Lawrence Saccato v. Davis Law Firm ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 26 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAWRENCE JAMES SACCATO, No. 12-35133
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 6:10-cv-06244-HO
v.
MEMORANDUM *
DAVIS LAW FIRM; U.S. BANK
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION N.D.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael R. Hogan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 13, 2012 **
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Lawrence James Saccato appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) action alleging that defendant
U.S. Bank failed to conduct a reasonable investigation upon receiving notice that
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Saccato disputed whether he had held a U.S. Bank account as reflected on his
credit report. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
district court’s summary judgment, Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d
892, 896 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Saccato’s original complaint without
leave to amend because neither 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) nor the related 2010
Federal Trade Commission regulations provide a private right of action. See
Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c) (excluding violations of “subsection (a) of this section,
including any regulations issued thereunder” from the FCRA’s private enforcement
provisions).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Saccato’s claims
in his operative complaint, which are predicated on 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b),
because Saccato failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
defendant U.S. Bank conducted a reasonable investigation in light of Saccato’s
general dispute. See Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1157 (“The pertinent question is thus
whether the furnisher’s procedures were reasonable in light of what it learned
about the nature of the dispute from the description in the . . . notice of dispute.”).
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We do not address Saccato’s contention that U.S. Bank and its counsel
violated the FCRA during the pendency of this lawsuit because these claims are
unrelated to the allegations in the complaint. See Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d
380, 389 n.6 (9th Cir. 1996) (declining to address claims not raised in the
complaint).
AFFIRMED.
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