Villatoro-Samayoa v. Garland ( 2021 )


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  •      19-1366
    Villatoro-Samayoa v. Garland
    BIA
    Ruehle, IJ
    A205 930 285/208 173 481
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3   States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4   on the 24th day of November, two thousand twenty-one.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            REENA RAGGI,
    8            RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    9            DENNY CHIN,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   EDELZAR VILLATORO-SAMAYOA,
    14   ADILENY MARISOL CASTANEDA
    15   MARTINEZ, A.K.A. ADELANY MARISOL
    16   CASTANEDA-MARTINEZ
    17            Petitioners,
    18
    19                     v.                                   19-1366
    20                                                          NAC
    21   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    22   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    23            Respondent.
    24   _____________________________________
    25
    26   FOR PETITIONERS:                   Stephen K. Tills, Esq., Orchard
    27                                      Park, NY.
    1    FOR RESPONDENT:                  Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
    2                                     General; Clair L. Workman, Senior
    3                                     Litigation Counsel; John B. Holt,
    4                                     Trial Attorney, Office of
    5                                     Immigration Litigation, United
    6                                     States Department of Justice,
    7                                     Washington, DC.
    8         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    9   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    11   is DENIED.
    12         Petitioners      Edelzar     Villatoro-Samayoa       and     Adileny
    13   Marisol     Castaneda    Martinez,      natives    and     citizens       of
    14   Guatemala, seek review of a December 18, 2019, decision of
    15   the   BIA   affirming    a   November   13,    2017,    decision    of    an
    16   Immigration    Judge    (“IJ”)    denying     asylum,    withholding      of
    17   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    18   (“CAT”).     In re Edelzar Villatoro-Samayoa, Adileny Marisol
    19   Castaneda Martinez, No. A 205 930 285/208 173 481 (B.I.A. Dec.
    20   18, 2019), aff’g No. A 205 930 285/208 173 481 (Immig. Ct.
    21   Buffalo Nov. 13, 2017).          We assume the parties’ familiarity
    22   with the underlying facts and procedural history.
    23         We review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA and
    24   assume credibility as the BIA did.          See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S.
    25   Dep’t of Just., 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d Cir. 2005).                        The
    2
    1    applicable standards of review are well established.                    See
    2    Yanqin Weng v. Gonzales, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009)
    3    (reviewing     factual   findings    for   substantial     evidence     and
    4    questions of law and application of law to fact de novo).
    5         Petitioners’ claim that the immigration court lacked
    6    jurisdiction over their proceedings is foreclosed by Banegas
    7    Gomez v. Barr, 
    922 F.3d 101
    , 110–12 (2d Cir. 2019).                        In
    8    Pereira   v.    Sessions,   the     Supreme   Court      held    that   the
    9   Immigration     and   Nationality     Act unambiguously         requires    a
    10   Notice to Appear (“NTA”) to include a hearing time and place
    11   to trigger the “stop-time rule,” 
    138 S. Ct. 2105
    , 2113–20
    12   (2018), which cuts off an alien’s accrual of physical presence
    13   or residence for the purposes of qualifying for cancellation
    14   of   removal,   see 8    U.S.C.     § 1229b(a),   (b),    (d)(1).       The
    15   Supreme Court recently clarified that an NTA that does not
    16   contain a hearing date and time as required by Pereira is not
    17   cured for purposes of the stop-time rule by a subsequent
    18   notice of hearing that provides the missing information.                See
    19   Niz-Chavez v. Garland, No. 19-863, --- S. Ct. ---, 
    2021 WL 20
       1676619, at *3, 5–6 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2021) (holding that time
    21   does not stop for purposes of cancellation of removal unless
    22   the Government issues a single NTA containing all statutorily
    3
    1    required information rather than providing the information in
    2    separate documents).
    3         Both Pereira — as we discussed in Banegas-Gomez — and
    4   Niz-Chavez address a “narrow question” regarding the stop-
    5   time rule and do not “void jurisdiction in cases in which an
    6   NTA omits a hearing time or place.”             Banegas Gomez, 
    922 F.3d 7
       at   110.     We     have     held    that    the    regulation    vesting
    8   jurisdiction       does    not   specify     what   information   must   be
    9   contained in a “charging document,” nor does it require an
    10   NTA to specify the time and date of the initial hearing, “so
    11   long as a notice of hearing specifying this information is
    12   later sent to the alien.”            
    Id.
     at 111–12 (internal quotation
    13   marks omitted).            Although the petitioners’ NTAs did not
    14   include the hearing time and date, they both subsequently
    15   received    hearing       notices    specifying     that   information   and
    16   attended their hearings.
    17        As to the agency’s denial of asylum, withholding of
    18   removal, and CAT relief, the petitioners challenge the IJ’s
    19   adverse     credibility       determination.          However,    the    BIA
    20   expressly assumed credibility, so the adverse credibility
    21   determination is no longer a basis for the decision under
    22   review.     See Xue Hong Yang, 
    426 F.3d at 522
    .                Petitioners
    4
    1   have    otherwise            abandoned         their    claims       because      they   only
    2   briefly address the other grounds for the denial of relief,
    3   arguing       only       generally          that       the     Guatemalan         government
    4   threatened         them       because       they       protested       a    hydro-electric
    5   project.          See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    426 F.3d 540
    , 545
    6   n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (deeming applicant’s “claim abandoned”
    7   where    he       raised          an   issue    in     “only    a    single       conclusory
    8   sentence”); Norton v. Sam’s Club, 
    145 F.3d 114
    , 117 (2d Cir.
    9   1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are
    10   considered waived and normally will not be addressed on
    11   appeal.”).
    12          Were we to reach the merits of the agency’s decisions,
    13   we   would        find       no    error.        The    record       supports      the   IJ’s
    14   conclusions that the petitioners failed to establish past
    15   harm    rising          to    the      level    of     persecution,         a   nexus    to   a
    16   protected ground, or well-founded fear of future persecution.
    17          The        petitioners           alleged        verbal       threats,      that    one
    18   petitioner was shot at but not injured by an unidentified
    19   person, and that the other petitioner was threatened once in
    20   person       by    an    individual         who      grabbed     her       arm.    Although
    21   persecution can include “non-life-threatening violence and
    22   physical abuse,” Beskovic v. Gonzales, 
    467 F.3d 223
    , 226 n.3
    5
    1    (2d Cir. 2006), the harm must be sufficiently severe, see
    2    Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
    433 F.3d 332
    , 341 (2d
    3    Cir. 2006), and there must be evidence that the harm was on
    4    account      of     a   protected        ground,     see       8      U.S.C.
    5   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).            Absent      past     persecution,        the
    6   petitioners could not meet their burden to show an objectively
    7   reasonable fear of future persecution or torture because they
    8   presented    no    evidence   that   anyone   in   Guatemala       remained
    9   interested    in    harming   them   and   the    Government       presented
    10   evidence that the hydro-electric project had been abandoned.
    11   See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (a), (b)(1); Jian Xing Huang v. U.S.
    12   INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    , 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of
    13   solid support in the record . . . [an applicant’s] fear is
    14   speculative at best.”).
    15       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    16   DENIED.     All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    17   stays VACATED.
    18                                    FOR THE COURT:
    19                                    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    20                                    Clerk of Court
    6