Thomas Beltran v. County of Los Angeles , 401 F. App'x 182 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             OCT 26 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    THOMAS E. BELTRAN,                               No. 08-56007
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00731-GAF-JWJ
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a political
    subdivision of the State of California; et
    al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 6, 2010 **
    Pasadena, California
    Before: HALL, FISHER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Thomas Beltran timely appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in
    his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging that Los Angeles County Sheriff Deputies Salim
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Aimaq and Penelope Armstrong falsely arrested him, detained him for an excessive
    period of time, and used excessive force against him. The district court held that the
    undisputed evidence showed that no constitutional violations occurred and that the
    deputies acted reasonably in detaining Beltran. We have jurisdiction over this matter
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    The facts of this case are known to the parties and we need not repeat them.
    Beltran may prevail on his false arrest claim if the deputies lacked probable
    cause to arrest him. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 
    159 F.3d 374
    , 380 (9th
    Cir. 1998). Probable cause exists if, “under the totality of the circumstances known
    to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair
    probability that [the arrested person] had committed a crime.” Beier v. City of
    Lewiston, 
    354 F.3d 1058
    , 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). Undisputed evidence in the record
    shows that the deputies had probable cause to arrest Beltran for burglary, having seen
    him carrying things out of a house the deputies believed no one was permitted to
    enter, and which Beltran admitted entering through a window. Thus, there was no
    genuine issue of material fact as to the false arrest claim and summary judgment was
    appropriate.
    Summary judgment was also proper for Beltran’s excessive detention claim.
    A detention, although initially appropriate, may be too long in duration to be justified
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    as an investigative stop. See United States v. Sharpe, 
    470 U.S. 675
    , 686 (1985).
    Whether a detention is too long is determined by examining “whether the police
    diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
    suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Id.;
    see also Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles, 
    308 F.3d 987
    , 992 (9th Cir. 2002). The
    evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Beltran shows that the deputies were
    diligently pursuing their investigation throughout the time Beltran was detained.
    Beltran’s statements to the deputies that he was an attorney for the co-administrator
    of the estate did not amount to exonerating evidence that stripped the deputies of
    probable cause or eliminated Beltran as a burglary suspect. Even if the deputies
    believed these statements, as Beltran alleges, the statements would have established
    only that Beltran was an attorney for the co-administrator—not that he was not
    committing burglary. Detaining Beltran after he made these statements, therefore, was
    not excessive.
    Finally, “[i]t is well-established that overly tight handcuffing can constitute
    excessive force.” Wall v. County of Orange, 
    364 F.3d 1107
    , 1112 (9th Cir. 2004).
    Beltran’s claim against the deputies for excessive force is analyzed under the Fourth
    Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. See Graham v. Connor, 
    490 U.S. 386
    , 388 (1989). This standard requires an evaluation of the officers’ conduct from
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    the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. 
    Id.
     at 396–97. Beltran was not
    subjected to excessive force because, given the undisputed facts, it was objectively
    reasonable for the deputies to finish their initial investigation of the residence and to
    clear the area before addressing Beltran’s complaints about his handcuffs being too
    tight.   After finishing their initial investigation, the deputies properly loosened
    Beltran’s handcuffs twice, when asked. Summary judgment was therefore proper.
    AFFIRMED.
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