Mark Wilson v. Candace Wheeler , 584 F. App'x 365 ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 30 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARK JAMES WILSON, No. 12-36006
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 6:11-cv-06105-TC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CANDACE E. WHEELER, Member,
Oregon Board of Parole-Post Prison
Supervision, (Board); et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ann Aiken, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 22, 2014**
Before: GOODWIN, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Oregon state prisoner Mark James Wilson appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants
violated his constitutional rights in connection with his hearing before the Oregon
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th
Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Thompson v.
Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s constitutional claims against
defendants in their official capacities because those claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir.
2007) (state officials sued for damages in their official capacities are entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 67-69
(1985) (distinguishing claims for prospective and retrospective relief and
explaining that claims for retrospective relief are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment).
To the extent that Wilson sought prospective injunctive relief with regard to
his informational privacy claim, dismissal of that claim was proper because Wilson
failed to state a claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010)
(though pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present
factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also United
States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “there is no
2 12-36006
authority for the proposition that a defendant’s preference that his personal history
be kept personal justifies denial of public access to criminal proceedings”); Seaton
v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 534-35 (9th Cir. 2010) (imprisonment results in “the
circumscription or loss of many significant rights,” in particular a loss of privacy in
prison treatment records).
AFFIRMED.
3 12-36006