United States v. Jose Pita-Mota , 472 F. App'x 756 ( 2012 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                               APR 24 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 10-10514               U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:09-cr-01114-GMS-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JOSE LUIS PITA-MOTA,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted April 19, 2012
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant Jose Luis Pita-Mota appeals his conviction and resulting sentence
    for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine,
    in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    ; distribution and possession with intent to distribute
    methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    ; being a felon in possession of a
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g), 924(a); and illegal reentry after
    removal, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a). We affirm.
    1. We assume, without deciding, that in the circumstances of this case, the
    district court erred by failing to apply mitigating procedures to the dual fact-and-
    expert testimony of some of the government’s witnesses, and that this error was
    plain. See United States v. Freeman, 
    498 F.3d 893
    , 903–04 (9th Cir. 2007)
    (describing the dangers of dual testimony). The assumed error did not affect
    Defendant’s substantial rights, however, because he has not shown "a reasonable
    probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have
    been different." United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    , 81–82 (2004)
    (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The evidence of Defendant’s guilt
    was overwhelming, and the allegedly impermissible expert testimony affected only
    minor topics.
    We carefully have considered Defendant’s other arguments concerning other
    alleged plain errors by the district court concerning expert testimony, and we find
    no reversible error.
    2. The district court did not err under Bruton v. United States, 
    391 U.S. 123
    (1968), by admitting the statement by a co-defendant, because the statement did
    not "facially, expressly, or powerfully implicate[]" Defendant. United States v.
    2
    Hernandez-Orellana, 
    539 F.3d 994
    , 1001 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Additionally, even assuming that the admission of the statement violated
    Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
     (2004), see United States v. Tuyet Thi-Bach
    Nguyen, 
    565 F.3d 668
    , 674–75 (9th Cir. 2009) (interpreting Crawford broadly),
    any such error was harmless. The statement’s implication of Defendant was not
    great and, as noted above, the evidence against Defendant was overwhelming.
    3. The district court did not err—let alone plainly err—by admitting the
    "prior acts" evidence relevant to two co-defendants. The district court gave a
    limiting instruction, and Defendant cites no support for his argument that the
    district court sua sponte must deny admission of relevant evidence simply because
    it may have some small prejudicial effect on a co-defendant.
    4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting lay testimony
    identifying Defendant’s voice. See United States v. Alvarez, 
    358 F.3d 1194
    , 1205
    (9th Cir. 2004) (stating the standard of review). Federal Rule of Evidence 901
    contemplates this type of testimony, and Federal Rule of Evidence 701 is not to the
    contrary. The district court did not abuse its "wide discretion" in admitting this
    evidence. Alvarez, 
    358 F.3d at 1205
    .
    5. The district court did not err at sentencing. The district court’s
    determination not to grant a two-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility
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    was not clearly erroneous, particularly in light of the "great deference" that we owe
    to the court’s decision. United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 
    369 F.3d 1076
    ,
    1088–89 (9th Cir. 2004). The imposition of a sentence at the low end of the
    Guidelines range was not unreasonable.
    AFFIRMED.
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