Dayna Padula v. Robert Morris , 535 F. App'x 605 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             AUG 01 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DAYNA PADULA,                                     No. 11-17117
    Plaintiff - Appellant,              D.C. No. 2:05-cv-00411-MCE-
    EFB
    v.
    ROBERT MORRIS; et al.,                            MEMORANDUM*
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Morrison C. England, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted April 16, 2013
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff Dayna Padula appeals the district court’s award of costs to the
    defendants following a jury verdict in favor of the defendants. We reverse and
    remand.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Padula argues that the district court erred when it failed to consider her
    indigence or inability to pay the award of costs because her declaration was
    unsigned. We agree. The record contained another copy of the declaration
    opposing costs and an IFP affidavit, both signed under penalty of perjury, when the
    district court ruled on costs and denied the IFP motions. Because the district court
    incorporated its ruling from the IFP order into the costs order and the IFP motions
    included evidence of Padula’s inability to pay, the district court should have
    considered her ability to pay costs. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 
    335 F.3d 932
    , 945 (9th Cir. 2003); Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 
    178 F.3d 1069
    , 1079-80
    (9th Cir. 1999). We express no opinion on whether the district court should or
    should not tax costs against Padula. The district court has discretion to refuse to
    tax costs.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion when it held that defendants’
    errors in the first bill of costs, which were immediately corrected after Padula’s
    objection, did not rise to the level of misconduct that warranted the punishment of
    a total denial of costs. Dawson v. City of Seattle, 
    435 F.3d 1054
    , 1071 (9th Cir.
    2006).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by taxing deposition transcript,
    PACER, and copy costs. Disallowance for expenses of depositions not used at trial
    2
    is within the district court's discretion. Wash. State Dep't of Transp. v. Wash.
    Natural Gas Co., 
    59 F.3d 793
    , 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Economics Laboratory,
    Inc. v. Donnolo, 
    612 F.2d 405
    , 411 (9th Cir.1979)). Thus, the district court was
    permitted to tax the costs in its discretion, even if the materials were not used at
    Padula’s trial. Sea Coast Foods, Inc. v. Lu-Mar Lobster & Shrimp, Inc., 
    260 F.3d 1054
    , 1061 (9th Cir. 2001).
    The district court abused its discretion by taxing $328.00, defendants’ half
    of the cost for airline tickets for the Padula and Feri depositions, because the
    parties agreed to split these costs. On remand, the district court should consider
    earlier agreements between the parties to pay costs if it taxes costs against Padula.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    3