Gunnison Valley Bank v. Crotts , 289 P.3d 608 ( 2012 )


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  •                           IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    ‐‐‐‐ooOoo‐‐‐‐
    Gunnison Valley Bank,                        )           PER CURIAM DECISION
    )
    Plaintiff and Appellee,               )            Case No. 20120389‐CA
    )
    v.                                           )                  FILED
    )              (November 1, 2012)
    Ryan Crotts and Sabrina Crotts,              )
    )              
    2012 UT App 308
    Defendants and Appellants.            )
    ‐‐‐‐‐
    Sixth District Court, Manti Department, 110600075
    The Honorable Wallace A. Lee
    Attorneys:      Ryan Crotts and Sabrina Crotts, Fairview, Appellants Pro Se
    V. Lowry Snow, Curtis M. Jensen, and J. David Westwood, St. George,
    for Appellee
    ‐‐‐‐‐
    Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Voros.
    ¶1    Ryan and Sabrina Crotts appeal the district court’s April 11, 2012 order. This
    matter is before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition. We affirm.
    ¶2     The Crottses assert that the district court erred by declining to set aside the
    default judgment entered against them after the district court struck their responsive
    pleading. A district court may set aside a default judgment for good cause shown. See
    Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c). A district court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to set
    aside a default judgment. See Salazar v. Chavez, 
    2012 UT App 177
    , ¶ 1, 
    282 P.3d 1033
    .
    This court reviews the district court’s decision on a motion to set aside a default
    judgment for an abuse of discretion. See 
    id.
     The district court also has the inherent
    power to strike a party’s pleading and award default judgment if the party engages in
    conduct that demonstrates a lack of merit. See Chen v. Stewart, 
    2005 UT 68
    ,¶ 43, 
    123 P.3d 416
    . The district court’s ruling on a motion to strike a pleading will not be disturbed
    absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Pratt v. Nelson, 
    2005 UT App 541
    , ¶ 9, 
    127 P.3d 1256
    .
    ¶3      The Bank moved to strike Ryan Crotts’s response to its complaint because he did
    not sign the response and it had been prepared by Sabrina Crotts, who is not a licensed
    attorney. The Bank also moved to strike Sabrina’s response because she indicated that
    she was “not appearing generally,” and she requested “a remedy in admiralty.” After
    the Bank moved to strike the Crottses’ response, or in the alternative, requested a more
    definite statement, the Crottses failed to timely respond to the Bank’s motions. The
    district court determined that the Crottses had failed to timely oppose the motions to
    strike, and that their response to the Bank’s complaint was “entirely unclear.” Thus, the
    district court struck the Crottses’ response to the Bank’s complaint. Subsequently, the
    Bank filed an application for default judgment, which the district court granted.
    ¶4     The Crottses filed a document that the district court construed as a rule 60(b)
    motion to set aside the default judgment. When the grounds for relief from a judgment
    or order are mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered
    evidence, or fraud, a rule 60(b) motion must be filed within three months of the entry of
    the judgment or order. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The district court determined that the
    Crottses had not timely moved to set aside the default judgment as it pertained to their
    claim for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence,
    or fraud. The district court also determined that the Crottses had failed to demonstrate
    that the default judgment was void or that the court lacked jurisdiction. The district
    court also concluded that the Crottses failed to make a plausible showing of any
    meritorious defense.
    ¶5     The Crottses fail to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by
    striking their response to the Bank’s complaint, entering default judgment, and
    declining to set aside the default judgment. Furthermore, the Crottses’ response to the
    sua sponte motion for summary disposition fails to provide the requisite legal
    argument, analysis, or presentation of a substantial issue, which, if well taken, would
    20120389‐CA                                 2
    entitle them to appellate relief. See State v. Green, 
    2005 UT 9
    ,¶ 11, 
    108 P.3d 710
    . Thus, we
    affirm the district court’s April 11, 2012 decision.
    ¶6     Affirmed.
    ____________________________________
    Gregory K. Orme, Judge
    ____________________________________
    James Z. Davis, Judge
    ____________________________________
    J. Frederic Voros Jr., Judge
    20120389‐CA                                  3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20120389-CA

Citation Numbers: 2012 UT App 308, 289 P.3d 608

Filed Date: 11/1/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023