Urica, Inc. v. Medline Industries, Inc. , 669 F. App'x 421 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    SEP 30 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    URICA, INC.,                                     No.   14-56545
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No.
    2:11-cv-02476-MMM-RZ
    v.
    MEDLINE INDUSTRIES, INC.;                        MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted September 2, 2016**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: TASHIMA, WARDLAW, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Urica, Inc. (“Urica”) asks us to reverse the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment to defendant Medline Industries, Inc. (“Medline”) on Urica’s inducing
    breach of contract claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Under California law, there are five elements for a claim of intentional
    interference with contractual relations: “(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a
    third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional
    acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4)
    actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting
    damage.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 
    50 Cal. 3d 1118
    , 1126
    (1990). Each element must be established to succeed on the claim. The district
    court correctly found that Urica failed to offer proof of resulting damages.
    “[D]amages for the loss of prospective profits are recoverable where the
    evidence makes reasonably certain their occurrence and extent.” Grupe v. Glick,
    
    26 Cal. 2d 680
    , 693 (1945). During trial, Urica conceded that it could not make an
    admissible claim for lost profits. As Urica’s counsel stated: “[P]laintiffs must
    concede to the Court that we cannot make an admissible case for lost profits . . .
    where Pharmaplast continued to supply goods to existing customers, the Court
    concluded that it would be too speculative. And we, of course, have no evidence to
    the contrary . . . .” Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings at 7, Urica, Inc. v.
    Medline Indus., Inc., No. CV11-2476-MMM-RZ (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2013).
    Indeed, the evidence shows that Urica’s affiliate URI Health & Beauty LLC
    (“URIHB”) did not lose any existing or future customers as a result of Medline’s
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    alleged interference. Despite the 2008 agreement between Medline and
    Pharmaplast S.A.E. (“Pharmaplast”), Pharmaplast continued to sell products to
    URIHB for existing customers. And Pharmaplast decided to stop quoting prices
    for new URIHB customers in late 2007 or early 2008 (before Medline’s alleged
    interference) because of URIHB’s chronic late payments.
    Urica suggests that Medline’s profits from sales of Pharmaplast products
    would be an appropriate measurement of damages. California courts have
    permitted consideration of a defendant’s profits in measuring a plaintiff’s loss of
    profits. See GHK Assocs. v. Mayer Grp., 
    224 Cal. App. 3d 856
    , 874 (1990);
    Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp. v. Care Enters., 
    177 Cal. App. 3d 1120
    , 1140
    (1986). But using a defendant’s profits as a measurement of damages is
    appropriate only when the plaintiff has first produced evidence that it was, in fact,
    damaged by the defendant’s interference. See GHK, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 873
    (using the defendant’s profits as a measurement of damages only after first finding
    that “substantial evidence” showed that the plaintiff was damaged and noting that
    “[w]here the fact of damages is certain, the amount of damages need not be
    calculated with absolute certainty”).
    Urica failed to make the initial showing that it was damaged by Medline’s
    alleged interference. As explained previously, Urica continued to place orders
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    with Pharmaplast for existing customers through 2011, and Pharmaplast chose not
    to quote prices for new URIHB customers for reasons independent of its later
    agreement with Medline.
    As the district court also noted, California law generally does not allow
    plaintiffs to recover more on an inducing breach of contract theory than they would
    have had the contract been fully performed. See GHK, 224 Cal. App. 3d at
    874–75. Notably, the district court granted summary judgment to Pharmaplast on
    Urica’s breach of contract claim on the ground that Urica suffered no damages as a
    result of that breach, and Urica does not appeal that holding. If Urica cannot
    recover against Pharmaplast (the very party that allegedly breached the exclusivity
    contract) because there were no resulting damages, then it necessarily follows that
    it cannot recover against Medline for inducing that breach. Further, expert
    testimony showed that, even if Pharmaplast would have been willing to supply
    URIHB’s new customers, URIHB would not have been able to take on the clients
    that Medline acquired because URIHB lacked the resources and management to
    handle such a large increase in sales. Accordingly, any attribution of Medline’s
    sales to URIHB for the purpose of calculating URIHB’s damages would likely
    result in a windfall to URIHB.
    AFFIRMED.
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