Darren Hilton v. Matthew Cate , 530 F. App'x 669 ( 2013 )

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                                                                             FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JUN 21 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DARREN ALEXES HILTON,                            No. 12-55932
Petitioner - Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:10-cv-02597-WQH-
WMC
v.
MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, California              MEMORANDUM *
Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitations,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 4, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: THOMAS, SILVERMAN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Darren Alexes Hilton appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus
petition, which challenges his convictions for forcible rape, pandering by
encouraging, forcible oral copulation, lewd acts upon a child fourteen or fifteen
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
years of age, and oral copulation of a person under eighteen years of age in
violation of California law, as well as related sentencing enhancements. We have
jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1291

, 2253(a). We affirm.
I
We review a state court's conclusion that the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes
were not motivated by purposeful discrimination in violation of Batson v.
Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79

 (1986), under the deferential standard set forth in

28 U.S.C. § 2254

(d)(2). Briggs v. Grounds,

682 F.3d 1165

, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012); Cook v.
LaMarque,

593 F.3d 810

, 816 (9th Cir. 2010); Ali v. Hickman,

584 F.3d 1174

,
1180–81 (9th Cir. 2009). Under that standard, we will uphold the state court’s
decision unless it was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254

(d)(2).
In evaluating habeas petitions premised on a Batson violation, “our standard is
doubly deferential: unless the state appellate court was objectively unreasonable in
concluding that a trial court’s credibility determination was supported by
substantial evidence, we must uphold it.” Briggs, 682 F.3d at 1170 (citing Rice v.
Collins,

546 U.S. 333

, 338–42 (2006)). This deference is owed because the
question of discriminatory intent “largely will turn on evaluation of credibility,”
and “evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and
2
credibility lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Hernandez v. New York,

500 U.S. 352

, 365 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Applying these standards to this case, we conclude that the district court
properly denied Hilton’s Batson claims. The California Court of Appeal concluded
that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination crediting the
prosecutor’s gender-neutral reasons for striking the four male prospective jurors.
Although some of the prosecutor’s reasons for striking these prospective jurors
appear questionable in hindsight, a court need not believe that “the stated reason
represents a sound strategic judgment” to find the prosecutor’s rationale
acceptable; rather, it need be convinced only that the justification “‘should be
believed.’” Kesser v. Cambra,

465 F.3d 351

, 359 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(quoting Hernandez,

500 U.S. at 365

). Even if “[r]easonable minds reviewing the
record might disagree about the prosecutor’s credibility, . . . on habeas review that
does not suffice to supersede the trial court's credibility determination.” Rice,

546 U.S. at

341–42. Thus, though we have some reason to doubt the prosecutor’s
credibility, the evidence of pretext was not so strong that the California court’s
decision to credit the prosecutor’s explanation for the peremptory strikes is an
unreasonable determination of the facts.
3
II
Assuming, without deciding, that the prosecutor committed misconduct in
his closing argument to the jury, Hilton failed to establish that the statement in
question “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a
denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright,

477 U.S. 168

, 181 (1986) (quoting
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,

416 U.S. 637

, 643 (1974)). The trial judge repeatedly
instructed the jury that the attorneys’ statements were not evidence, the
objectionable remark was but one sentence in a lengthy closing argument, and the
evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Therefore, the California Court of Appeal’s
denial of this claim did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law.

28 U.S.C. § 2254