United States v. Todd Horob , 407 F. App'x 228 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JAN 04 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 09-30445
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 1:08-cr-00093-RFC-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    TODD KENNETH HOROB,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Richard F. Cebull, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 3, 2010
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: ALDISERT, W. FLETCHER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.**
    Todd Kenneth Horob appeals from his conviction on seven counts of fraud-
    related crimes. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Horob’s conviction under
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge for the Third
    Circuit, sitting by designation.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1344
    , but we reverse his convictions under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1014
     and 18
    U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). We remand for resentencing in light of those reversals.1
    I.
    Horob’s opening brief challenged his convictions under Counts I, II, IV, V
    and VII and the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines. He also
    claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The government’s brief conceded that
    Horob’s conviction under Count VII for aggravated identity theft in furtherance of
    bankruptcy fraud, in violation of § 1028A(a)(1), was plain error because no such
    crime exists. We agree, and therefore reverse and remand for resentencing
    accordingly. Horob conceded at oral argument that his convictions under Counts
    IV and V, as well as his corresponding sentence, were proper. We agree, and thus
    affirm his convictions under those counts. He also conceded that his ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim is not yet ripe for review. We agree, and will not reach
    the question. As a result of these concessions, we must resolve only whether
    1
    The district court had jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3231
    . See United
    States v. Ratigan, 
    351 F.3d 957
    , 963 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that defects in the
    government’s evidence regarding a bank’s FDIC status go to the merits of the case,
    not to subject-matter jurisdiction). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    We review for plain error Horob’s convictions under § 1014 and § 1344 because
    Horob did not move for a directed verdict. See United States v. Cruz, 
    554 F.3d 840
    , 844-845 (9th Cir. 2009).
    2
    Horob’s convictions under § 1014 and § 1344 were plain error. We consider them
    in turn.
    A.
    Horob was convicted for making false statements to a federally insured
    bank, Wells Fargo, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1014
    . An element of the offense
    requires that the bank be “insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation”
    during the crime. § 1014; see also United States v. Ware, 
    416 F.3d 1118
    , 1121 (9th
    Cir. 2005). To prove during Horob’s 2009 trial that Wells Fargo was FDIC insured
    when he made false statements to it in 2006, the government offered no evidence
    beyond calling Wells Fargo employee Gerald Lundgren, who attested that the bank
    “is” federally insured. (E.R. 64.)
    Lundgren’s 2009 present-tense statement was not sufficient evidence for the
    jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Wells Fargo was FDIC insured when
    Horob misled it in 2006. See United States v. Ali, 
    266 F.3d 1242
    , 1244 (9th Cir.
    2001) (holding that present-tense trial testimony, years after the alleged offense,
    cannot establish that a bank was insured during the offense). Although the “totality
    of the trial evidence” may sometimes permit a jury to infer, based upon present-
    tense testimony in conjunction with other evidence, that a bank was federally
    3
    insured, e.g., Ware, 
    416 F.3d at 1122-23
    , this is not such a case. We therefore
    reverse Horob’s conviction under § 1014.
    B.
    Horob was also convicted of defrauding a federally insured bank, Dakota
    West, in violation of § 1344. To prove at Horob’s 2009 trial that Dakota West was
    federally insured when Horob defrauded it in April 2005, the government called
    Dakota West CEO Denton Zubke, who testified that the bank “is” federally
    insured. (E.R. 345.) The government also offered into evidence a receipt generated
    by Dakota West on March 31, 2005. In small print near the top of the receipt were
    the words: “Your Savings Federally Insured,” “NCUA,” and “National Credit
    Union Association, a U.S. Government Agency.”
    This exhibit makes this case a direct factual analogue to United States v.
    Allen, 
    88 F.3d 765
    , 769 (9th Cir. 1996), in which we held that trial exhibits dating
    to the time of the offense and stating “Member FDIC” were enough to establish
    that a bank was federally insured during the offense. In this case, the statement,
    “Your Savings Federally Insured,” appeared on the government’s exhibit, the date
    on which closely matched the timing of the alleged fraud. As in Allen, this
    evidence sufficed to support the jury’s verdict. We therefore affirm Horob’s
    conviction under § 1344.
    4
    We REVERSE Horob’s convictions under Count I and Count VII of his
    indictment, and we REMAND for resentencing accordingly. We AFFIRM
    Horob’s remaining convictions.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-30445

Citation Numbers: 407 F. App'x 228

Judges: Aldisert, Fisher, Fletcher

Filed Date: 1/4/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023