Raye Stiles v. Paragon Realty , 474 F. App'x 661 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            JUL 20 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RAYE ELLEN STILES,                               No. 11-15903
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 4:07-cv-00670-RCC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    PARAGON REALTY, DBA TPI Vista
    Montana, LLC; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted July 17, 2012 **
    Before:        SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
    Raye Ellen Stiles appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
    in her action alleging, among other claims, housing discrimination. We have
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    11-15903
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo and may affirm the
    district court on any ground supported by the record. Crowley v. Nevada, 
    678 F.3d 730
    , 733–34 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
    Summary judgment on Stiles’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional
    distress, aggravation of preexisting conditions, and public humiliation was proper
    because she already litigated these claims in Arizona state court, and, thus, res
    judicata precludes her from bringing such claims in federal court. See Sunkist
    Growers v. Fisher, 
    104 F.3d 280
    , 283–84 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that under
    Arizona law a litigant may not bring a claim identical to one she has previously
    litigated).
    Summary judgment on Stiles’ federal claims and her state law conspiracy
    claims based on her eviction was also proper because Stiles is collaterally estopped
    from relitigating the issue of whether her landlord had a valid, non-pretexual
    motive for evicting her. See Chaney Bldg. Co. v. Tucson, 
    716 P.2d 28
    , 30 (Ariz.
    1986) (discussing the differences between issue and claim preclusion).
    Summary judgment on Stiles’ claim that defendants failed to repair her
    apartment out of discriminatory or retaliatory animus in violation of the Federal
    Housing Act was proper because she failed to raise a material dispute of fact as to
    whether there was disparate treatment based upon a federally protected ground.
    2                                     11-15903
    See Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 
    583 F.3d 690
    , 711
    (9th Cir. 2009); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 256 (1986)
    (plaintiff may not survive summary judgment based on conclusory allegations in
    complaint).
    Stiles’ other contentions, including those concerning discovery issues and
    alleged attorney misconduct, are unpersuasive.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                   11-15903