Coulette Osmore v. Michael Astrue , 472 F. App'x 529 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             MAR 20 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    COULETTE OSMORE,                                 No. 11-35212
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 3:09-cv-05640-RBL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
    the Social Security Administration
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 6, 2012 **
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: PAEZ and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges, and GWIN, District Judge.***
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
    Coulette Osmore appeals the district court’s judgment reversing the
    Commissioner’s final decision that Osmore was not disabled within the meaning of
    Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1383c(a)(3), and remanding the
    matter for further administrative proceedings. With her appeal, Osmore seeks an
    order that, on remand, the Adminstrative Law Judge (ALJ) must complete an
    entirely new evaluation of Osmore’s Supplemental Security Income and Disability
    Insurance Benefits applications. We affirm.
    Standing
    Osmore has standing to pursue this appeal because “the District Court’s
    order g[ave] [Osmore] some, but not all, of the relief she requested.” Forney v.
    Apfel, 
    524 U.S. 266
    , 271 (1998).
    Evaluation of the Medical Evidence
    The Commissioner says that, on remand, he will both consider the effects of
    Osmore’s mental impairments and allow Osmore to argue that medication side
    effects limit her residual functional capacity. Accordingly, Osmore’s claim that
    the ALJ improperly disregarded evidence of Osmore’s depression and medication
    side effects is moot. See W. Coast Seafood Processors Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def.
    Council, Inc., 
    643 F.3d 701
    , 704 (9th Cir. 2011) (“An appeal is moot if there exists
    no ‘present controversy as to which effect relief can be granted.’” (quoting
    Outdoor Media Grp., Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 
    506 F.3d 895
    , 900 (9th Cir.
    2007))). On remand, the ALJ must consider Osmore’s mental impairments and
    medication side effects.
    The ALJ did not err by failing to discuss specifically Osmore’s MRI and CT
    scan results. “[I]n interpreting the evidence and developing the record, the ALJ
    does not need to discuss every piece of evidence.” Howard ex rel. Wolff v.
    Barnhart, 
    341 F.3d 1006
    , 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted). Here, Osmore’s MRI results were consistent with her CT scan
    results. Both revealed that Osmore has the severe impairment spondylolisthesis.
    The ALJ properly considered Osmore’s medical records—including records that
    evaluated her MRI and CT scan—in evaluating Osmore’s impairments.
    The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Tim
    Truschel’s (a treating physician) opinion: other treating and non-treating
    physicians’ opinions, along with Osmore’s treatment records, contradicted Dr.
    Truschel’s opinion. A non-examining physician’s opinion may constitute
    substantial evidence to disregard the opinion of an examining physician if it is
    consistent with other independent evidence in the record and the ALJ does not rely
    on the non-examining physician’s report alone. Lester v. Chater, 
    81 F.3d 821
    , 831
    (9th Cir. 1995).
    The ALJ did not err in evaluating the medical records from Osmore’s twelve
    other physicians. The ALJ noted Osmore’s history of back pain, cited several of
    Osmore’s physicians’ medical opinions and treatment records, and appropriately
    developed and considered the record. See, e.g., Howard, 
    341 F.3d at 1012
    .
    Evaluation of Other Evidence
    The ALJ did not err in discrediting Osmore’s symptom testimony based on
    inconsistencies with 1) the objective medical evidence and 2) Osmore’s daily
    activities. See Regennitter v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    166 F.3d 1294
    , 1297 (9th
    Cir. 1998) (Inconsistencies with clinical observations can “satisfy the requirement
    of a clear and convincing reason for discrediting a claimant’s testimony.”); Rollins
    v. Massanari, 
    261 F.3d 853
    , 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (The ALJ may reject the
    claimant’s testimony when inconsistent with the claimant’s daily activities and
    contrary to the medical evidence.).
    The ALJ did not err in failing to consider Osmore’s lay-witness evidence. In
    2004, Osmore’s husband and sister prepared reports for Osmore’s prior Social
    Security benefits applications; the present application concerns disability
    beginning March 2005. Accordingly, these out-of-date lay-witness reports are not
    probative evidence of Osmore’s 2005 disability status. See Vincent v. Heckler, 
    739 F.2d 1393
    , 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he evidence which the Secretary ignored was
    neither significant nor probative.”). On remand, however, Osmore may seek leave
    to submit additional evidence from lay witnesses.
    Other Claims of Error
    The district court explained that because “the ALJ erred in evaluating the
    medical evidence in the record concerning [Osmore’s] mental impairments and
    limitations,” the ALJ also erred “in assessing [Osmore’s] residual functional
    capacity.” In its judgment reversing and remanding, the district court ordered the
    ALJ to make a new determination of Osmore’s residual functional capacity and of
    Osmore’s ability to perform past relevant and current work. Accordingly,
    Osmore’s remaining allegations of error—regarding the ALJ’s determination of
    Osmore’s residual functional capacity and ability to perform past relevant and
    current work—are also moot. See W. Coast Seafood, 
    643 F.3d at 704
    .
    AFFIRMED.