United States v. Charles Chaney ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 10 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-30349
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:11-cr-00010-HRH-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CHARLES CHANEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
H. Russel Holland, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 30, 2012 **
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Charles Chaney (“Chaney”) appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress two recorded interviews with police officers in their car. Chaney
argues that his statements, though voluntary, should have been suppressed under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, as the statements were the product of an
illegal police entry into his home. We review de novo the district court’s denial of
a motion to suppress evidence, and review for clear error underlying factual
findings. United States v. Bynum, 362 F.3d 574, 578 (9th Cir. 2004).
Voluntary statements should be suppressed where officers confront the
suspect with illegally obtained evidence, or where the defendant’s answers during
questioning may have been “induced or influenced by the illegal search.” United
States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2011). Chaney’s statements were
not a “product of the initial illegal search.” Id. at 1159. The police discovered
sufficient evidence prior to the illegal search that rendered the evidence discovered
in Chaney’s home de minimis. See United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 968, 972 (9th
Cir. 1975). Officer Arthur Dull testified that he recognized Chaney on sight in the
patrol car. A still-warm all terrain vehicle with a stolen police radar gun was
parked outside Chaney’s home. Chaney was aware that the police had this
information when he voluntarily decided to speak to the police and to deny
involvement in the theft. Chaney did not change his story when confronted with
additional physical evidence obtained in the home. Finally, in the first interview,
no mention was made of the evidence from the illegal search, and in the second
interview, a single reference to the evidence did not change Chaney’s story and
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was redacted before the recording was played for the jury. Thus, the circumstances
surrounding Chaney’s statements indicate that they were not induced by the
search. The district court properly denied the suppression motion.
Chaney also appeals the district court’s denial of his request for a mistrial.
He argues that the agent’s inadmissible opinion testimony that Chaney appeared
“nervous and untruthful” was prejudicial and willful. We review for abuse of
discretion a district court’s denial of a mistrial request. United States v.
Washington, 462 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2006). Reversal is warranted when the
defendant shows that “the misconduct materially affected the verdict.” United
States v. Tucker, 641 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2011).
The agent’s statement was not prejudicial and did not affect the verdict.
Chaney admitted that he was involved in the vehicle theft. The jury heard
testimony from several credible witnesses regarding Chaney’s use of the police
officer’s firearm. The jury also heard several phone calls during which Chaney
discussed the theft. Finally, the judge properly admonished the jury regarding the
agent’s testimony. A jury is presumed to follow the district court’s curative
instructions. Doe ex. rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1270 (9th Cir.
2000). Taking the context of the trial as a whole, we conclude that the district
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court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial because the
agent’s testimony did not materially impact the verdict.
AFFIRMED.
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