Western Oilfields Supply Compa v. Jerry Goodwin , 461 F. App'x 624 ( 2011 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEC 14 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
WESTERN OILFIELDS SUPPLY CO., No. 10-16254
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-286-RLH-LRL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JERRY GOODWIN, et al,
Defendant - Appellee.
WESTERN OILFIELDS SUPPLY CO., No. 10-17212
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-286-RLH-LRL
v.
JERRY GOODWIN, et al,
Defendant - Appellee.
WESTERN OILFIELDS SUPPLY CO., No. 10-17573
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-286-RLH-LRL
v.
JERRY GOODWIN, et al,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada, Las Vegas
Roger L. Hunt, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 16, 2011
San Francisco, California
Before: NOONAN and BEA, Circuit Judges, and WALTER, Senior District
Judge.**
Appellant Western Oilfields Supply Co. (“Rain for Rent”), appeals: the
district court’s judgment, following a jury trial, in favor of Jerry Goodwin and the
directed verdict dismissing Flora Goodwin from the suit; the district court’s
post-judgment order finding that Rain for Rent was not the prevailing party and
thus not entitled to attorney’s fees; and the district court’s post-judgment order
granting Goodwin $181,530.42 in attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we
affirm the district court in all respects.
The district court did not err in excluding “lack of consideration” from the
jury instruction given on promissory estoppel. “Jury instructions must be
formulated so that they fairly and adequately cover the issues presented, correctly
state the law, and are not misleading.” Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9th
** The Honorable Donald E. Walter, Senior United States District Judge
for Western Louisiana, sitting by designation.
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Cir. 1996). “If the instructions are challenged as a misstatement of the law, they
are then reviewed de novo.” City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 46 F.3d 929,
933 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The district court properly instructed the
jury on the four prima facie elements of promissory estoppel, based on California
law, and was not required to further instruct the jury as to that which need not
exist. See U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. State, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 894, 901 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (internal citation omitted).
Rain for Rent also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the jury’s
finding that Rain for Rent had not completed its delivery and installation of an
irrigation system, as a condition precedent to triggering Goodwin’s obligation to
pay for the system. A jury’s verdict must be upheld if it is supported by substantial
evidence. Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified School Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227
(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir.
1999)). Rain for Rent failed to object to the form of the jury interrogatories at trial.
Goodwin presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find there was a failure
of a condition precedent.
The district court likewise did not err in admitting Jerry Goodwin’s non-
expert, firsthand testimony regarding his estimated crop yield. A district court’s
decision to permit a witness offering opinion testimony to testify as a lay witness is
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reviewed for abuse of discretion. U.S. v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th
Cir. 2001). It was within the court’s discretion to find that Goodwin’s 45 years of
experience as a farmer and rancher amply qualified him to provide such lay
opinion. Any calculations involved in Goodwin’s testimony required only
rudimentary math skills and could qualify as lay opinion testimony under Fed. R.
Evid. 701.
The district court did not err in granting a directed verdict for Flora
Goodwin. Our review is de novo. West America Corp. v. Vaughan-Bassett
Furniture Co., Inc., 765 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir.1985). A directed verdict is proper
where the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.
Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 106 (9th Cir. 1988). There was
no evidence to suggest that Flora Goodwin was a legal partner or active participant
in O Bar Cattle Company. Both Flora Goodwin’s testimony at trial and the weight
of the documentary evidence proved that she did not participate in the business at
all.
Finally, the district court did not err in finding Goodwin to be the prevailing
party and thus entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. “The court’s determination
[that] a party prevailed on a contract action is an exercise of discretion which
should not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse.” Jackson v.
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Homeowners Assoc. Monte Vista Estates-East, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363, 375 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001) (citation omitted). Under Cal. Civ. Code § 1717, Goodwin is the
proper “prevailing party” in this case. Rain for Rent failed to achieve its main goal
of litigation, which was to prevail on its breach of contract claim against Goodwin.
Rather, Goodwin successfully defended against that claim. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in granting Goodwin reasonable attorney’s fees based on
his successful defense of Rain for Rent’s breach of contract claim.
AFFIRMED.
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