Reddy v. Gilbert Medical Transcription Service, Inc. , 467 F. App'x 622 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 26 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KRISHNA REDDY, No. 10-56683
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00524-JFW-
DTB
v.
GILBERT MEDICAL TRANSCRIPTION MEMORANDUM *
SERVICE, INC.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 17, 2012 **
Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Krishna Reddy appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in her
employment action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004), a dismissal on the basis of the
applicable statute of limitations, EEOC v. Dinuba Med. Clinic, 222 F.3d 580, 584
(9th Cir. 2000), and summary judgment, Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363
F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed defendant Slattery for lack of personal
jurisdiction because Reddy failed to establish that either general or specific
personal jurisdiction existed over her. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800-03(discussing requirements for a district court sitting in California to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant).
The district court properly dismissed Reddy’s Title VII claim for failure to
exhaust her administrative remedies in a timely manner. See Dinuba Med. Clinic,
222 F.3d at 585 (a Title VII action cannot proceed in federal court unless a plaintiff
has timely exhausted administrative remedies); see also Garcia v. Brockway, 526
F.3d 456, 465 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Equitable tolling may be applied if, despite all due
diligence, a plaintiff is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence
of his claim.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants
Transcription Matchmaker and Kaminski on Reddy’s contract claim because
Reddy failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the parties
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had entered into a contract. See United States ex rel. Oliver v. Parsons Co., 195
F.3d 457, 462 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing the elements for a contract under
California law). Contrary to Reddy’s contention, Transcription Matchmaker and
Kaminski were not required to provide her with a written contract under
California’s Employment Agency, Employment Counseling and Job Listing
Services Act because Reddy did not pay them a fee or deposit. See Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1812.501(c) (defining “job listing service” as those who receive “a fee or other
valuable consideration to be paid, directly or indirectly, by the jobseeker”); id.§ 1812.516(a) (providing that “[e]very job listing service shall give a written
contract to every jobseeker from whom a fee or deposit is to be received, whether
directly or indirectly”).
The district court properly granted partial summary judgment to defendants
Gilbert Medical Transcription Service, Inc., Gilbert, and Sowards for the reasons
stated by the district court in its order entered on December 20, 2010.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing terminating
sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) based on Reddy’s willful and repeated
violations of the court’s discovery orders after the court had imposed monetary
sanctions and warned Reddy of the possibility of terminating sanctions. See Conn.
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096-97 (9th
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Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of review, discussing factors for evaluating
terminating sanctions, and noting that terminating sanctions may be appropriate
“[w]here a party so damages the integrity of the discovery process that there can
never be assurance of proceeding on the true facts” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Reddy’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
We do not consider Reddy’s request to vacate a vexatious litigant order
because it was issued against her in a different case.
AFFIRMED.
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