Margaretha Widjaja v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ( 2021 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MARGARETHA NATALIA WIDJAJA,                        No. 20-55862
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    D.C. No.
    v.                           2:19-cv-07825-
    MWF-AFM
    JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., a
    national banking association,
    Defendant-Appellee,                  OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 6, 2021
    Pasadena, California
    Filed December 20, 2021
    Before: D. Michael Fisher, * Paul J. Watford, and
    Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Watford
    *
    The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2            WIDJAJA V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK
    SUMMARY **
    Electronic Fund Transfer Act
    The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the
    district court’s dismissal of an action under the Electronic
    Fund Transfer Act against JPMorgan Chase Bank.
    Reversing the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim under the
    EFTA or its California counterpart and remanding, the panel
    held that, to avoid liability for unauthorized electronic fund
    transfers, a consumer must report an unauthorized
    withdrawal within 60 days after a bank sends a monthly
    statement reflecting the withdrawal. The panel held that
    plaintiff did not plausibly allege extenuating circumstances
    excusing her failure to report unauthorized withdrawals, and
    notice to Chase from a third-party source did not excuse her
    failure to report. Nonetheless, under 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a),
    a consumer may be held liable for unauthorized transfers
    occurring after the 60-day period only if the bank establishes
    that those transfers “would not have occurred but for the
    failure of the consumer” to timely report the earlier
    unauthorized transfer reflected on her bank statement. The
    panel held that plaintiff met her pleading burden by alleging
    facts plausibly suggesting that even if she had reported an
    unauthorized transfer within the 60-day period, the
    subsequent unauthorized transfers for which she sought
    reimbursement would still have occurred.
    Affirming the dismissal of additional state law claims,
    the panel held that plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    WIDJAJA V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK                  3
    failed because a Privacy Notice appended to her Deposit
    Account Agreement did not impose any substantive duties
    on Chase. The panel held that plaintiff’s claim for breach of
    the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing failed
    because the Deposit Account Agreement expressly
    permitted Chase to close plaintiff’s accounts.
    COUNSEL
    Paro Astourian (argued), Astourian & Associates Inc.,
    Pasadena, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Karin L. Bohmholdt (argued) and Blakeley S. Oranburg,
    Greenburg Traurig LLP, Los Angeles, California, for
    Defendant-Appellee.
    OPINION
    WATFORD, Circuit Judge:
    To address concerns raised by the increasing prevalence
    of electronic banking transactions, Congress enacted the
    Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 (EFTA), 
    15 U.S.C. § 1693
     et seq. Lawmakers viewed such transactions—
    processed through computer networks without human
    interaction—as “much more vulnerable to fraud,
    embezzlement, and unauthorized use than the traditional
    payment methods.” Bank of America v. City and County of
    San Francisco, 
    309 F.3d 551
    , 564 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
    H.R. Rep. No. 95-1315, at 2 (1978)). Consumer groups
    urged Congress to provide protection from liability for
    unauthorized transfers, similar to the protection Congress
    had already afforded for unauthorized credit card charges.
    4          WIDJAJA V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK
    See 
    15 U.S.C. § 1643
    (a) (imposing a $50 cap on liability for
    unauthorized credit card use); Lewis M. Taffer, The Making
    of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act: A Look at Consumer
    Liability and Error Resolution, 
    13 U.S.F. L. Rev. 231
    , 238
    (1979). Congress responded in the EFTA by imposing a
    similar, but not identical, cap on a consumer’s liability for
    unauthorized electronic fund transfers.
    The plaintiff in this case, Margaretha Widjaja, alleges
    that she was the victim of unauthorized electronic fund
    transfers from her checking account at JPMorgan Chase
    Bank (Chase).        Identity thieves made a series of
    unauthorized withdrawals that ultimately totaled more than
    half a million dollars. Chase reimbursed Widjaja for some
    of those losses, but it has refused to repay $300,000 of the
    funds stolen from her account. Widjaja sued Chase for
    violating the EFTA, alleging that the bank has imposed
    liability on her in excess of what the EFTA allows. The
    district court dismissed Widjaja’s complaint at the pleading
    stage on the ground that Widjaja’s lengthy delay in reporting
    the unauthorized withdrawals to Chase barred her claims as
    a matter of law. We conclude that the district court
    misinterpreted the relevant provision of the EFTA and
    reverse the dismissal of Widjaja’s EFTA claim.
    I
    According to the complaint, whose allegations we accept
    as true at this stage of the litigation, Widjaja is a foreign
    national who held several accounts at Chase, including the
    checking account at issue here. Although she maintains a
    residence in California, Widjaja resides primarily outside the
    United States and spends a significant portion of the year
    traveling overseas.
    WIDJAJA V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK                  5
    Widjaja alleges that, through unknown means,
    unidentified individuals gained access to her Chase checking
    account in October 2017 and began making unauthorized
    withdrawals without her knowledge. The first withdrawal
    involved a transfer on October 31 of less than two dollars to
    Union Bank, followed by a much larger transfer of $29,000
    to Union Bank on November 2. This second transfer aroused
    Union Bank’s suspicion, which led it to contact Chase’s
    fraud department. The banks jointly determined that the
    transaction was fraudulent, as the Union Bank customer who
    received the $29,000 had no relationship with Widjaja.
    Union Bank accordingly refunded the money to Widjaja’s
    Chase account.
    Although Chase learned through this episode that
    Widjaja’s account had been compromised, it did nothing to
    protect her account from further unauthorized withdrawals.
    It did not change Widjaja’s account number and password or
    freeze her account. Nor did it inform her that an
    unauthorized transfer had taken place. Due to this inaction,
    Widjaja alleges, the same individuals were able to make
    more than 100 unauthorized withdrawals from her checking
    account between November 2017 and March 2019.
    Widjaja did not report any of the unauthorized
    withdrawals to Chase until March 2019. She does not
    dispute that each of the withdrawals appeared on the
    monthly bank statements Chase sent her. Widjaja alleges
    that, between November 2017 and March 2019, she was
    traveling overseas and had “very limited or no” internet
    access to check her bank statements. When Widjaja returned
    to California in March 2019, she reviewed her statements
    and noticed the unauthorized withdrawals. She reported
    them to Chase and thereafter the withdrawals stopped.
    6            WIDJAJA V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK
    Chase reimbursed Widjaja for some of the unauthorized
    withdrawals through its internal dispute resolution process.
    But it has refused to reimburse her for $300,000 of the losses
    she suffered, citing her failure to report the initial
    unauthorized withdrawals within 60 days of their appearance
    on her bank statements, as the EFTA ordinarily requires. See
    15 U.S.C. §§ 1693f(a), 1693g(a); 
    12 C.F.R. § 1005.6
    (b)(3). 1
    In June 2019, Widjaja filed this action against Chase.
    After amending her complaint, she asserted four claims:
    (1) violation of the EFTA or, alternatively, California’s
    EFTA counterpart, 
    Cal. Comm. Code § 11101
     et seq.;
    (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the implied covenant of
    good faith and fair dealing; and (4) negligence. The district
    court granted Chase’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule
    of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court agreed with Chase
    that the EFTA generally requires consumers to report an
    unauthorized withdrawal within 60 days after the bank sends
    a monthly statement reflecting the withdrawal. Because it is
    undisputed that Widjaja failed to report the withdrawals at
    issue within that time frame, the court held that the EFTA
    bars her claim as a matter of law. The court therefore
    dismissed Widjaja’s EFTA claim with prejudice, along with
    her remaining state law claims.
    1
    Regulation E, which implements the EFTA, was originally
    promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
    and published in Part 205 of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
    See 
    12 C.F.R. § 205.1
    (a). After the Dodd-Frank Act transferred
    rulemaking authority to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the
    Bureau republished Regulation E in Part 1005 of Title 12. See Electronic
    Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 
    76 Fed. Reg. 81,020
     (Dec. 27, 2011);
    
    12 C.F.R. § 1005.1
    (a). The provisions relevant to this case, now found
    at 
    12 C.F.R. § 1005.6
    , are identical to the provisions in 
    12 C.F.R. § 205.6
    .
    WIDJAJA V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK                    7
    II
    This appeal requires us to interpret the EFTA provision
    limiting a consumer’s liability for unauthorized electronic
    fund transfers, 15 U.S.C. § 1693g. The provision states that
    in most instances a consumer’s liability for an unauthorized
    transfer (or a series of related unauthorized transfers, see
    
    12 C.F.R. § 1005.6
    (b)) may not exceed $50. That baseline
    cap on liability is subject to two exceptions, however.
    The first exception raises the cap to $500 when the
    unauthorized transfers occur due to the loss or theft of an
    access device (such as an ATM card) and the consumer fails
    to notify her bank within two business days of learning that
    the device has been lost or stolen. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a); see
    
    12 C.F.R. § 1005.6
    (b)(2). The second exception—the one
    relevant here—provides that the cap on liability will be lifted
    if: (1) an unauthorized transfer appears on the monthly
    statement banks must send to consumers under 15 U.S.C.
    § 1693d(c); (2) the consumer fails to report the unauthorized
    transfer to her bank within 60 days after the statement is sent
    to her; and (3) the bank can establish that unauthorized
    transfers made after the 60-day period would not have
    occurred but for the consumer’s failure to provide timely
    notice of the earlier unauthorized transfer. 15 U.S.C.
    § 1693g(a). In that scenario, the consumer’s liability for
    unauthorized transfers that occur within the 60-day period
    cannot exceed $50 or $500 (depending on the
    circumstances), but the consumer faces unlimited liability
    for unauthorized transfers occurring outside the 60-day
    period. See 
    12 C.F.R. § 1005.6
    (b)(3); 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005,
    Supp. I, 6(b)(3) ¶ 1.
    8           WIDJAJA V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK
    The statutory language creating this second exception
    reads as follows:
    Notwithstanding the [default liability cap],
    reimbursement need not be made to the
    consumer for losses the financial institution
    establishes would not have occurred but for
    the failure of the consumer to report within
    sixty days of transmittal of the statement (or
    in extenuating circumstances such as
    extended travel or hospitalization, within a
    reasonable time under the circumstances) any
    unauthorized electronic fund transfer or
    account error which appears on the periodic
    statement provided to the consumer under
    section 1693d of this title.
    15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a); see also 
    12 C.F.R. § 1005.6
    (b)(3). A
    neighboring subsection makes clear that the bank bears the
    burden of proving that “the conditions of liability set forth in
    subsection (a) have been met.” 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(b).
    Widjaja does not dispute that she failed to report any of
    the unauthorized withdrawals to Chase within the 60-day
    period set by the EFTA. She contends instead that her
    compliance with the 60-day reporting requirement was
    excused for two reasons, both of which, we conclude, the
    district court properly rejected.
    First, Widjaja asserts that, during her time abroad, she
    had “very limited or no access to her banking records and/or
    to the internet,” and that her extended international travel
    thus constituted “extenuating circumstances” under
    § 1693g(a). The district court held that this cursory
    allegation does not plausibly explain how someone with
    Widjaja’s financial means lacked adequate internet access to
    WIDJAJA V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK                    9
    view her banking records for more than a year. We agree
    with the district court that Widjaja has not plausibly alleged
    “extenuating circumstances” excusing her failure to timely
    report the unauthorized withdrawals.
    Second, Widjaja contends that she did not need to report
    the unauthorized withdrawals to Chase because it was
    already aware of the initial $29,000 withdrawal in November
    2017 by virtue of its communications with Union Bank. The
    district court properly rejected this argument as well.
    Section 1693g(a) plainly states that “the consumer” must
    report an unauthorized withdrawal to her bank within the
    prescribed 60-day period to avoid facing potentially
    unlimited liability for subsequent withdrawals occurring
    after that period. The statute says nothing about a bank
    receiving notice from third-party sources unaffiliated with
    the consumer. It is true that a different portion of § 1693g(a)
    refers to losses that occur “prior to the time the financial
    institution is notified of, or otherwise becomes aware of,
    circumstances which lead to the reasonable belief that an
    unauthorized electronic fund transfer involving the
    consumer’s account has been or may be effected.”
    § 1693g(a) (emphasis added); see also 
    12 C.F.R. § 1005.6
    (b)(5)(iii) (notice is deemed “constructively given
    when the institution becomes aware of circumstances
    leading to the reasonable belief that an unauthorized
    transfer” has taken place). But that language addresses
    whether the default cap on liability for unauthorized
    transfers will be $50 or some lesser amount. When the
    statute addresses the issue relevant here—the circumstances
    under which the default cap on liability will be lifted—it
    10            WIDJAJA V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK
    unambiguously provides that “the consumer” must report an
    unauthorized transfer to her bank within the 60-day period. 2
    Despite our agreement with the district court on the two
    points just discussed, we must nonetheless reverse the
    dismissal of Widjaja’s EFTA claim. While the Act requires
    a consumer to notify her bank of unauthorized transfers
    within the prescribed 60-day reporting period, a consumer
    who fails to do so is not automatically liable for all
    subsequent losses. A consumer may be held liable for
    unauthorized transfers occurring after the 60-day period only
    if the bank establishes that those transfers “would not have
    occurred but for the failure of the consumer” to timely report
    the earlier unauthorized transfer reflected on her bank
    statement. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a). The district court’s
    analysis overlooked this requirement, and the error was not
    harmless.
    The EFTA authorizes a private right of action against a
    bank that “fails to comply” with any provision of the Act,
    including the provision limiting a consumer’s liability for
    unauthorized transfers. § 1693m(a). When, as here, a bank
    concludes that the EFTA authorizes liability in excess of the
    default cap, the consumer must allege facts plausibly
    suggesting that the bank’s conclusion is wrong in order to
    state a claim that the bank has violated § 1693g. That will
    often prove difficult when the consumer fails to report an
    unauthorized transfer within the 60-day period and seeks
    reimbursement for losses suffered as a result of further
    2
    The official staff interpretations of Regulation E state that notice
    may also be provided by “a person acting on the consumer’s behalf.”
    12 C.F.R. pt. 1005, Supp. I, 6(b)(5) ¶ 2. Widjaja does not contend that
    Union Bank was acting on her behalf when it notified Chase of the
    fraudulent transfer in November 2017.
    WIDJAJA V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK                   11
    unauthorized transfers occurring after that period. When
    notified by a consumer that an unauthorized transfer has
    taken place, most banks have procedures in place to prevent
    subsequent unauthorized transfers, such as freezing the
    consumer’s account or changing the account number and
    password. A consumer must therefore allege facts plausibly
    suggesting that even if she had reported an unauthorized
    transfer within the 60-day period, the subsequent
    unauthorized transfers for which she seeks reimbursement
    would still have occurred. See Nayab v. Capital One Bank
    (USA), N.A., 
    942 F.3d 480
    , 495–97 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding
    in a similar context that the plaintiff must allege facts giving
    rise to a reasonable inference that a statutorily available
    affirmative defense does not apply).
    We think Widjaja has met her pleading burden here. She
    alleges that Chase became aware of a security breach that
    enabled unknown individuals to make an unauthorized
    withdrawal of $29,000 from her checking account in
    November 2017. Yet, according to Widjaja’s allegations,
    Chase took no action to protect her account from further
    unauthorized withdrawals, despite having a strong financial
    incentive to do so. If Widjaja had notified Chase of the
    unauthorized withdrawals within the EFTA’s 60-day
    reporting period, Chase itself would have borne liability for
    all related unauthorized withdrawals, save for the $50 or
    $500 loss Widjaja would bear. The only outer limit on
    Chase’s liability in that scenario (assuming the thieves acted
    quickly enough) was the amount of money in Widjaja’s
    checking account—in this instance, at least half a million
    dollars. And at the time Chase allegedly failed to act in
    November 2017, it of course had no way of knowing
    whether Widjaja would fail to report the unauthorized
    withdrawals within the 60-day period, or how quickly or
    slowly the thieves would move to drain her account.
    12         WIDJAJA V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK
    The EFTA thus gave Chase a strong financial incentive
    to take immediate corrective action in November 2017,
    regardless of the source of its notice that fraud was afoot. In
    these circumstances, to hold Widjaja liable for subsequent
    losses, Chase will have to explain why its response to notice
    from Widjaja herself would have been substantially different
    from its (non)response to the notice it received from Union
    Bank. At a later stage in the case, Chase may be able to
    provide such an explanation. But at the pleading stage,
    Widjaja’s allegations plausibly suggest that some sort of
    failure in the bank’s fraud-prevention procedures occurred
    with respect to her checking account. Put differently,
    Widjaja’s allegations give rise to a reasonable inference that
    Chase would not have taken action to prevent subsequent
    losses even if she had reported the initial unauthorized
    withdrawals within the 60-day period. Her allegations
    suffice to survive a motion to dismiss.
    We reverse the district court’s dismissal of Count One,
    the count alleging a claim under the EFTA or, in the
    alternative, California’s EFTA counterpart.
    III
    Widjaja also contests the district court’s dismissal of her
    state law claims for breach of contract and breach of the
    implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (She has
    not challenged the dismissal of her negligence claim.) The
    district court held that Widjaja’s failure to provide notice to
    Chase within the EFTA’s 60-day reporting period foreclosed
    these state law claims as well. We affirm the district court’s
    dismissal of Widjaja’s state law claims, but for different
    reasons.
    As to her breach of contract claim, Widjaja argues that
    Chase’s failure to safeguard her account and to take action
    WIDJAJA V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK                  13
    in response to the notice from Union Bank violated the
    Deposit Account Agreement (DAA) that governs the
    relationship between Chase and its depositors. Widjaja does
    not cite any specific provision of the DAA that Chase
    allegedly violated. She points generally to the Privacy
    Notice appended to the DAA, which states: “To protect your
    personal information from unauthorized access and use, we
    use security measures that comply with federal law.” The
    Privacy Notice does not impose any substantive duties on
    Chase; it merely explains Chase’s policies and a consumer’s
    ability to limit the sharing of personal information.
    Widjaja’s breach of contract claim therefore fails.
    Widjaja alleges that Chase breached the implied
    covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to act when
    it became aware that Widjaja’s account had been
    compromised and by abruptly closing Widjaja’s accounts
    after she filed this lawsuit, allegedly in retaliation for her
    legal action against the bank. While the DAA gives Chase
    the discretionary power to decline or prevent transactions,
    Widjaja does not allege that Chase exercised this discretion
    in bad faith when it failed to take action to prevent the
    unauthorized withdrawals.          And the DAA expressly
    permitted Chase to close Widjaja’s accounts “at any time for
    any reason or no reason without prior notice.” The implied
    covenant of good faith cannot “prohibit a party from doing
    that which is expressly permitted by an agreement.” Carma
    Developers (California), Inc. v. Marathon Development
    California, Inc., 
    826 P.2d 710
    , 728 (Cal. 1992). Thus,
    Widjaja’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
    faith and fair dealing also fails.
    AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and
    REMANDED.
    Widjaja shall recover her costs on appeal.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-55862

Filed Date: 12/20/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/20/2021