Einstein Cosmetics, Llc v. Cvs Caremark Corp. , 524 F. App'x 337 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          APR 30 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    EINSTEIN COSMETICS, LLC,                )      No. 11-56147
    )
    Plaintiff – Appellant,            )      D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00640-AHM-AGR
    )
    v.                                )      MEMORANDUM *
    )
    CVS CAREMARK CORP.;                     )
    CVS PHARMACY, INC.,                     )
    )
    Defendants – Appellees.           )
    )
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    A. Howard Matz, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 8, 2013 **
    Pasadena, California
    Before:      FERNANDEZ, RAWLINSON, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Einstein Cosmetics, LLC (“Einstein”) appeals the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment and terminating sanctions in favor of CVS Pharmacy, Inc. and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
    argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    CVS Caremark Corp. (collectively “CVS”). We affirm.
    (1)      Einstein first asserts that the district court erred when it determined
    that Einstein’s complaint must be dismissed because the person who purported to
    file and pursue the action had no authority to do so on Einstein’s behalf. We
    disagree. The evidence before the court made it plain that Einstein was an LLC so
    structured that sole “management [was] vested in only one manager,” 1 a
    requirement that could not be changed absent an amendment to the articles of
    organization.2 The evidence showed that Shalant was not that manager,3 and had
    no authority to bring an action on behalf of Einstein. In short, he was not an agent
    of Einstein for that purpose. See S. Sacramento Drayage Co. v. Campbell Soup
    Co., 
    220 Cal. App. 2d 851
    , 856, 
    34 Cal. Rptr. 137
    , 139–40 (1963). On appeal it is
    suggested that this was a stockholder’s derivative4 action on behalf of Einstein.
    However, that issue was not raised before the district court and is waived. See
    Crawford v. Lungren, 
    96 F.3d 380
    , 389 n.6 (9th Cir. 1996). Moreover, we note
    that the prerequisites to filing a derivative action were never pled. See Cal. Corp.
    1
    
    Cal. Corp. Code § 17151
    (b).
    2
    
    Id.
     § 17054(c)(2).
    3
    Nor was he the Chief Executive Officer.
    4
    See 
    Cal. Corp. Code § 17501
    ; see also Paclink Commc’ns Int’l, Inc. v.
    Superior Court, 
    90 Cal. App. 4th 958
    , 963–64, 
    109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436
    , 439 (2001).
    2
    Code § 17501(a)(2); see also 
    Cal. Corp. Code § 800
    (b); Potter v. Hughes, 
    546 F.3d 1051
    , 1055 (9th Cir. 2008); Bader v. Anderson, 
    179 Cal. App. 4th 775
    , 782–83,
    
    101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821
    , 826–27 (2009).
    (2)    Einstein then argues that the district court erred when it granted
    terminating sanctions as to CVS’s counterclaim because of Einstein’s discovery
    violations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(i), (b)(2)(A)(vi); see also Leon v. IDX
    Sys. Corp., 
    464 F.3d 951
    , 958 (9th Cir. 2006).5 Again, we disagree.6 While the
    district court did not expressly find bad faith on Einstein’s part,7 the apparent
    refusal of Einstein to produce its manager and CEO — the most important
    witnesses to the arrangement with CVS — for their depositions and its failure to
    otherwise comply with its discovery obligations were redolent of bad faith.8
    Especially in light of the lack of opposition at the district court and the whole
    flavor and course of the litigation before it, we cannot say that the district court
    5
    While the district court referred to its inherent power, it is not clear that it
    relied upon that power separately.
    6
    We note that Einstein did not oppose the motion for terminating sanctions,
    but now, surprisingly, appeals their grant.
    7
    See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 
    482 F.3d 1091
    , 1096 (9th Cir. 2007).
    8
    See Virtual Vision, Inc. v. Praegitzer Indus., Inc., 
    124 F.3d 1140
    , 1143–44
    (9th Cir. 1997).
    3
    abused its discretion 9 when it applied the five-factor test that the district courts
    must use in determining whether a terminating sanction is appropriate.10
    Moreover, the district court’s determination that lesser sanctions would not be
    effective is not specifically disputed on appeal,11 and it cannot be doubted that the
    inability to obtain discovery would be prejudicial to CVS’s presentation of its case.
    On this record, we are unable to hold that the district court erred.
    AFFIRMED.
    9
    See Leon, 
    464 F.3d at
    957–58; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage
    Distribs., 
    69 F.3d 337
    , 348 (9th Cir. 1995).
    10
    See Conn. Gen., 
    482 F.3d at 1096
    ; Valley Eng’rs Inc. v. Elec. Eng’g Co.,
    
    158 F.3d 1051
    , 1057 (9th Cir. 1998).
    11
    Einstein’s general comment that none of the five factors applies is not “a
    viable argument on appeal.” Alcock v. Small Bus. Admin. (In re Alcock), 
    50 F.3d 1456
    , 1461 n.9 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 
    229 F.3d 917
    , 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000).
    4