Robert Caswell v. Olympic Pipeline Company , 484 F. App'x 151 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                 JUN 13 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LISA CASWELL, in her capacity as                 No. 10-35748
    executor of the estate of Robert Caswell,
    D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05232-BHS
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    OLYMPIC PIPELINE COMPANY; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    LISA CASWELL, in her capacity as                 No. 11-35260
    executor of the estate of Robert Caswell,
    D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05232-BHS
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    UNION OIL COMPANY OF
    CALIFORNIA; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Argued and Submitted June 6, 2012
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: SILVERMAN and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and HALL, District
    Judge.**
    Plaintiffs Robert and Lisa Caswell appeal the district court’s summary
    judgment orders that dismissed their product liability claims. The court ruled that
    the Caswells’ claims were barred by Oregon’s 8-year statute of repose. The
    Caswells also ask us to review the Washington state trial court’s order granting
    summary judgment to Olympic Pipeline Company on the same basis. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    Like the district court, we apply Washington’s choice-of-law rules to decide
    whether Washington’s or Oregon’s substantive law applies. See Fields v. Legacy
    Health Sys., 
    413 F.3d 943
    , 950–52 (9th Cir. 2005). Also like the district court, we
    hold that Oregon had the most significant relationship to this action. At the time of
    injury, the Caswells were Oregon residents. Robert Caswell was injured in Oregon
    while working in Oregon for an Oregon employer. In Rice v. Dow Chemical Co.,
    
    875 P.2d 1213
    , 1217–18 (Wash. 1994), the Washington Supreme Court applied
    Oregon’s statute of repose in a scenario very similar to this one.
    **
    The Honorable Janet C. Hall, District Judge for the District of
    Connecticut, sitting by designation.
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    The Caswells also argue that the district court erred when it denied their
    request for further discovery on whether the petroleum products were
    manufactured and designed in Washington. We disagree. The district court
    correctly held that, even if the Caswells can show that the products were
    manufactured and designed in Washington, Oregon would still have more
    significant contacts. Therefore, additional discovery would have been futile.
    The Caswells raise two new arguments for the first time on appeal. The first
    is that, even if Oregon law applies, Oregon’s statute of repose was not triggered
    because there was no evidence that the petroleum had been purchased for use or
    consumption. The second argument is that the Oregon statute of repose violates
    the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. We decline to review
    these arguments because they were not raised before the district court. Barrientos
    v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC, 
    583 F.3d 1197
    , 1215–16 (9th Cir. 2009).
    Lastly, the Caswells argue that the Washington state trial court erred in
    applying Oregon’s statute of repose before the action was removed. We have
    jurisdiction to review the state court’s order because the district court necessarily
    adopted that order as its own after removal. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bayside
    Developers, 
    43 F.3d 1230
    , 1238 (9th Cir. 1994); Butner v. Neustadter, 
    324 F.2d 783
    , 785–86 (9th Cir. 1963). We also have jurisdiction because, at the time
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    judgment was entered, there was complete diversity between the parties. See
    Gould v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
    790 F.2d 769
    , 774 (9th Cir. 1986).
    First, we note that removal based on diversity jurisdiction was proper here,
    despite the lack of complete diversity, because the Caswells failed to contest the
    allegations in the notice of removal that Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company
    and Olympic Pipeline Company were fraudulently joined and that the Caswells
    cannot state a claim against them. The Caswells’ failure to object to the factual
    allegations in the notice of removal and their decision not to move for remand are
    construed as an admission that Tesoro Refining and Olympic Pipeline were sham
    defendants joined solely to destroy complete diversity. See Schnabel v. Lui, 
    302 F.3d 1023
    , 1032 (9th Cir. 2002). After removal, the district court correctly
    adopted as its own the state court’s decision to dismiss Tesoro Refining and
    Olympic Pipeline on the grounds that Oregon’s statute of repose barred the
    Caswells’ claims against them. Although Olympic Pipeline has its principal place
    of business in Washington, the decision to apply Oregon law was correct.
    AFFIRMED.
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