Meruelo Maddux Properties, Inc v. County of Los Angeles Tax Coll , 461 F. App'x 646 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 16 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In the Matter of: MERUELO MADDUX No. 10-56526
PROPERTIES, INC.; et al.,
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-03536-SVW
Debtors,
MEMORANDUM*
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES TAX
COLLECTOR; et al.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 7, 2011
Pasadena, California
Before: D.W. NELSON, GOULD, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Even assuming arguendo that the loan agreements at issue here gave Bank
of America the right to pay property taxes the borrowers owed the County of Los
Angeles, the County had no obligation to accept those payments at the bankruptcy
hearing. Tax payments may be made only at the tax collector’s office or a location
duly authorized by the board of supervisors. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 2613. A
bankruptcy court is neither. Bank of America has not adduced any evidence that
the other locations where the County accepted tax payments (a post office box and
via electronic funds transfer) were not duly authorized. The general rule that an
offer of performance may be made “[w]herever the person to whom the offer ought
to be made can be found,” Cal. Civ. Code § 1489, is not to the contrary, because
section 1489 is applicable only “[i]n the absence of an express provision to the
contrary,” id., and thus is superseded by the express requirements of section 2613.
See also United States v. Soberanes, 318 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen
there is an apparent conflict between a specific provision and a more general one,
the more specific one governs . . . .”). Nor has Bank of America established that
the County’s attorney in a bankruptcy proceeding is “the person to whom the offer
[of payment of property taxes] ought to be made.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1489. Finally,
Bank of America has not pointed to any fact allegedly misunderstood by the
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district court that is material to the question whether the County was legally
obligated to accept Bank of America’s tender of property tax payment.
The requests for judicial notice are denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.
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