Sharon Everson v. Carolyn W. Colvin , 577 F. App'x 743 ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 06 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHARON L. EVERSON, No. 13-35072
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-05960-RBL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 3, 2014**
Seattle, Washington
Before: GOODWIN, McKEOWN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
1. Substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ)
conclusion that Ms. Everson did not have the severe medically determinable
physical impairments of fibromyalgia or chronic pain syndrome. See 20 C.F.R.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Page 2 of 4
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). None of Everson’s treating or examining physicians
definitively diagnosed either condition. Moreover, two of the doctors who
suggested Everson might suffer from either condition concluded that she was, in
any event, not significantly impaired. Even if the ALJ erred at this stage, any error
was harmless. The ALJ explained that he considered Everson’s subjective
experience and reports of symptoms related to chronic pain and fibromyalgia in
assessing her residual functional capacity.
2. The ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination was supported by
substantial evidence. First, the ALJ provided several specific and legitimate
reasons for his rejection of the controverted opinions of Drs. Tomski and Havsy,
properly “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting
clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Cotton
v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), superseded by statute
on other grounds as recognized in Bunnell v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th
Cir. 1990). The ALJ reasoned, for example, that both opinions were inconsistent
with Everson’s treatment record over time as well as the opinions of at least three
examining physicians and the state’s medical expert.
Nor did the ALJ err in weighing the remaining expert evidence. Everson
argues that the ALJ erred in failing to explicitly discuss certain test results, clinical
Page 3 of 4
findings, and treatment notes made by seven other doctors, a chiropractor, and a
physical therapist. But the ALJ did discuss all of the expert opinions, both by
reference to exhibit numbers and through detailed discussions of the doctors’ key
conclusions. An ALJ “need not discuss all evidence presented to her.” Vincent ex
rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(emphasis removed). Rather, an ALJ need only “summarize[] the facts and
conflicting clinical evidence in detailed and thorough fashion, stating his
interpretation and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th
Cir. 1989). The ALJ amply fulfilled this requirement.
3. The ALJ offered specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting
Everson’s testimony about the intensity and limiting effects of her symptoms. See
Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the objective
medical record conflicted with Everson’s testimony. “Contradiction with the
medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective
testimony.” Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th
Cir. 2008). Second, the ALJ identified several inconsistencies between Everson’s
daily activities and her testimony. For example, Everson testified that she could
not use her hands for gross or fine manipulation, but she also testified that she
regularly grips a steering wheel when driving, uses a cane, and uses her hands for
Page 4 of 4
dressing and grooming. As the ALJ observed, Everson’s ability to use her hands
was relevant to her ability to perform past relevant work as an office assistant.
4. The additional evidence submitted by Everson to the Appeals Council
after the ALJ issued his decision does not change our conclusion that, “in light of
the record as a whole, the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence
and was free of legal error.” Taylor v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228,
1232 (9th Cir. 2011). Dr. Wohns ultimately recommended only that Everson
obtain further evaluation, while Dr. Steinitz concluded that any abnormalities he
detected through electromagnetic study were “unimpressive.” Neither expert
identified additional limitations caused by Everson’s conditions.
AFFIRMED.