Deshon Britt v. Dave Davey , 616 F. App'x 336 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    SEP 22 2015
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DESHON BRITT,                                     No. 13-56040
    Petitioner - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01160-SJO-PLA
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    DAVE DAVEY, Acting Warden,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted September 2, 2015
    Pasadena, California
    Before: GRABER, RAWLINSON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    Deshon Britt (Britt) appeals the district court’s denial of habeas relief under
    28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
    “Under Jackson [v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979)], evidence is
    sufficient to support a conviction so long as after viewing the evidence in the light
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Boyer v. Chappell,
    
    793 F.3d 1092
    , 1101 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted) (emphasis in the original). Because Britt filed his habeas petition after the
    enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
    we may grant relief only if the California Court of Appeal—which issued the last
    reasoned state-court decision in this case—applied Jackson in an “objectively
    unreasonable” fashion. Long v. Johnson, 
    736 F.3d 891
    , 896 (9th Cir. 2013), cert.
    denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 2843
    (2014) (citation omitted). When reviewing cases under
    Jackson and AEDPA, “there is a double dose of deference that can rarely be
    surmounted.” Boyer v. Belleque, 
    659 F.3d 957
    , 964 (9th Cir. 2011).
    The California Court of Appeal’s determination that sufficient evidence
    supported Britt’s conviction for first-degree murder under an aiding and abetting
    theory was not “objectively unreasonable.” 
    Long, 736 F.3d at 896
    . A rational jury
    could have concluded that Britt shared the intent of co-defendant Milton Jones
    (Jones) to murder Aaron Patterson (Patterson), a member of the rival gang 8 Trey
    Gangster Crip, and that Britt knew Jones possessed a gun. First, there was
    testimony that Britt and Jones were members of the 99 Watts Mafia Crip gang who
    regularly spent time together at a liquor store in their gang’s territory, including on
    2
    the day of the shooting. See People v. Godinez, 
    2 Cal. App. 4th 492
    , 500 (1992)
    (“Godinez admitted having associated with the gang members for several years,
    and further admitted riding around in a van with the attackers for several hours
    before the assault, permitting an inference he was aware they possessed knives that
    night.”). Second, Britt exited the liquor store and initiated contact with Patterson
    by asking Patterson, “Where are you from?” The question was a “confrontational”
    way of asking Patterson about his gang membership. Patterson and Britt then
    stated their respective gang affiliations. Rather than ending contact with Patterson
    after this exchange, Britt returned to the liquor store and re-emerged with Jones,
    who was armed. Together, they confronted Patterson again.
    Third, there is no indication that Britt was surprised or displeased when
    Jones pulled out a gun and aimed it at Patterson. See People v. Campbell, 25 Cal.
    App. 4th 402, 409 (1994) (jury could reasonably conclude that defendant aided and
    abetted when, inter alia, there was no evidence that defendant was surprised by, or
    feared interfering with, the main perpetrator’s conduct). Rather, Britt stood near
    Jones as Jones fired, before fleeing the scene with Jones. See People v. Medina,
    
    209 P.3d 105
    , 113 (Cal. 2009) (“[F]actors suggesting aiding and abetting include[]
    presence at the scene, companionship, and conduct before and after the crime,
    including flight. . . .”) (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
    3
    In telephone calls from jail, Britt did not profess his innocence. Nor did
    Britt express surprise that Jones had a gun or that Jones killed Patterson instead of
    only assaulting him. Rather, Britt expressed regret that he did not remove his
    clothing to avoid detection by the police.
    A rational jury could conclude that Britt premeditated and deliberated when
    he walked away from Patterson, re-entered the liquor store, left with Jones, and
    confronted Patterson with a fellow armed gang member. Britt also had motive to
    kill because the reply of “8 Trey” to the question, “Where are you from?” was
    “disrespectful” to 99 Mafia gang members. Even if evidence presented at trial
    could yield another inference, we “must respect the exclusive province of the jury
    to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw
    reasonable inferences from proven facts[.]” Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 
    747 F.3d 789
    , 795 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 
    135 S. Ct. 676
    (2014) (citation omitted).
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-56040

Citation Numbers: 616 F. App'x 336

Filed Date: 9/22/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023