United States v. Jarrid Bloom , 474 F. App'x 664 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 20 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-30007
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:09-cr-00015-RRB-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JARRID CHRISTOPHER BLOOM,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 28, 2012
Fairbanks, Alaska
Before: GOODWIN, W. FLETCHER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Jarrid Christopher Bloom contends that the district
court’s restitution order violates the terms of his plea agreement, and he therefore
seeks to withdraw the plea. As the facts and procedural history are familiar to the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
parties, we do not recite them here except as necessary to explain our disposition.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm Bloom’s conviction.
“Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are measured by contract law
standards.” United States v. De La Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation omitted). To interpret plea agreements, this court applies
“objective standards” to determine “the parties’ or defendant’s reasonable beliefs
that control.” Id. at 1337 n.7.
Here, Bloom seeks to withdraw his plea agreement because the court ordered
restitution despite a statement in the the plea agreement that states “[n]o restitution
is involved in this case.” However, the plea agreement also states that “the Court
may order the defendant to pay restitution[,]” and that Bloom “waives without
exception the right to appeal on all grounds contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3742 the
sentence the Court imposes – including forfeiture (if applicable) or terms or
conditions of probation (if applicable) or supervised release, and any fines or
restitution.” (emphasis added). These statements put Bloom on notice that the plea
could result in restitution, despite the inaccurate boilerplate language. See United
States v. Anglin, 215 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
government’s “failure to remove from a plea agreement boilerplate language that
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reserves a defendant’s right to appeal her conviction does not necessarily vitiate
other language in the plea agreement that clearly waives that right”).
Moreover, in Bloom’s January 4, 2010 Sentencing Memorandum, filed after
the court accepted the plea, Bloom argued that the statement that “[n]o restitution
is involved in this case” means that the court may not require him to pay
restitution. However, Bloom stated that he “does not want to withdraw his guilty
plea, nor does he wish to set the plea agreement aside. He simply asks that the
court compel the government through specific performance to provide the benefit
promised to him in exchange for surrendering his right to trial, i.e., stand by the
stated agreement of no restitution.” On appeal, Bloom cannot seek for the first
time to vacate his plea agreement. Accordingly, we affirm Bloom’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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