United States v. Agustin Vasquez-Olea , 463 F. App'x 704 ( 2011 )


Menu:
  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              DEC 23 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 11-50039
    Plaintiff - Appellee,               D.C. No. 3:10-cr-01754-AJB-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    AGUSTIN VASQUEZ-OLEA,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 9, 2011
    Pasadena, California
    Before: D.W. NELSON, GOULD, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Agent
    Tobar, a native Spanish speaker who was also fluent in English, and who had
    received additional training in Spanish translation from his employer, was qualified
    to verify the accuracy of the phone call translation. See United States v. Abonce-
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Barrera, 
    257 F.3d 959
    , 964–65 (9th Cir. 2001). Even if the district court had erred
    in accepting Agent Tobar’s qualifications, any such error was harmless because
    Vasquez-Olea has not alleged any inaccuracy in the translation. See United States
    v. Pena-Espinoza, 
    47 F.3d 356
    , 360 (9th Cir. 1995).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the
    government’s notice stating that Agent Tobar would testify to the “substance” of
    the recorded phone call and providing a short summary of his knowledge of
    Spanish met the requirements of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
    Procedure, because the notice adequately “describe[s] the witness’s opinions, the
    bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness’s qualifications.” Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G). Even if the notice had been defective, Vasquez-Olea has not
    shown a reasonable likelihood that a different verdict would have resulted if he had
    received earlier or more detailed notice. See United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 
    125 F.3d 1241
    , 1247 (9th Cir. 1997).
    The district court adequately remedied any untimeliness in the government’s
    production of the recorded jail cell call to Vasquez-Olea by offering him a
    continuance, which he declined. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2)(B). Therefore, any
    untimeliness under Rule 16 was harmless. See Figueroa-Lopez, 
    125 F.3d at 1247
    .
    2
    The district court did not err in admitting Vasquez-Olea’s admissions made
    in the field because Agent Barr’s apprehension of Vasquez-Olea and his
    companions was a non-custodial Terry stop occasioned by reasonable suspicion,
    and the questioning was reasonably limited in scope and duration to confirming
    that suspicion. See United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 
    421 F.3d 825
    , 829–30 (9th
    Cir. 2005) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by Melendez-Diaz v.
    Massachusetts, 
    129 S. Ct. 2527
    , 2532 (2009). Agent Barr’s use of reasonable
    force to avoid the risk of a physical confrontation or potential flight, including the
    temporary display of a service weapon, did not convert the Terry stop into
    custodial arrest. See United States v. Buffington, 
    815 F.2d 1292
    , 1300 (9th Cir.
    1987); United States v. Greene, 
    783 F.2d 1364
    , 1367–68 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
    Cervantes-Flores, 
    421 F.3d at 830
    .
    Vasquez-Olea’s admissions, which were contained in three separate
    statements, were mutually corroborated by each other and their proximity in time
    to one another. See United States v. Hernandez, 
    105 F.3d 1330
    , 1332–33 (9th Cir.
    1997). The admissions were further corroborated by evidence of the mode of
    Vasquez-Olea’s entry to the United States and the circumstances under which
    Agent Barr tracked and discovered the group, including the activated sensors
    beginning at the border, trail of muddy footprints down a known smuggling trail,
    3
    and remote location in which the group was hiding when apprehended. See United
    States v. Garcia-Villegas, 
    575 F.3d 949
    , 951 (9th Cir. 2009). Because a rational
    factfinder could find that the element of alienage was established beyond a
    reasonable doubt, Vasquez-Olea’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails. See
    United States v. Gonzalez, 
    528 F.3d 1207
    , 1211 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Jackson v.
    Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979)).
    AFFIRMED.
    4