United States v. Ym, Juvenile Female , 486 F. App'x 688 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    *
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            NOV 07 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 11-10256
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 4:10-cr-03289-CKJ-JJM-
    1
    v.
    YM, JUVENILE FEMALE,                             MEMORANDUM *
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted September 11, 2012
    Las Vegas, Nevada
    Before: ARNOLD**, RAWLINSON, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Y.M. appeals after being adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for knowingly
    possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute it. We conclude that the
    government has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that any violations of the
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Morris S. Arnold, Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth
    Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 5031
    -
    5042, that may have occurred in this case did not prejudice Y.M. See United States
    v. Juvenile Male, 
    595 F.3d 885
    , 902-04 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). We also hold
    that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting a Customs and
    Border Protection (CBP) agent to testify as an expert in identifying marijuana. The
    officer testified that he had been a CBP agent for approximately six years, had
    received specialized training in identifying narcotics, and had encountered
    marijuana more than one hundred times over the course of his career. The district
    court thus had an ample record from which to conclude that the CBP agent was
    “qualified as an expert” because of his “knowledge, skill, experience, training,
    [and] education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. His testimony, moreover, was “the product
    of reliable principles and methods,” and he “reliably applied the principles and
    methods to the facts of the case.” Id.; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
    Inc., 
    509 U.S. 579
     (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
    526 U.S. 137
     (1999).
    Nor did the district court violate the Confrontation Clause by admitting the
    CBP agent’s testimony about lab reports that supported his past accuracy in
    identifying substances as marijuana. The government did not introduce any lab
    reports that identified the seized material as marijuana, and the court relied on the
    CBP agent's testimony about the lab reports only to determine the admissibility of
    2                                    11-10256
    his expert testimony, not as evidence of Y.M.’s guilt. Cf. Melendez-Diaz v.
    Massachusetts, 
    557 U.S. 305
    , 311 (2009). The government also met its burden of
    showing that it was “more probable than not” that any error in the court’s
    admission of evidence of a prior act under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) “did not materially
    affect the verdict.” United States v. Seschillie, 
    310 F.3d 1208
    , 1214 (9th Cir.
    2002).
    Finally, we detect no error in the district court’s conclusion that Y.M. failed
    to make out a duress defense. See, e.g., United States v. Leal-Cruz, 
    431 F.3d 667
    ,
    673 (9th Cir. 2005).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    11-10256