Michael Gummo Bear v. Pierce County , 529 F. App'x 866 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            JUN 20 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MICHAEL ANTHONY GUMMO, AKA                       No. 11-35387
    Michael Chiofar, AKA Michael Anthony
    Gummo Bear,                                      D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05227-BHS
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    MEMORANDUM *
    v.
    PIERCE COUNTY, All its agents and
    Employees; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 18, 2013 **
    Before:        TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    Michael Anthony Gummo, aka Michael Chiofar, aka Michael Anthony
    Gummo Bear, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his civil rights
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    action. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a
    dismissal for failure to state a claim, Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-42 (9th
    Cir. 2010), and we affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Gummo’s 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claims
    against defendants City of Seattle, King County, and Pierce County because
    Gummo failed to allege facts demonstrating that any alleged federal constitutional
    violations resulted from an official custom, policy, or a failure to train. See Galen
    v. County of Los Angeles, 
    477 F.3d 652
    , 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing
    requirements for municipal liability under § 1983).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gummo’s motion
    for appointment of counsel because Gummo failed to demonstrate exceptional
    circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 
    560 F.3d 965
    , 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
    forth standard of review and requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for
    appointment of counsel).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gummo’s motions
    for reconsideration because Gummo failed to establish any ground for such relief.
    See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 
    5 F.3d 1255
    , 1262-63
    (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and discussing grounds for
    reconsideration).
    2                                    11-35387
    Gummo’s contentions concerning the guardian ad litem appointed by the
    district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) and alleged violations of due process are
    unpersuasive.
    We do not consider arguments concerning claims that were not included in
    Gummo’s complaint, including the negligence claims. See Dream Palace v.
    County of Maricopa, 
    384 F.3d 990
    , 1005 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining the reasoning
    for not considering arguments that were not raised before the district court).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                      11-35387