Ronald Hills v. Indymac Mortgage Holdings, Inc ( 2018 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 12 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RONALD HILLS; IVAN RENE MOORE,                  No.    17-56599
    individually, and as the Executor of the
    Estate of Ima Moore,                            D.C. No. 2:17-cv-04826-RGK-PJW
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    INDYMAC MORTGAGE HOLDINGS,
    INC.; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted July 10, 2018**
    Before:      CANBY, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    Ronald Hills and Ivan Rene Moore appeal pro se from the district court’s
    judgment dismissing their action alleging federal and state law violations related to
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appellants’ request for oral
    argument, set forth in their opening and reply briefs, is denied.
    a mortgage loan, foreclosure, and subsequent title transfers. We have jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of the statute
    of limitations and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,
    
    382 F.3d 969
    , 973 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed appellants’ action because it is time-
    barred and appellants failed to plead facts demonstrating that equitable tolling
    should apply. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 
    656 F.3d 1034
    ,
    1045-46 (9th Cir. 2011) (federal standard for equitable tolling); Collier v. City of
    Pasadena, 
    191 Cal. Rptr. 681
    , 685 (Ct. App. 1983) (test under California law for
    equitable tolling of limitations period).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants an
    opportunity to amend because amendment would have been futile. See 
    Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041
    (setting forth standard of review and stating that leave to amend
    may be denied where amendment would be futile); Kendall v. Visa USA, Inc., 
    518 F.3d 1042
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 2008) (amendment is futile where a plaintiff “fail[s] to
    state what additional facts [he] would plead if given leave to amend, or what
    additional discovery [he] would conduct to discover such facts”).
    We do not consider issues not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in
    2                                    17-56599
    the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal.
    See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    17-56599