Laurel Curtis v. Cir , 648 F. App'x 689 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 18 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAUREL ANN CURTIS, No. 13-72743
Petitioner - Appellant, Tax Ct. No. 5657-10
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from a Decision of the
United States Tax Court
Submitted March 7, 2016**
Portland, Oregon
Before: BERZON and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and SAMMARTINO,***
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
Laurel Ann Curtis appeals pro se from the Tax Court’s decision upholding
income tax deficiencies and additions to tax for tax years 1994 through 1997. We
have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). We review the Tax Court’s legal
conclusions de novo, and review its factual findings for clear error. Johanson v.
Comm’r, 541 F.3d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
1. We reject Curtis’s contention that the IRS lacked authority to assess taxes
because the statute of limitations had run. Curtis admits that she never filed tax
returns for 1994 through 1997. “In the case of failure to file a return, the tax may
be assessed . . . at any time.” 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c)(3).
2. The Tax Court properly concluded, on stipulated evidence, that the rents
and capital gains Curtis had received were taxable income. The Internal Revenue
Code defines “gross income” as “all income from whatever source derived,”
including both rents and “[g]ains derived from dealings in property.” 26 U.S.C. §
61(a)(3), (5). The Tax Court also appropriately imposed additions to tax for
Curtis’s failure to pay estimated taxes. See 26 U.S.C. § 6654(a).
3. The Tax Court did not err by imposing a penalty for Curtis’s fraudulent
failure to file tax returns. The Internal Revenue Code authorizes penalties for
fraudulent failure to file timely tax returns, id. § 6651(f), and this Court has defined
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tax fraud to include “intentional wrongdoing on the part of the taxpayer with the
specific intent to avoid a tax known to be owing.” Maciel v. C.I.R., 489 F.3d 1018,
1026 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estate of
Trompeter v. Comm’r, 279 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Tax Court did not
clearly err in finding that Curtis had such intent.
4. The Tax Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sanction against
Curtis under 26 U.S.C. § 6673 for taking frivolous positions regarding the
constitutionality and mandatory nature of income taxes. See id. § 6673(a)(1).
Curtis relied on arguments that have long been held frivolous, including in a
previous case against Curtis. Curtis v. C.I.R., 73 F. App’x 200, 202 (9th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished). “When taxpayers are on notice that they may face sanctions for
frivolous litigation, the tax court is within its discretion to award sanctions under
section 6673.” Wolf v. Comm’r, 4 F.3d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED.
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