United States v. Cesar Jimenez-Lopez , 472 F. App'x 437 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 16 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-10081
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:10-cr-00110-JMR-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CESAR JIMENEZ-LOPEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John M. Roll, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 13, 2012**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, D.W. NELSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Cesar Jimenez-Lopez appeals from his conviction, by guilty plea before a
magistrate judge, of entry without inspection in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Jimenez-Lopez claims that his December 7, 2009 group plea hearing violated his
Fifth Amendment right to due process.
Although Jimenez-Lopez preferred to render his guilty plea pursuant to an
individualized plea hearing rather than as part of a group plea proceeding, he
voluntarily agreed to participate in the group proceeding so that he could make his
plea and return to Mexico that same day rather than remain in custody while he
waited for an individualized hearing. Requiring Jimenez-Lopez to choose between
resolving his case immediately as part of a group and resolving it later in an
individualized hearing did not violate due process. See Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 751 (1970); see generally United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108,
1115-16 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[In criminal proceedings,] being forced to choose
between unpleasant alternatives is not unconstitutional.”).
In addition, the magistrate judge did not violate Jimenez-Lopez’s due
process rights by accepting his guilty plea because the record contains “affirmative
evidence that [Jimenez-Lopez] entered his plea knowingly and willfully.” See
United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (“[I]f a defendant’s guilty plea is not
equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process
and is therefore void.”); United States v. Escamilla-Rojas, 640 F.3d 1055, 1062
2
(9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he right to due process does not impose strict requirements on
the mechanics of plea proceedings. Rather, the right simply requires the record to
‘disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and
voluntarily.’”) (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 n.4).
AFFIRMED.
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