, the evidence was sufficient to establish that he knew that his
    activities were illegal.
    AFFIRMED.
    6
    See United States v. Naghani, 
    361 F.3d 1255
    , 1259 (9th Cir. 2004) (de novo
    review).
    7
    See United States v. Harris, 
    705 F.3d 929
    , __, 
    2013 WL 174372
    , at *2 (9th
    Cir. Jan. 14, 2013); United States v. Broncheau, 
    597 F.2d 1260
    , 1263 (9th Cir.
    1979); see also Naghani, 
    361 F.3d at
    1259–61.
    3