United States v. Harold Spear, III ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                           FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            JUN 05 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 12-10124
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 1:08-cr-00128-DAE-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    HAROLD C. SPEAR, III, M.D.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 12-10125
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 1:07-cr-00299-DAE-1
    v.
    HAROLD C. SPEAR, III, M.D.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Hawaii
    David A. Ezra, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 8, 2013
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, and FISHER and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Harold Spear appeals his conviction by guilty plea to five counts of
    knowingly and intentionally distributing controlled substances outside the usual
    course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose. We have
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.1
    1. There was no plain error in the change of plea colloquy. Spear admitted
    dispensing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional medical
    practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose. That is sufficient to establish
    illegal distribution. See United States v. Black, 
    512 F.2d 864
    , 866 & n.2, 868 (9th
    Cir. 1975).
    2. There was a sufficient factual basis to support Spear’s guilty plea. See
    United States v. Neel, 
    547 F.2d 95
    , 96 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). Spear admitted
    that he prescribed controlled substances without conducting a face-to-face visit or
    obtaining any objective data supporting the prescription, and that he signed
    prescriptions in blank. When his staff issued a prescription using these blank
    forms, the patient was charged between $60 and $100 in cash or credit card
    payments. Because “[c]ulpable intent . . . can be inferred from the defendant’s
    conduct and from the surrounding circumstances,” United States v. Bucher, 375
    1
    In a concurrently filed opinion, we conclude that the appellate waiver in
    Spear’s plea agreement does not preclude our review of the merits of this appeal.
    
    2 F.3d 929
    , 934 (9th Cir. 2004), there was a sufficient factual basis for Spear’s guilty
    plea. See also United States v. Feingold, 
    454 F.3d 1001
    , 1008 (9th Cir. 2006).
    3. The government did not breach the plea agreement by introducing
    uncharged prescriptions as evidence of relevant conduct during the sentencing
    hearing. The government did not explicitly promise to limit relevant conduct to
    the counts that were charged but dismissed, and Spear never objected to the
    admission of these uncharged prescriptions, either during the sentencing hearing or
    in his motions to withdraw his guilty plea.
    4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Spear’s motion
    to withdraw his guilty plea. The court applied the correct standard of review, held
    an evidentiary hearing and carefully considered but rejected the arguments
    supporting Spear’s motion. See United States v. Davis, 
    428 F.3d 802
    , 806 (9th Cir.
    2005). The court properly considered Spear’s delay in filing that motion to
    evaluate the credibility of his stated reasons for seeking to withdraw his plea.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-10124, 12-10125

Judges: Kozinski, Fisher, Watford

Filed Date: 6/5/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/2/2024