Milaudi Karboau v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 514 F. App'x 697 ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 03 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MILAUDI KARBOAU, No. 10-72951
Petitioner, Agency No. A026-358-197
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 12, 2013 **
Before: PREGERSON, REINHARDT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Milaudi Karboau, a native and citizen of Morocco, petitions pro se for
review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his
appeal from a deportation order of an immigration judge (“IJ”). Our jurisdiction is
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law. Vargas-
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2007). We dismiss the
petition for review.
We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s deportation order because
Karboau’s convictions for first-degree theft by receiving under Oregon Revised
Statute § 164.095 constitute final convictions for aggravated-felony theft offenses
that render him deportable under former 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii). See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (restricting the court’s jurisdiction to review deportation
orders predicated on aggravated-felony convictions); see also Planes v. Holder,
652 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[The] definition of ‘conviction’ . . . requires
only that the trial court enter a formal judgment of guilt, without any requirement
that all direct appeals be exhausted or waived.”); Verdugo-Gonzalez v. Holder,
581 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The act of . . . receiving stolen property
knowing that it was stolen entails an exercise of control over the property without
consent and with the intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of
ownership . . . [and thus] fall[s] within the generic definition of theft.”). The
validity of these convictions is not properly before us. See Ramirez-Villalpando v.
Holder, 645 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A petitioner may not collaterally
attack his state court conviction on a petition for review of a BIA decision.”).
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The record does not support Karboau’s due process claims alleging IJ bias
and ineffective assistance of counsel. See Vargas-Hernandez, 497 F.3d at 926
(requiring a petitioner alleging IJ bias to show that the IJ harbored a “deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible”); Serrano v.
Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 2006) (“To assert a valid due process
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate prejudice;
namely, he must show that he has ‘plausible grounds for relief.’” (citation
omitted)). Consequently, Karboau’s due process claims are not sufficiently
colorable to invoke our jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). See Mendez-
Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To be colorable in this
context . . . , the claim must have some possible validity.” (citation omitted)).
Karboau’s challenges to the agency’s custody determination are not properly
before us because custody-redetermination hearings and deportation hearings are
separate proceedings, and challenges to those proceedings must be separately
exhausted. See Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011);
Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1247 (9th Cir. 2010).
The BIA’s decisions denying the motions to reopen and reconsider that
Karboau filed while this petition for review was pending are also not properly
before us in this petition for review. Cf. Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 981 n.1
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(9th Cir. 2007) (noting that denials of subsequent motions to reopen must be
separately appealed).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.
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