United States v. Mark Forrester , 496 F. App'x 733 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               OCT 23 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 11-50193
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 3:01-cr-03177-W-2
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    MARK STEPHEN FORRESTER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Thomas J. Whelan, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 11, 2012 **
    Pasadena, California
    Before: KLEINFELD and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and QUIST, Senior
    District Judge.***
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for Western Michigan, sitting by designation.
    Mark Stephen Forrester appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy
    to manufacture and distribute ecstasy in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    , 841(a)(1).
    He raises two arguments. We address each in turn and affirm.
    We review de novo the district court’s decision to preclude Forrester from
    presenting the defense that ecstasy should not be a Schedule I controlled substance.
    United States v. Forrester, 
    616 F.3d 929
    , 934 (9th Cir. 2010) [Forrester II].
    Forrester II has already decided this issue, holding that “substantive collateral
    attacks on permanent scheduling orders are impermissible in criminal cases where
    defendants’ sentences will be determined by those scheduling orders.” 
    Id. at 937
    .
    Forrester II is the law of the circuit and the law of the case. See Gonzalez v.
    Arizona, 
    677 F.3d 383
    , 389 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). All of Forrester’s
    controlled substance scheduling arguments, including this one, were either decided
    explicitly or addressed by necessary implication in Forrester II. See United States
    v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 
    235 F.3d 443
    , 452 (9th Cir. 2000).
    We review factual findings related to the estimated yield of seized drug-
    making materials for clear error. Forrester II, 
    616 F.3d at 935
    . The district court
    found the government’s expert credible, and chose not to believe Forrester’s
    2
    calculations. It did not clearly err in accepting the government’s ecstasy yield
    estimates instead of Forrester’s, nor did it ignore Forrester II’s instruction to select
    a calculation bringing less punishment when presented with two equally good
    measures. See 
    id. at 949
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-50193

Citation Numbers: 496 F. App'x 733

Judges: Kleinfeld, McKEOWN, Quist

Filed Date: 10/23/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023