People v. Mata CA2/2 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 10/22/21 P. v. Mata CA2/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,                                                           B301460
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BA466152)
    v.
    ALFREDO MATA,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County. Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.
    Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
    for Defendant and Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Colleen M. Tiedemann,
    Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    ______________________
    Alfredo Mata appeals the judgment entered following a jury
    trial in which he was convicted of 12 counts of sexual abuse of his
    girlfriend’s two daughters, both minors who were under the age
    of 10 at the time of the offenses.1 The trial court sentenced Mata
    to an aggregate term of 160 years to life.
    During trial a clinical psychologist testified as an expert
    about Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS).
    Appellant contends: (1) the admission of the CSAAS evidence
    was highly prejudicial and should have been excluded as a novel
    and unreliable scientific theory that has not gained general
    acceptance in the scientific community; (2) the trial court
    improperly admitted expert testimony regarding case-specific
    behavior in connection with the CSAAS evidence; (3) CALCRIM
    No. 1193 misstates the law and impermissibly permitted the jury
    to determine guilt based on CSAAS; (4) the trial court erred by
    precluding testimony regarding specific instances of one of the
    complaining witnesses’ dishonesty; and (5) the cumulative effect
    of the foregoing errors requires reversal. We disagree and affirm.
    1 The jury convicted appellant of four counts of intercourse
    or sodomy with a child 10 years old or younger (Pen. Code,
    § 288.7, subd. (a) (undesignated statutory references are to the
    Penal Code), counts 1, 2, 8, 9); four counts of oral copulation or
    sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7,
    subd. (b), counts 3, 4, 5, 10); and four counts of committing a lewd
    act on a child (§ 288, subd. (a), counts 6, 7, 11, 12). The jury also
    found true multiple victim allegations as to counts 6, 7, 11, and
    12 pursuant to section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e).
    2
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    Evelyn V. and appellant began dating2 when Evelyn’s
    daughters, Isabella and Camilla, were four and five years old,
    respectively. Approximately two years later in June 2015,
    appellant moved in with Evelyn and her children. He moved out
    in November 2016.
    Camilla
    Camilla testified that appellant began sexually abusing her
    when she was six or seven years old, and the abuse continued
    until she was eight or nine years old. On multiple occasions he
    touched her breasts and vagina under her clothes. He kissed her
    on the lips and licked her breasts and her vagina. He put his
    fingers and his penis inside her vagina and one time he put his
    penis inside her anus. He repeatedly told Camilla not to tell her
    mother. Camilla did not tell anyone because she was scared
    something would happen if she did, and she worried that people
    would think bad things about her.
    One day, when she was seven or eight years old, Camilla
    was playing tag outside with a neighborhood friend and ran past
    her mother’s bedroom window. Through an opening in the
    curtains, Camilla saw appellant on top of Isabella, who was lying
    naked on her back on the bed. Appellant was standing between
    Isabella’s legs in front of her. Camilla was scared for her sister.
    On July 4, 2016, Camilla told her mother that appellant
    had been touching her inappropriately. She did not, however, tell
    her mother everything appellant had done to her because she was
    scared. Evelyn responded that if Camilla was telling the truth,
    they should go to the police. Evelyn then called appellant into
    2Evelyn and appellant had previously dated. Their son,
    Jericho, was born in 2001.
    3
    the room and told him what Camilla had said. Appellant denied
    everything and said they should go to the police, but Camilla
    declined, saying, “ ‘Okay. Just leave it like that.’ ” Evelyn later
    asked Isabella if appellant had ever touched her inappropriately.
    Isabella responded, “ ‘I have nothing to say.’ ”
    After Camilla reported the abuse to her mother, appellant
    continued to live in the home for four more months. He moved
    out on November 28, 2016, but still came to the house
    occasionally. Evelyn remained in contact with him because he
    was Jericho’s father.
    In January 2018, Camilla’s tutor noticed that she looked
    worried and sad and she was not doing her work. The tutor
    asked Camilla if she was okay. Stuttering and nervous, Camilla
    said she did not feel well and wanted to go to the nurse. When
    the tutor asked what was wrong, Camilla said, “ ‘It’s my mom’s
    boyfriend.’ ” Camilla told the tutor appellant tried to touch her,3
    and even though she had spoken with her mom about it,
    appellant was still coming to the house.
    That day, Camilla spoke with a police officer and the
    principal in the school office. She told them that appellant had
    touched her body inappropriately, but she did not elaborate
    because she was nervous and scared, and it was difficult for her
    to talk about.
    Isabella
    Isabella was eight years old when appellant moved in with
    her family. Isabella testified that during the time appellant lived
    in the home he touched her “private part” on numerous occasions.
    The first time, appellant led Isabella into her brother’s bedroom,
    3Camilla testified at trial that she told the tutor appellant
    had assaulted her, without providing any details.
    4
    had her lie down on the bed, and closed the door. He then
    touched her front “private part” under her clothes with his hands.
    Isabella did not tell anyone what had happened because she was
    nervous and did not know what to do. The second time appellant
    touched Isabella’s front “private part” under her clothes with his
    hand she was lying on the bed in her brother’s bedroom and the
    door was closed. She was eight or nine years old.
    On another occasion, appellant led Isabella into the
    backseat of a car parked behind the house. There, he pulled her
    pants down and rubbed both her front and back “private parts”
    with his hand. Isabella felt bad after the incident and did not tell
    anyone about it. Isabella also described an occasion when
    appellant led her into the bedroom she shared with her sister,
    removed her pants and underwear, and rubbed her front “private
    part” with his hand.
    Appellant also penetrated Isabella’s vagina with his penis.
    The first incident occurred in Jericho’s bedroom with the door
    closed. Isabella was lying on the bed and appellant was about six
    inches to a foot away from her. She could see appellant’s “private
    part.” After removing her skirt and underwear, appellant
    touched Isabella’s front “private part” with his hand and then put
    his “private part” inside her. It felt bad and painful. Isabella
    told appellant to stop but he ignored her and “just kept going.”
    Isabella was too nervous and scared to tell anyone what had
    happened. On two other occasions appellant put on a condom
    before putting his penis in Isabella’s vagina.
    Isabella cried during her testimony and several times
    explained that what happened with appellant was hard to talk
    about.
    5
    Interviews of Isabella and Camilla
    On March 2, 2018, both Camilla and Isabella were
    interviewed by Harriet Kerr, a child advocate from Stuart
    House.4 Portions of the video from these interviews were played
    for the jury.
    During her interview, Camilla reported that appellant
    sometimes kissed her using his tongue and put his penis in her
    mouth. He once hit Camilla and locked the door when she tried
    to leave the room. He frequently tried to get her to touch his
    penis. Camilla told Kerr she was worried that people would
    think her mother was “not good” and that she would be separated
    from her mother. At trial, Camilla admitted she was not sure if
    she told “all the truth” during her interview with Kerr, but she
    confirmed that she was telling the truth in court.
    Isabella told Kerr that after appellant moved in, he started
    taking Camilla into the bedroom and locking the door when their
    mother was out. Isabella said, “He did it to me, too. [¶] . . . [¶]
    Um, he would lock the door, when my mom wasn’t there. [¶] . . .
    [¶] And then like he would touch me in places where he shouldn’t,
    like·my sister.” During her interview Isabella also described
    other acts of sexual abuse by appellant. But she admitted on
    cross-examination some difficulty of recollection as well as her
    tendency to agree with Kerr so she could get the interview over
    with.
    4  Los Angeles Police Officer Jason Kim, an investigating
    officer at Stuart House, described Stuart House as “a multi
    disciplinary team . . . of detectives[,] . . . deputy district attorneys,
    children[’s] social workers, . . . [and] some victim advocates from
    U.C.L.A.”
    6
    The prior sexual abuse of Teresa Cruz
    Teresa Cruz testified pursuant to Evidence Code section
    1108.5 At the time of trial, Cruz was 22 years old. As a young
    child Cruz lived with her mother, her brothers, and appellant,
    who was her stepfather. When Cruz was eight years old the
    family moved from Los Angeles to a house in Fresno, where Cruz
    had her own bedroom. Her mother worked the night shift at a
    restaurant, leaving for work around 4:00 p.m. and returning
    home around 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. When Cruz was about nine years
    old, appellant began coming into her bedroom while her mother
    was at work. He would hug her from behind and touch her
    nipples and breast area. He did this repeatedly on more than 10
    occasions. This made Cruz very uncomfortable, but appellant
    ignored her requests that he stop.
    When Cruz was 10 years old, appellant came into her room
    and began touching her breasts as he had before. But this time
    he removed both his and Cruz’s pants and put his penis between
    her thighs. When Cruz told him to stop, he refused. And when
    Cruz threatened to tell her mother if he did not stop, he
    responded, “ ‘[I]f you do, I will do something to you.’ ” Cruz was
    very scared. Appellant did the same thing on another occasion
    when Cruz was 10 years old.
    The third time appellant repeated the removal of his own
    and Cruz’s pants, Cruz was 12 years old. This time, he held her
    5 Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a) provides: “In
    a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual
    offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual
    offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by [Evidence Code]
    Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to
    [Evidence Code] Section 352.”
    7
    tightly and tried to put his penis inside her vagina. Cruz started
    crying and told him she did not want to do this. She pushed him
    away, and he left Cruz’s bedroom.
    At the time, Cruz did not tell anyone about these incidents
    because she felt no one would believe her. After the last incident,
    appellant lived in the home with Cruz and her family for two
    more years, and moved out when Cruz was 15 years old. During
    an argument with her mother after appellant had moved out,
    Cruz told her mother what appellant had done and they reported
    the abuse to the police.
    Defense
    Appellant testified in his own behalf and denied sexually
    abusing Isabella, Camilla, or Cruz. He testified that he and
    Camilla argued daily because she did not like that he imposed
    rules in the household. These rules included not being
    disrespectful to her mother, no jumping on the couch, no eating in
    the living room, putting belongings away after school, and
    wearing shoes outside. He testified that Cruz also began to push
    for more freedom when she was 12 or 13 years old. Appellant did
    not allow it, and they argued a lot.
    DISCUSSION
    I. The Trial Court Properly Admitted the CSAAS
    Evidence
    Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
    admitting the highly prejudicial CSAAS evidence because the
    model fails the Kelly test.6 He argues that the CSAAS model
    6 “Formerly known as the Kelly-Frye rule, based on the
    rulings of People v. Kelly (1976) 
    17 Cal.3d 24
     (Kelly) and Frye v.
    United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
    293 F. 1013
    , the rule is now the
    Kelly rule in California after changes to the Federal Rules of
    8
    constitutes a novel and unreliable scientific theory that has not
    gained general acceptance in the scientific community, and the
    admission of expert testimony based on CSAAS resulted in a
    violation of appellant’s state and federal constitutional rights.
    We disagree. 7
    A. Relevant background
    Clinical psychologist Jayme Jones testified as the final
    witness for the prosecution. Dr. Jones explained that CSAAS is a
    model created primarily to clarify common misconceptions with
    regard to victims’ delayed disclosure of child sexual abuse.
    Although the word “syndrome” is in the name, CSAAS is not a
    diagnostic test, but rather a description of behaviors to aid in
    understanding why children may not immediately disclose sexual
    abuse.
    Dr. Jones testified that CSAAS consists of five categories of
    common behaviors exhibited by victims of child sexual abuse:
    secrecy, helplessness, accommodation, delayed disclosure, and
    recantation. Dr. Jones described each category, but explained
    that not all victims necessarily experience all five parts of the
    model. She testified that the most common behavior of a child
    sexual abuse victim “is to never tell anybody” about the abuse. If
    a victim does tell someone, disclosure is typically not made until
    Evidence that superseded Frye.” (People v. Nieves (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 404
    , 442, fn. 8.)
    7 The Attorney General argues that appellant’s Kelly
    argument is forfeited because he failed to raise it during trial.
    While not expressly identifying Kelly as a basis for his objection,
    appellant argued that the evidence was unreliable and irrelevant.
    This is sufficient for us to consider the Kelly argument on its
    merits.
    9
    months or even years after the fact, and the revelations “tend to
    come a little at a time,” depending on the reaction of the person
    to whom the abuse is disclosed.
    On both direct and cross-examination Dr. Jones testified
    that the CSAAS model cannot be used to determine if abuse has
    occurred or whether a person is telling the truth about abuse.
    She also confirmed the model was not developed to be used to aid
    a jury in determining whether abuse occurred. Dr. Jones stated
    that she did not interview any of the victims in the case, she did
    not read any reports associated with the case, and she did not
    prepare any report of her own. She also testified that she could
    not opine as to the truth of the allegations in the case or the
    veracity of any of the witnesses.
    B. CSAAS evidence is not subject to Kelly analysis
    Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting
    testimony based on CSAAS because CSAAS is a novel scientific
    theory that has not gained general acceptance in the scientific
    community. Appellant argues that because CSAAS does not meet
    the Kelly test’s criteria for reliability, it is inadmissible as a
    matter of law. We disagree.
    Under the Kelly test, admission of evidence derived from a
    “ ‘new scientific technique’ ” requires proof that “ ‘the technique is
    generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific
    community.’ ” (People v. Jackson (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 269
    , 315,
    quoting People v. Bolden (2002) 
    29 Cal.4th 515
    , 544.) The term
    “new scientific technique” defies fixed definition due to the
    constantly evolving nature of science and scientific
    understanding, and courts apply two principles to determine
    whether proffered evidence must be subjected to analysis under
    Kelly. (Jackson, at p. 316.) “ ‘First, [Kelly] only applies to that
    10
    limited class of expert testimony which is based, in whole or part,
    on a technique, process, or theory which is new to science and,
    even more so, the law.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Stoll (1989) 
    49 Cal.3d 1136
    , 1156 (Stoll).) “Second, a Kelly hearing may be
    warranted when ‘the unproven technique or procedure appears in
    both name and description to provide some definitive truth which
    the expert need only accurately recognize and relay to the jury.’ ”
    (Jackson, at p. 316; Stoll, at p. 1156.) We review de novo the
    question whether a given scientific technique is subject to the
    Kelly test. (Jackson, at p. 316.)
    Under these principles, CSAAS evidence is subject to
    exclusion under Kelly only if it is offered “ ‘to prove that a
    molestation actually occurred.’ ” (People v. Wells (2004) 
    118 Cal.App.4th 179
    , 188, quoting People v. Patino (1994) 
    26 Cal.App.4th 1737
    , 1744.) First, CSAAS is neither new to science
    nor the law. In fact, the CSAAS evidence appellant challenges
    “has been ruled to be properly admitted by the courts of this state
    for decades.” (People v. Munch (2020) 
    52 Cal.App.5th 464
    , 472
    (Munch); People v. McAlpin (1991) 
    53 Cal.3d 1289
    , 1300–1301
    (McAlpin); People v. Lapenias (2021) 
    67 Cal.App.5th 162
    , 173
    (Lapenias); People v. Bowker (1988) 
    203 Cal.App.3d 385
    , 389,
    fn. 3 (Bowker) [CSAAS dates back to at least 1983].) Plainly,
    CSAAS does not fall into the first category of evidence to which
    Kelly applies.
    Second, California courts have strictly limited admission of
    CSAAS evidence (and analogous models such as battered person’s
    syndrome and rape trauma syndrome) to disabusing a jury of
    commonly held misconceptions about how a child reacts to a
    molestation, “ ‘and to explain the emotional antecedents of
    abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior.’ ”
    11
    (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1301; People v. Humphrey (1996)
    
    13 Cal.4th 1073
    , 1088 (Humphrey); Lapenias, supra, 67
    Cal.App.5th at p. 171.) Thus, while “expert testimony on the
    common reactions of child molestation victims is not admissible
    to prove that the complaining witness has in fact been sexually
    abused[,] it is admissible to rehabilitate such witness’s credibility
    when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the
    incident⎯e.g., a delay in reporting⎯is inconsistent with his or
    her testimony claiming molestation.” (McAlpin, at p. 1300;
    Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 466, 468; see also People v.
    Coffman and Marlow (2004) 
    34 Cal.4th 1
    , 82 (Coffman and
    Marlow) [psychological expert may not testify about rape trauma
    syndrome in order to prove that a rape actually occurred, but
    “such testimony is admissible to rehabilitate the credibility of the
    complaining witness against a suggestion that her behavior after
    the assault—such as a delay in reporting it—was inconsistent
    with her claim of having been raped”]; People v. Bledsoe (1984) 
    36 Cal.3d 236
    , 247–248, 251.)
    With this limitation, expert testimony based on CSAAS
    does not purport to provide a definitive truth, but “is ‘based on
    [the expert’s] clinical experience with child sexual abuse victims
    and on [his or] her familiarity with professional literature in the
    area.’ ” (Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 473, quoting People
    v. Harlan (1990) 
    222 Cal.App.3d 439
    , 449 (Harlan).) Such expert
    testimony meets “traditional standards for competent expert
    opinion, without need for additional screening procedures [under
    Kelly]” (Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1161), and is therefore not
    12
    subject to the Kelly rule8 (Munch, at p. 473; Lapenias, supra, 67
    Cal.App.5th at p. 173; Harlan, at p. 449 [“The [Kelly] rule does
    not apply to [CSAAS] evidence”]).
    8  Appellant cites cases from eight jurisdictions that have
    limited or banned entirely the use of CSAAS testimony on the
    ground that it lacks reliability, and invites us to do the same. He
    also argues that the California Supreme Court has not resolved
    the issue of whether CSAAS meets the Kelly test. In Munch,
    however, our colleagues in Division Six observed that our
    Supreme Court has already “ruled that CSAAS evidence ‘is
    admissible to rehabilitate [a child] witness’s credibility when the
    defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the incident—
    e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her
    testimony claiming molestation.’ (People v. McAlpin, 
    supra,
     53
    Cal.3d at p. 1300.)” (Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 468; see
    also People v. Brown (2004) 
    33 Cal.4th 892
    , 906; Coffman and
    Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 82; Humphrey, 
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th
    at p. 1088.)
    Division Six declined Munch’s invitation to abrogate
    McAlpin based on several of the sister state opinions upon which
    appellant relies. (Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 469–472.)
    Noting our Supreme Court’s recognition that “ ‘[t]he great
    majority of courts approve such expert rebuttal testimony’ ” and
    its determination that CSAAS evidence is admissible (McAlpin,
    
    supra,
     53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300–1301), Munch observed that the
    Supreme Court decision in McAlpin remains binding on all lower
    courts in this state. (Munch, at p. 468, citing Auto Equity Sales,
    Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 
    57 Cal.2d 450
    , 455 [“Courts
    exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by
    courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt
    to overrule decisions of a higher court”].) As Munch concluded,
    simply because “other jurisdictions may disagree with it does not
    change its impact on California cases.” (Munch, at p. 468.)
    13
    II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
    Admitting Expert Testimony Based on CSAAS
    Appellant contends that the prosecutor improperly elicited
    expert testimony based on CSAAS “that went directly to the
    question of whether these complaining witnesses were abused.”
    He argues that because the expert’s testimony was used to apply
    the CSAAS theory to case-specific behaviors, its admission
    violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We
    disagree.
    A. The trial court properly limited the scope of testimony
    regarding CSAAS
    The CSAAS evidence was relevant to Isabella, Camilla, and
    Cruz, each of whom made delayed disclosures of appellant’s
    abuse, disclosed the abuse in a piecemeal fashion, and/or
    recanted or avoided discussing some of the abuse. We conclude
    the trial court properly limited the expert testimony based on
    CSAAS to address these issues.
    “ ‘The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether
    to admit or exclude expert testimony [citation], and its decision
    as to whether expert testimony meets the standard for
    admissibility is subject to review for abuse of discretion.’ ”
    (People v. Duong (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 36
    , 60; McAlpin, 
    supra,
     53
    Cal.3d at p. 1299.)
    The danger that the jury will misapply CSAAS testimony
    “is . . . present where the expert gives ‘general’ testimony
    describing the components of the syndrome in such a way as to
    allow the jury to apply the syndrome to the facts of the case and
    conclude the child was sexually abused.” (Bowker, supra, 203
    Cal.App.3d at p. 393.) Accordingly, “the evidence must be
    targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or ‘misconception’ suggested by the
    14
    evidence.”9 (Id. at pp. 393–394.) And “the better practice is to
    limit the expert’s testimony to observations concerning the
    behavior of abused children as a class and to avoid testimony
    which recites either the facts of the case at trial or obviously
    similar facts.” (People v. Gilbert (1992) 
    5 Cal.App.4th 1372
    ,
    1384.)
    Appellant does not take issue with Dr. Jones’s
    comprehensive explanation of the five parts of CSAAS, but
    identifies certain portions of her testimony as improperly case
    specific. The challenged testimony includes: (1) whether a child
    who is met with disbelief or skepticism after disclosing sexual
    abuse may delay further disclosure (yes); (2) whether it is
    common for sexually abused children not to speak out, scream, or
    verbalize discomfort (yes); (3) when the abuser is someone in the
    family, whether it is common for the victim to immediately
    disclose the abuse (no); (4) whether all victims go through each
    part of the model (no); (5) the percentages of children who
    disclose abuse within the first year (10 to 15 percent) and in
    years one through five (an additional 20 to 25 percent); and
    (6) whether after disclosure, it is common for a child to reach a
    point of not wanting to talk about it anymore (yes).10
    9 “Identifying a ‘myth’ or ‘misconception’ has not been
    interpreted as requiring the prosecution to expressly state on the
    record the evidence which is inconsistent with the finding of
    molestation. It is sufficient if the victim’s credibility is placed in
    issue due to the paradoxical behavior, including a delay in
    reporting a molestation.” (People v. Patino (1994) 
    26 Cal.App.4th 1737
    , 1744–1745 (Patino).)
    10Appellant also appears to complain about portions of
    Dr. Jones’s testimony to which the trial court sustained
    15
    In overruling appellant’s objections to this testimony, the
    trial court found that Dr. Jones was applying the CSAAS model
    to describe the behavior of children as a class and their common
    reactions to sexual abuse, rather than the specific conduct of the
    children involved in this case. Although some of the expert’s
    testimony happened to correspond with these children’s actual
    behavior, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
    conclusion that the testimony helped explain behaviors common
    to victims of child sexual abuse that might appear to a jury to be
    self-impeaching and contradictory. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at
    p. 1301; see Humphrey, 
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th at p. 1088 [expert
    testimony in battered women’s syndrome case necessary “ ‘to
    explain a behavior pattern that might otherwise appear
    unreasonable to the average person’ ” and place “ ‘the behavior in
    an understandable light’ ”]; Harlan, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at
    p. 450.) Dr. Jones’s testimony was not so specific to these
    children as to run afoul of the prohibition on case-specific expert
    testimony, and it was properly admitted.
    B. Any error in the admission of the expert testimony was
    harmless
    Any risk that the jury might improperly infer abuse from
    the CSAAS testimony was all but eliminated by the many
    instances in which the jury was told that it could not rely on the
    expert’s testimony to find the children had in fact been sexually
    abused. Not only did Dr. Jones deny any familiarity with the
    objections. However, the trial court instructed the jury to ignore
    questions to which it sustained objections, and we presume the
    jury followed this instruction. (See Coffman and Marlow, supra,
    34 Cal.4th at p. 83.) Appellant’s argument with respect to these
    portions of Dr. Jones’s testimony is therefore moot.
    16
    facts or witnesses in the case, she also specifically testified that
    the CSAAS model is not used to determine if abuse has occurred
    or to help a jury determine whether a witness is telling the truth.
    Dr. Jones had no opinion as to whether any of the witnesses in
    this case were telling the truth.
    Further, defense counsel emphasized in closing argument
    that CSAAS is “not meant to diagnos[e] whether somebody is a
    victim of sexual abuse. It does not help anybody determine
    whether a child is telling the truth . . . about being sexually
    abused. It is simply a tool that is used by mental health
    professionals to help them decide how to treat somebody who is a
    confirmed victim. [¶] . . . [Mental health professionals] can
    assume something that a jury in a criminal trial cannot do, which
    is they assume that the person they are working with is, in fact, a
    victim of child sexual abuse. [¶] So don’t get tempted to go back
    into the jury room and say, ‘well, she didn’t say right away, that
    means that she was sexually abused,’ that is not the purpose of
    that testimony.” Urging the jury to reject Dr. Jones’s testimony
    altogether, counsel continued: “There is no scenario that you can
    think of that [Dr.] Jones would not tell you is consistent with
    sexual abuse. [¶] With respect to your own job here, [Dr. Jones’s]
    testimony is not helpful, because you cannot assume, as [Dr.
    Jones] does in her work, that the testimony that you’re hearing is
    true, and that the witnesses were telling the truth. [CSAAS] was
    not meant to be used in a criminal trial, and just a reminder not
    to use it as some sort of diagnosis, that something did or did not
    happen.”
    Finally, the trial court properly instructed the jury that Dr.
    Jones’s testimony did not constitute evidence of appellant’s guilt
    and could be used only for the limited purpose of deciding
    17
    whether the conduct of Camilla, Isabella, and Cruz was
    consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested
    and evaluating the believability of the testimony of each of the
    three witnesses.
    In this context, any possible error in admitting Dr. Jones’s
    testimony must be deemed harmless under any standard.
    (Chapman v. California (1967) 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 24 [harmless beyond
    a reasonable doubt]; People v. Watson (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
    , 837
    (Watson) [no reasonable probability that the outcome would have
    been different in the absence of the alleged error].)
    C. The prosecutor did not improperly urge the jury to infer
    guilt based on the CSAAS evidence
    Appellant further contends that the prosecutor’s closing
    argument improperly urged the jury to apply the CSAAS
    evidence to find appellant guilty, violating his due process rights
    and requiring reversal. Appellant’s failure to object to the
    prosecutor’s argument forfeited the issue for appeal. (People v.
    Hoyt (2020) 
    8 Cal.5th 892
    , 944 [defendant forfeits any challenge
    to prosecutor’s argument by failing to object].) Furthermore,
    nothing in the prosecutor’s statements to the jury supports
    appellant’s allegation that “[t]he prosecution repeatedly urged
    the jury to use Dr. Jones’ testimony diagnostically to find that the
    sexual molestation actually occurred.”
    In discussing Isabella’s revelations about appellant’s abuse,
    the prosecutor stated: “You might ask yourself, ‘well, why didn’t
    Isabella tell anybody what the defendant had done immediately?’
    [¶] Well, keep in mind, you heard from Dr. Jones that delayed
    disclosure is not uncommon for children who experience sexual
    abuse.” Far from urging the jury to leap to the conclusion that
    Isabella was abused as appellant asserts, the prosecutor’s
    18
    argument plainly falls within the permissible application of
    CSAAS evidence: rehabilitation of Isabella’s credibility in light of
    her seemingly self-impeaching behavior, that is, delayed
    disclosure of the abuse.
    Similarly, in discussing the delays by Camilla and Cruz in
    disclosing the abuse, the prosecutor pointed out that Dr. Jones
    had explained that this sort of behavior is not uncommon because
    the child does not know if he or she will be believed. The
    prosecutor observed that both Camilla and Cruz had this
    experience. Again, the prosecutor’s argument did not urge the
    jury to use CSAAS diagnostically to find that appellant had
    sexually abused these girls. Rather, it properly sought to bolster
    the credibility of these witnesses by explaining their delayed
    disclosure.
    “The admission of relevant evidence will not offend due
    process unless the evidence is so prejudicial as to render the
    defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Falsetta
    (1999) 
    21 Cal.4th 903
    , 913.) The CSAAS evidence admitted here
    was relevant to the issues presented and, as it was properly
    limited, did not render appellant’s trial fundamentally unfair.
    (See Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1747 [the admission of
    CSAAS evidence does not render a trial fundamentally unfair].)
    Appellant suffered no violation of his due process rights.
    III. CALCRIM No. 1193 Is a Legally Correct Instruction
    The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to the pattern
    jury instruction11 CALCRIM No. 1193. Appellant contends that
    11 “The California jury instructions approved by the
    Judicial Council are the official instructions for use in the state of
    California.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(a).)
    19
    CALCRIM No. 1193 misstates the law and impermissibly
    permitted the jury to determine guilt based on the CSAAS
    evidence. Appellant’s failure to object to the instruction below
    forfeited this argument on appeal. (People v. Lucas (2014) 
    60 Cal.4th 153
    , 291, fn. 51 [failure to object to alleged instructional
    error generally forfeits issue on appeal]; see People v. Maury
    (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 342
    , 426 [error cannot be predicated on trial
    court’s failure to modify instruction on its own motion where
    defendant did not request any such amplification or
    explanation].)
    Appellant’s argument also fails on its merits.
    In accordance with CALCRIM No. 1193, the court
    instructed the jury: “You have heard testimony from Dr. Jayme
    Jones regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.
    [¶] Dr. Jones’ testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation
    syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any of
    the crimes charged against him. [¶] You may consider this
    evidence only in deciding whether or not Camilla V.’s,
    Isabella V.’s, and Theresa Cruz’s conduct was not inconsistent
    with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and in
    evaluating the believability of the testimony of each of the three
    above named witnesses.”
    Appellate courts have rejected challenges to CALCRIM
    No. 1193 similar to those appellant raises here, holding that the
    instruction accurately informs the jury on the limited use of
    CSAAS evidence. These courts have uniformly found the
    instruction does not improperly allow the alleged victim of child
    sexual abuse to corroborate her or his own testimony, violate the
    defendant’s due process rights, or misapply or lessen the
    prosecution’s burden of proof. (Lapenias, supra, 
    67 Cal.App.5th 20
    at p. 175; People v. Gonzales (2017) 
    16 Cal.App.5th 494
    , 503–504;
    Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 473–474.) Other jury
    instructions given also limited the danger that the jury would use
    the CSAAS testimony for an improper purpose. (See, e.g.,
    CALCRIM No. 226 [instructing that it is the jury’s duty to
    determine the credibility of witnesses]; CALCRIM No. 303
    [limiting the use of certain evidence].)
    IV. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
    Limiting Purported Impeachment Evidence
    Appellant contends the trial court erred by precluding
    testimony regarding specific instances of Camilla’s dishonesty for
    impeachment. We disagree.
    A. Relevant background
    Evelyn testified concerning her relationship with appellant,
    the dates he lived at her house, her perception of appellant’s
    relationship with Camilla, as well as Camilla’s disclosure of
    appellant’s sexual abuse. On cross-examination, defense counsel
    asked if Evelyn had an opinion as to whether Camilla was an
    honest person. After the prosecutor objected, Evelyn testified
    outside the presence of the jury that Camilla tended to lie about
    “the daily things having to do with daily life. Nothing
    important.”
    Citing Evidence Code section 787, the trial court ruled that
    neither counsel could ask about specific examples of Camilla’s
    dishonesty. The court added: “I’m certainly not going to let you
    get close to having her offer an opinion about whether or not her
    claims, meaning Camilla’s claims, are true or not. You’re not
    allowed to do that, and I mean, it seems to me that’s what you’re
    trying to do.” The court declared, “This isn’t what the case is
    supposed to be about,” and emphasized it would not permit
    21
    defense counsel to belabor the point and any questioning on the
    subject was to be brief.
    Evelyn then testified before the jury that, during the period
    from 2015 to 2016, she did not consider Camilla to be an honest
    person. She conceded, however, that Camilla did not lie about
    everything.
    B. The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of
    specific instances of Camilla’s untruthfulness
    Appellant contends the trial court erred in excluding
    specific instances of Camilla’s dishonesty pursuant to Evidence
    Code section 787. He asserts the error violated his rights to
    confrontation and due process, requiring reversal. To the extent
    the trial court’s ruling excluding such evidence rested solely on
    Evidence Code 787, the trial court erred. (See People v. Dalton
    (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 166
    , 214 (Dalton).) But because the trial court
    was authorized to exclude the evidence of specific instances of
    Camilla’s dishonesty pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 and
    implicitly did so, we conclude any error in limiting the
    impeachment evidence under Evidence Code section 787 was
    harmless. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837.)
    Before June 1982, Evidence Code section 78712 had long
    been interpreted to proscribe proof of specific instances of a
    witness’s conduct to impeach the witness’s credibility, regardless
    12  Evidence Code section 787 provides: “Subject to
    [Evidence Code] Section 788 [allowing the credibility of a witness
    to be attacked with evidence of a felony conviction], evidence of
    specific instances of [a witness’s] conduct relevant only as tending
    to prove a trait of [the witness’s] character is inadmissible to
    attack or support the credibility of a witness.” (See Dalton,
    supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 213.)
    22
    of the relevance of such evidence. (See People v. Wagner (1975)
    
    13 Cal.3d 612
    , 618–619; People v. Lankford (1989) 
    210 Cal.App.3d 227
    , 235; see also People v. Eldridge (1905) 
    147 Cal. 782
    , 786 [although evidence of prior felony conviction is
    admissible to impeach a witness’s credibility, details and
    circumstances of the offense are not].) However, with the
    enactment of Proposition 8 in 1982, which added the “Right to
    Truth-in-Evidence” provision to California’s Constitution, all
    “relevant” proffered evidence became admissible. (Cal. Const.,
    art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2) (§ 28(f)(2));13 Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
    p. 213.)
    Our Supreme Court has explained that “the enactment of
    article I, section 28, subdivision ([f]) of the California
    Constitution ‘supersedes all California restrictions on the
    admission of relevant evidence except those preserved or
    permitted by the express words of section 28([f]) itself.’
    [Citation.] Among those provisions superseded is Evidence Code
    section 787.” (In re Freeman (2006) 
    38 Cal.4th 630
    , 640, fn. 5;
    Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 214; People v. Harris (1989) 
    47 Cal.3d 1047
    , 1081 [“section 28[(f)(2)] contains no . . . exception
    that would preserve the exclusionary rule of Evidence Code
    sections 786–790, when the evidence relates to a witness’s
    conduct, but is offered to attack or support the credibility of the
    witness”].) Article I, section 28, subdivision (f)(2) of the
    California Constitution thus abrogates Evidence Code section
    787’s exclusion of specific instances of misconduct that have “any
    13 This provision was originally codified at article I, section
    28, subdivision (d), but was subsequently redesignated as section
    28, subdivision (f)(2). (People v. Capers (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 989
    ,
    1002, fn. 6.)
    23
    tendency in reason” (Evid. Code, § 210) to impeach a witness’s
    credibility (Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 214).
    The trial court erred in excluding under Evidence Code
    section 787 evidence of specific instances of Camilla’s
    untruthfulness to attack her credibility. However, as our courts
    have long held, “a trial court’s order will ordinarily be upheld if it
    is legally correct on any basis.” (Conservatorship of McQueen
    (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 602
    , 612; Davey v. Southern Pacific Co. (1897)
    
    116 Cal. 325
    , 329 [“No rule of decision is better or more firmly
    established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of
    reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct
    in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a
    wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to
    the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations
    which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion”].) Here,
    even though the trial court cited an invalid basis for limiting the
    impeachment evidence, we will uphold the ruling because the
    evidence was subject to exclusion on a valid ground.
    The “Right to Truth-in-Evidence” amendment to the
    constitution did not strip trial courts of all discretion to exclude
    any relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probative value.
    Thus, under Evidence Code section 352, trial courts retain the
    discretion to exclude even relevant evidence “ ‘if its probative
    value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
    admission will . . . necessitate undue consumption of time or . . .
    create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
    issues, or of misleading the jury.’ ” (Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
    p. 214; Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2) [“Nothing in this
    section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence
    24
    relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code Sections 352,
    782 or 1103”].)
    Here, although the trial court did not cite Evidence Code
    section 352 in making its ruling, it implicitly excluded evidence of
    specific instances of Camilla’s alleged dishonesty under that
    statute. In light of defense counsel’s inability to identify any
    example of Camilla’s dishonesty that would have been probative,
    and Evelyn’s in camera testimony that Camilla had lied only
    about unimportant matters, “things having to do with daily life,”
    the court was clearly concerned that any probative value of
    Evelyn’s testimony would confuse or mislead the jury, waste
    time, and be outweighed by undue prejudice. (See People v. Clark
    (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 522
    , 586 (Clark).) To avoid these risks, the
    trial court properly limited the evidence and admonished counsel
    not “to belabor this,” to keep the questioning “minimal,” and not
    to “go[] beyond the basic two or three questions.” The court
    concluded its ruling by stating, “This is not what the trial centers
    on.”
    A trial court’s discretionary ruling under Evidence Code
    section 352 will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
    that discretion. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 586.) In
    determining abuse, “[w]e examine the trial court’s decision to
    determine whether the court ‘ “exercised its discretion in an
    arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in
    a miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Schultz (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 623
    , 668.) We find no such abuse of the court’s discretion here.14
    14 We also reject appellant’s claims that the trial court’s
    ruling violated his constitutional rights to due process and
    confrontation. As our Supreme Court has held, the routine
    application of the ordinary rules of evidence “does not implicate a
    25
    V. There Was No Cumulative Error
    Finally, having found no errors that individually or
    collectively deprived appellant of a fair trial, we reject appellant’s
    contention that his conviction should be reversed because of the
    cumulative effect of the errors identified in his opening brief.
    (See People v. Avila (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 680
    , 718; People v.
    Halvorsen (2007) 
    42 Cal.4th 379
    , 422.)
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    LUI, P. J.
    We concur:
    ASHMANN-GERST, J.
    HOFFSTADT, J.
    criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.” (People v. Jones
    (2013) 
    57 Cal.4th 899
    , 957; see also Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 
    476 U.S. 683
    , 690 [“we have never questioned the power of States to
    exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that
    themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability⎯even if
    the defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted”].)
    26