Beverly Hollis-Arrington v. Cendant Mortgage Corporation , 465 F. App'x 675 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JAN 09 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BEVERLY ANN HOLLIS-ARRINGTON,                    No. 10-56649
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    D.C. No. 2:00-cv-11125-CBM-
    v.                                             AJW
    CENDANT MORTGAGE
    CORPORATION; UNITED GUARANTY                     MEMORANDUM *
    INSURANCE COMPANY, Erroneously
    Sued As United Guaranty Residential
    Insurance Company,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    BEVERLY ANN HOLLIS-ARRINGTON,                    No. 10-56651
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    D.C. No. 2:01-cv-05658-CBM-
    v.                                             AJW
    CENDANT MORTGAGE
    CORPORATION; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees,
    and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    HAROLD TENNEN; ED FELDMAN,
    Intervenors - Appellees.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 19, 2011 **
    Before:        GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
    In these consolidated appeals, Beverly Ann Hollis-Arrington appeals pro se
    from the district court’s orders denying her motions to set aside the judgments in
    two actions arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo the district court’s determination of
    jurisdiction over a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, Scott v. Younger, 
    739 F.2d 1464
    ,
    1466 (9th Cir. 1984), and for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of
    such a motion, Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 
    452 F.3d 1097
    , 1100 (9th Cir.
    2006). We affirm.
    To the extent that Hollis-Arrington’s Rule 60(b) motions to set aside the
    judgments fall within Rule 60(b)(3), the district court properly denied them as
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2                                    10-56649
    untimely because Hollis-Arrington filed the motions more than one year after the
    judgments were entered. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) (allowing relief from
    judgment for “fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by opposing party”);
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (Rule 60(b)(3) motion must be made within one year of
    entry of judgment); Nevitt v. United States, 
    886 F.2d 1187
    , 1188 (9th Cir. 1989) (a
    district court lacks jurisdiction to consider an untimely motion to set aside a
    judgment).
    To the extent that Hollis-Arrington’s motions fall within Rule 60(b)(6), the
    district court did not abuse its discretion by denying them because Hollis-Arrington
    failed to establish extraordinary circumstances. See Latshaw, 
    452 F.3d at 1104
    (while “‘fraud on the court’ can sometimes constitute extraordinary circumstances
    meriting relief under Rule 60(b)(6),” such relief is construed narrowly).
    Hollis-Arrington’s remaining contentions, including those regarding Rule
    60(b)(4), are unpersuasive.
    Hollis-Arrington’s request for judicial notice is granted.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                      10-56649
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-56649, 10-56651

Citation Numbers: 465 F. App'x 675

Judges: Goodwin, McKEOWN, Wallace

Filed Date: 1/9/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023