Haas Automation, Inc. v. Brian Denny , 521 F. App'x 626 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              MAY 28 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    HAAS AUTOMATION, INC.                            No. 11-56991
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:09-cv-08336-CBM-
    PLA
    v.
    BRIAN DENNY, an individual;                      MEMORANDUM *
    CNCPROS.NET, INC., an Idaho
    corporation; AUTOMATED
    SOLUTIONS, INC., an Idaho corporation
    Defendants - Appellants,
    ___________________
    ASI MACHINE AND SUPPLY, an
    unknown entity,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Consuelo B. Marshall, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 9, 2013
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Before: WARDLAW and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge.**
    Defendants Brian Denny, CNCPros.net, Inc. (“CNCPros”), and Automated
    Solutions, Inc. (“ASI”) appeal the district court’s order awarding attorneys’ fees to
    Haas Automation, Inc. (“Haas”) and denying them to CNCPros and ASI. The
    order followed a jury verdict in favor of Haas on claims under the
    Anticybersquatting and Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”). We affirm.
    Under the Lanham Act, “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award
    reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 
    15 U.S.C. § 1117
    (a) (2006). An
    exceptional case is one “where the acts of infringement can be characterized as
    ‘malicious’, ‘fraudulent’, ‘deliberate’, or ‘willful’.” Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
    Baccarat Clothing Co., 
    692 F.2d 1272
    , 1276 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting S. Rep. No.
    93-1400, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 7133). We also have
    held that “[e]xceptional circumstances can be found when the non-prevailing
    party’s case is groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith.”
    Gracie v. Gracie, 
    217 F.3d 1060
    , 1071 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted); see also Earthquake Sound Corp. v. Bumper Indus., 
    352 F.3d 1210
    , 1217 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hile a finding that the losing party has acted
    in bad faith may provide evidence that the case is exceptional, other exceptional
    **
    The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the U.S. Court of
    International Trade, sitting by designation.
    2
    circumstances may warrant a fee award.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Considering all of the circumstances of this case, including the jury's verdict,
    Watec Co. v. Liu, 
    403 F.3d 645
    , 656 (9th Cir. 2005), we agree with the district
    court that the threshold standard for awarding fees has been met, and further that
    the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees.1
    Turning to the claim for attorneys’ fees raised by ASI and CNCPros, even if
    ASI and CNCPros were determined to be “prevailing parties” within the meaning
    of the Lanham Act, Haas’ actions would not have made this an exceptional case.
    Denny concedes that he is the sole owner of ASI and “the president of CNCPros,
    his closely-held corporation, and was essentially the only person acting on behalf
    of CNCPros when he registered the domains in CNCPros’s name.” Because Haas’
    ACPA claims against ASI and CNCPros were not groundless, unreasonable,
    vexatious, or brought in bad faith, ASI and CNCPros are not eligible for an award
    of attorneys’ fees.
    In its brief, Haas seeks attorneys’ fees on appeal, pursuant to Ninth Circuit
    Rule 39-1. Although Denny’s appeal was ultimately unsuccessful, it raised serious
    questions of law regarding the standards for awarding attorneys’ fees in an ACPA
    1
    We deny Haas’ request for judicial notice because it does not satisfy
    the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Fed. R. Evid. 201 (“The court
    may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute . . . .”).
    3
    case. See U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 
    793 F.2d 1034
    , 1044 (9th Cir. 1986)
    (highlighting the “difficult issues” raised on appeal in deciding not to award
    appellate attorneys’ fees). Accordingly, we do not award Haas attorneys’ fees on
    appeal.
    AFFIRMED.
    4