State v. Medina , 440 P.3d 846 ( 2019 )


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    2019 UT App 49
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellant,
    v.
    SERGIO BRISENO MEDINA,
    Appellee.
    Amended Opinion 1
    No. 20170328-CA
    Filed March 28, 2019
    Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy
    No. 161903223
    Sean D. Reyes and Jeffrey S. Gray, Attorneys
    for Appellant
    Sarah J. Carlquist, Scott A. Wilson, and Jesse M. Nix,
    Attorneys for Appellee
    JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M.
    CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER concurred.
    MORTENSEN, Judge:
    ¶1     Because this case comes to us on interlocutory appeal, the
    following facts and allegations remain undetermined. “On
    interlocutory review, we recount the facts as alleged and in a
    light most favorable to the ruling below.” State v. Stewart, 2018
    1. This Amended Opinion replaces the Opinion in Case No.
    20170328-CA issued January 17, 2019. After our original opinion
    issued, Defendant filed a petition for rehearing. We grant the
    petition. Paragraph 1 is new; paragraphs 3 through 8 and
    paragraph 12 of the original opinion have been deleted.
    State v. Medina
    UT 24, ¶ 2 n.1 (cleaned up). A woman (Victim) was found fatally
    stabbed on the side of a road. The ensuing investigation led
    police to Sergio Briseno Medina. During an interview, detectives
    (Detectives) read Medina his Miranda rights. 2 Medina invoked
    his right to counsel, but immediately after invoking, Medina
    initiated a substantive conversation with the Detectives
    regarding the investigation, the circumstances surrounding the
    murder, and the pending charges against him. After the
    Detectives told Medina that they had “questions for [him] about
    [the murder],” Medina stated, “I’m gonna answer questions,”
    and he demanded to know “what’s going on” and “[w]hy is it
    me . . . being targeted for something that I wasn’t even nearby.”
    During the resulting conversation, Medina made several
    incriminating statements. Three days later, the Detectives, after
    confirming that Medina understood he could have an attorney
    present, interviewed him a second time. The State charged
    Medina with murder and obstructing justice. Medina moved to
    suppress his statements made during the interviews, arguing
    that his Miranda rights were violated by the Detectives’
    questioning without counsel present. The district court granted
    Medina’s motion, and the State appeals.
    ¶2    We reverse.
    BACKGROUND
    The Interviews
    ¶3     Medina was in Denver, Colorado when law enforcement
    located him. A search of Medina’s and Victim’s cell phone
    records had established that Medina was in the vicinity of
    Victim’s body and her jeep around the time of the murder; a
    2. Miranda rights include the right to remain silent and the right
    to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation. See
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 440 (1966); see also infra ¶ 11.
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    State v. Medina
    search of the jeep uncovered Medina’s fingerprints on the
    outside of the jeep and Victim’s blood on the interior. Medina
    was arrested and brought into a Denver police station for
    questioning.
    ¶4    Prior to any questioning, the Detectives read Medina his
    Miranda rights, whereupon Medina invoked his right to counsel.
    The conversation ensued as follows:
    The Detectives: Okay well just so you’re aware we
    just wanna make sure that you are aware of your
    rights okay you still have those (inaudible) and
    you wanna find out and you wanna have a
    discussion with us and we wanna make sure you
    know your rights okay?
    Medina: Ya.
    D: So you do know you have the right to remain
    silent. Anything you say can and will be used
    against you in a court of law. You have the right to
    have an attorney present with you while you’re
    being questioned. If you can’t afford to hire one,
    one will be appointed to represent you before any
    questioning if you wish. Okay?
    M: Can I have an attorney present then?
    D: So . . . and if you . . . so you’re saying you don’t
    wanna talk to us without your attorney present?
    M: Well ya the thing is I don’t know what’s going
    on. I wanna know what’s going on.
    D: Okay.
    M: Why is it that my sister[’]s door gets kicked
    in . . . I’ve got an officer asking if I got my hands . . .
    20170328-CA                       3                  
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    State v. Medina
    if I have an injury on my hands and they’re
    checking my hands and I was like no what’s goin
    on . . . Does he have . . . What injury are you talking
    about . . . What’s going on. You know what I
    mean? I’m only here tryin (inaudible) cause I
    wanna lay off the meth cause I was consumin
    (inaudible) all this goin on and I was like what’s
    goin on. My sister’s mad at me right and doesn’t
    want to talk to me because the same situation.
    D: Is it what happened with her . . .
    M: Ya I mean come on wouldn’t you be mad?
    D: Sure. I’d be frustrated absolutely and that’s . . .
    We can have a discussion about that absolutely.
    M: And that’s why I’m like okay what’s goin on. I
    got people callin me hey there’s a homicide or
    something . . . What are you guys talkin about, you
    know what I mean?
    D: Sure.
    M: And that’s what I wanna know what’s going on
    it’s like . . . I’m trippin out because that stuff you
    don’t play around with.
    D: Right.
    M: You don’t joke around with. That’s not a joke so
    all I wanna ask you is what’s going on here please.
    I’m gonna answer questions, but at the same time I
    don’t want to get bullshit all mixed up you know
    what I mean?
    D: And we’re here to talk about that. We’re here to
    . . . we wanna discuss that with you.
    20170328-CA                    4                 
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    State v. Medina
    M: Okay.
    D: But you know we do have questions for you
    about it. You know we’re trying to see . . . Your
    name was brought up that’s how we’re here you
    know? People brought your name up and so here
    we are and we wanna be able to talk to you about
    it, but it’s up to you I mean . . .
    M: Okay (inaudible) what’s going on man please?
    What’s goin on I actually want to know . . . That’s
    what . . . That’s what I’m asking what’s goin on.
    Why is it me that I’m being targeted for something
    that I wasn’t even nearby. It’s like what the fuck.
    D: Okay.
    ¶5     Medina went on to explain that he was confused by the
    circumstances of his arrest. Medina then agreed to answer the
    Detectives’ questions and admitted that Victim was a “friend,”
    that they sold drugs together, and that they had gotten into an
    argument on the day of the murder. He continued to deny
    involvement in Victim’s murder. The Detectives also questioned
    Medina about his text messages to his fiancée and to another
    individual.
    ¶6    Three days later, the Detectives interviewed Medina for a
    second time. The second conversation went as follows:
    The Detectives: So you asked me to do a couple
    things when we last talked. I did that okay so I got
    some . . . some good news as far as that goes okay,
    but just as we get talkin I just want to make sure
    you still are aware of your rights okay? Do you
    understand your rights too?
    Medina: Yes.
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    State v. Medina
    D: That you do have the right to an attorney and
    you don’t have to talk. You can have on[e] present
    with you and all that right? So you still understand
    those?
    M: Yes.
    D: You’re still okay to talk to me then?
    M: Ya.
    ¶7     Thus, the Detectives confirmed Medina’s understanding
    that he could have an attorney present or continue to speak with
    the Detectives without an attorney present. Medina then claimed
    that he spoke with Victim on the phone while he was at or near a
    specific Maverick gas station and that during the call, “[Victim]
    was talking and laughing with somebody in the background.”
    But surveillance footage obtained by police from the Maverik
    store refuted Medina’s story—he was nowhere to be seen at or
    near the store during the time Medina claimed to be there. The
    State subsequently charged Medina with murder and
    obstructing justice.
    The Motion to Suppress
    ¶8      After the State filed charges against him, Medina moved
    to suppress the statements made to the Detectives during his
    interrogation, arguing that they persisted in questioning him
    after he had invoked his Miranda right to an attorney. The
    district court granted the motion, finding that Medina had
    invoked his right to counsel, and that even though he had
    “initiated . . . further conversation, as he continued to talk after
    his request for counsel,” he did not knowingly and intelligently
    waive his right to counsel. The court further ruled that because
    Medina did not waive his Miranda rights in the first
    interrogation, his statements in the second interview were also
    inadmissible. But the court qualified the ruling, stating that had
    Miranda procedure been properly followed in the first interview,
    20170328-CA                     6                 
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    State v. Medina
    “the second recitation of Miranda preceding the [second]
    interview would have been adequate.” The State then
    successfully petitioned for leave to take an interlocutory appeal
    from the district court’s order granting Medina’s motion to
    suppress his statements to police.
    ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶9      We address only one issue in this case: whether the
    district court correctly granted Medina’s motion to suppress.
    Rulings regarding the validity of a Miranda waiver are reviewed
    for correctness, while granting “some degree of discretion to the
    trial court because of the wide variety of factual settings
    possible.” State v. Bybee, 
    2000 UT 43
    , ¶ 16, 
    1 P.3d 1087
     (cleaned
    up). “When a district court bases its ultimate conclusions
    concerning the waiver of a defendant’s Miranda rights, upon
    essentially undisputed facts, in particular the transcript of an
    officer’s colloquy with the defendant, its conclusions present
    questions of law which we review under a correction of error
    standard.” State v. Gardner, 
    2018 UT App 126
    , ¶ 11, 
    428 P.3d 58
    (cleaned up).
    ANALYSIS
    I. The First Interview
    ¶10 The State argues on appeal that Medina “validly waived
    his Miranda rights by his conduct and words after initiating
    further discussion with police.” We agree.
    ¶11 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
    states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to
    be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda
    v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966), the United States Supreme Court
    held that law enforcement officers must “protect this privilege
    by informing an accused person of his or her constitutional
    20170328-CA                    7                
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    State v. Medina
    rights before engaging in custodial interrogation.” State v.
    Dahlquist, 
    931 P.2d 862
    , 866 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Miranda,
    
    384 U.S. at 444
    ). Those rights include the right to remain silent
    and the right to have an attorney present. Miranda, 
    384 U.S. at 444
    .
    ¶12 After an accused’s Miranda rights are read, they “must
    unambiguously request counsel” in such a way that the “desire
    to have counsel present” is sufficiently clear. Davis v. United
    States, 
    512 U.S. 452
    , 459 (1994). “Interrogation must cease if the
    accused invokes his or her right to consult with an attorney, and,
    with limited exceptions, the prosecution may not use any
    statements made by the accused taken in violation of Miranda’s
    protections.” Dahlquist, 
    931 P.2d at 866
    . Both Medina and the
    State agree, and the district court ruled, that Medina
    unambiguously invoked his right to counsel initially.
    ¶13 But if, after invoking the right to counsel, the accused
    himself “’initiates further communication, exchanges, or
    conversations with the police,’ then he has effectively waived his
    right to counsel and the interrogation may continue.” State v.
    Gardner, 
    2018 UT App 126
    , ¶ 15, 
    428 P.3d 58
     (quoting Edwards v.
    Arizona, 
    451 U.S. 477
    , 485 (1981)). An accused’s statements made
    “after he has invoked his right to counsel and before counsel is
    made available to him are admissible if three conditions are
    satisfied.” State v. Moore, 
    697 P.2d 233
    , 236 (Utah 1985); see also
    Edwards, 
    451 U.S. at
    481–82; State v. Newton, 
    682 P.2d 295
    , 296
    (Utah 1984).
    ¶14 “First, it must be the accused, not the law enforcement
    officers, who initiates the conversations in which the
    incriminating statements are made. Second, the prosecution
    must show . . . a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
    counsel. Third, the accused’s statements must be shown by a
    preponderance of the evidence to have been voluntarily made.”
    Moore, 697 P.2d at 236. We address each condition in turn.
    20170328-CA                     8                
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    State v. Medina
    A.    Initiated Conversation
    ¶15 The State argues that “immediately after invoking his
    right to counsel, [Medina] initiated further conversation with
    [the Detectives] about the investigation.” Medina counters with
    the argument that “it is not enough for the defendant to initiate a
    routine conversation about ‘something unrelated to the crime
    charged,’ to relinquish his previously invoked right to counsel.”
    To bolster his argument, Medina cites State v. Dahlquist, 
    931 P.2d 862
     (Utah Ct. App. 1997), arguing that “Medina did not initiate a
    conversation with police that related either directly or indirectly
    to the investigation.” While we agree that initiating a routine
    conversation about something unrelated to the crime charged is
    not enough to relinquish an accused’s right to counsel, State v.
    Moore, 
    697 P.2d 233
    , 236 (Utah 1985), we are persuaded by the
    State’s argument that Medina’s conversation was more than just
    routine or unrelated to the crimes charged.
    ¶16 In Dahlquist, this court reversed a district court’s denial of
    a motion to suppress where the police continued to question a
    defendant after the defendant had invoked counsel, but had
    subsequently asked, “What am I being questioned about?” 
    931 P.2d at 864
    . The court explained, “In order for a defendant to
    initiate a conversation with authorities that will be held to
    constitute a willingness to talk about the charges without
    counsel, he or she must indicate a desire to open up a more
    generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the
    investigation.” 
    Id. at 866
     (cleaned up). And the court went on to
    state that,
    [D]efendant initiated no such open-ended
    conversation. After invoking his right to counsel,
    he merely asked what he was being questioned
    about. That question was succinctly answered and
    his invocation of the right to counsel was
    simultaneously acknowledged. There the matter
    should have been left until Dahlquist had counsel
    20170328-CA                     9                
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    State v. Medina
    present or definitively waived his right to counsel,
    either expressly or by initiating a discussion
    relative to the substance of the investigation. . . .
    Instead of heeding his own recognition that he
    could not ask Dahlquist any questions, [the
    detective] continued the conversation by
    “advising” Dahlquist, without request, of specific
    “facts” related to the investigation.
    
    Id.
    ¶17 On those facts, the court held that the detective’s “tactic”
    was “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
    Dahlquist” and that “[b]y continuing the custodial dialogue after
    acknowledging that Dahlquist had invoked his right to consult
    an attorney, albeit in the form of a statement rather than a
    question, [the detective] violated Dahlquist’s Miranda rights.” Id.
    at 867.
    ¶18 Here, Medina’s statements to the Detectives go beyond
    the scope of those made in Dahlquist. They are more akin to the
    statements made in State v. Gardner, 
    2018 UT App 126
    , 
    428 P.3d 58
    . In that case, two officers informed a defendant of his Miranda
    rights and the defendant invoked those rights. Id. ¶ 16. But
    before the officers could leave the interrogation room, the
    defendant went on to “explain that [the victim] and her mother
    had been threatening him for years about reporting
    inappropriate conduct between himself and [the victim],” and
    “told a long story about some problems with [the victim’s]
    mother.” Id. One of the officers eventually interrupted the
    defendant and “asked again if he should try to reach [the
    defendant’s] attorney, to which [the defendant] again responded
    in the affirmative.” Id. But after the first officer left the room to
    call the defendant’s attorney, the defendant continued to speak
    to a second officer—unsolicited—about domestic issues with
    [the victim’s] mother. Id.
    20170328-CA                     10                 
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    State v. Medina
    ¶19 There, this court held that “[o]nce [the defendant] told the
    officers that [the victim] and her mother had been threatening to
    report him for engaging in inappropriate conduct with [the
    victim], without being asked a question by the officers,” he had
    effectively waived his right to counsel because he “initiated
    further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
    officers specifically related to the crime for which he was being
    interrogated.” See id. ¶ 17 (cleaned up).
    ¶20 Here, Medina invoked his right to counsel, but then,
    without prodding from the Detectives, immediately went on to
    state,
    Well ya the thing is I don’t know what’s going on. I
    wanna know what’s going on. . . . Why is it that my
    sister[’]s door gets kicked in . . . I’ve got an officer
    asking if I got my hands . . . if I have an injury on
    my hands and they’re checking my hands and I
    was like no what’s goin on . . . Does he have . . .
    What injury are you talking about . . . What’s going
    on. You know what I mean? I’m only here tryin
    (inaudible) cause I wanna lay off the meth cause I
    was consumin (inaudible) all this goin on and I
    was like what’s goin on. My sister’s mad at me
    right and doesn’t want to talk to me because the
    same situation.
    These types of statements are not simply “routine,” nor
    “unrelated to the crime charged,” as Medina suggests. Rather,
    upon invoking his right to counsel, Medina immediately asked
    what was going on, and the context of his continuing questions
    makes clear that he was not asking what process he would be
    subject to, but was instead asking about the investigation of the
    case and his actions as he spontaneously launched into an
    extensive and elaborate explanation for the circumstances and
    his whereabouts on the night of the murder.
    20170328-CA                     11                 
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    State v. Medina
    ¶21 Thus, Medina’s statements are far different from those in
    Dahlquist, in which the defendant simply asked, “What am I
    being questioned about?” Dahlquist, 
    931 P.2d at 866
    . They are
    much more similar to the statements made in Gardner, in which
    the defendant not only asked what was going on, but went on
    to—without invitation or provocation—explain himself and
    divulge further details regarding the crime charged. See Gardner,
    
    2018 UT App 126
    , ¶ 16. Medina gave the Detectives no chance to
    leave the room, let alone contact his attorney, before initiating
    further conversation and insisting that he receive answers from
    the Detectives. Unsolicited, Medina asked what was going on;
    why the police had kicked in his sister’s door; questioned why
    the police wanted to check his hands; and offered an explanation
    for his trip to Denver. Accordingly, we conclude that Medina
    initiated further communication with the Detectives and that the
    district court incorrectly ruled that the statements did not
    involve the underlying crime.
    B.     Knowing and Intelligent Waiver
    ¶22 Because we have determined that Medina initiated
    further contact with the Detectives, and thereby waived his right
    to have counsel present during the interrogation, we must next
    turn to the question of whether he waived this right knowingly
    and intelligently. See State v. Moore, 
    697 P.2d 233
    , 236 (Utah 1985)
    (holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact
    with law enforcement, “the prosecution must show, on the
    motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
    right to counsel”); see also Martinez v. Cate, 
    903 F.3d 982
    , 992–93
    (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that “[i]f the accused invoked his right to
    counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning
    only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the
    police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he
    had invoked” (cleaned up)); Bush v. Warden, 573 F.App’x 503,
    510–11 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating that “even if the accused reinitiates
    conversation with police after invoking his or her right to
    counsel, the burden remains on the prosecution to demonstrate
    20170328-CA                     12                 
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    State v. Medina
    that the reinitiation events constituted a knowing and intelligent
    waiver under a totality of circumstances”).
    ¶23 “The determination of whether a waiver of the right to
    counsel was made knowingly and intelligently depends upon
    the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case,
    including the background, experience, and conduct of the
    accused.” Moore, 697 P.2d at 236 (cleaned up); see also Oregon v.
    Bradshaw, 
    462 U.S. 1039
    , 1046 (1983) (stating that whether a
    waiver is knowing and intelligent is based upon “the totality of
    the circumstances”); Bone v. Polk, 441 F.App’x 193, 196 (4th Cir.
    2011) (explaining that when “evaluating the totality of the
    circumstances for the purposes of determining the validity of a
    Miranda waiver, we consider factors such as a defendant’s
    intelligence and education, his age and familiarity with the
    criminal justice system, the proximity of the waiver to the giving
    of the Miranda warnings, and whether he reopened the dialogue
    with the authorities” (cleaned up)); State v. Barrett, 
    2006 UT App 417
    , ¶ 11, 
    147 P.3d 491
     (explaining that “determin[ing] whether
    [a d]efendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda
    rights” is done by “examining the particular facts and
    circumstances surrounding the case”).
    ¶24 A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel
    exists when a defendant expresses a desire to “tell . . . what
    really happened,” and then proceeds to make incriminating
    statements about what happened without further prodding by
    the investigating officers, 3 see State v. Hilfiker, 
    868 P.2d 826
    , 831
    (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (cleaned up); see also Smith v. Duckworth,
    
    824 F.3d 1233
    , 1247 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that to be
    considered knowing and intelligent, “the waiver must have been
    3. The waiver need not be express. It may be inferred from a
    defendant indicating that he understands his rights and the
    defendant’s subsequent course of conduct. See State v. Barrett,
    
    2006 UT App 417
    , ¶ 11, 
    147 P.3d 491
    .
    20170328-CA                      13                
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    State v. Medina
    made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being
    abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it”).
    ¶25 The State argues that the district court incorrectly
    concluded that Medina’s waiver was not knowingly made. We
    agree. The district court based its decision, in part, on the fact
    that the Detectives “had asked questions intended to elicit
    additional information” and, in part, on the fact that the
    Detectives did not “seek a clarification of [his] invocation of [the]
    right to counsel” after Medina initiated further discussion about
    the investigation.
    ¶26 To the district court’s first point, we conclude that the
    court incorrectly determined that the Detectives improperly
    asked questions intended to elicit additional information from
    Medina. The exchange between Medina and the Detectives
    proceeded as follows:
    Medina: Can I have an attorney present then?
    The Detectives: So . . . and if you . . . so you’re
    saying you don’t wanna talk to us without your
    attorney present?
    M: Well ya the thing is I don’t know what’s going
    on. I wanna know what’s going on.
    D: Okay.
    M: Why is it that my sister[’]s door gets kicked in
    . . . I’ve got an officer asking if I got my hands . . . if
    I have an injury on my hands and they’re checking
    my hands and I was like no what’s goin on . . .
    Does he have . . . What injury are you talking about
    . . . What’s going on. You know what I mean? I’m
    only here tryin (inaudible) cause I wanna lay off
    the meth cause I was consumin (inaudible) all this
    goin on and I was like what’s goin on. My sister’s
    20170328-CA                       14                  
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    State v. Medina
    mad at me right and doesn’t want to talk to me
    because the same situation.
    ¶27 Here, Medina implored the Detectives to discuss the
    murder investigation with him, continually asking them
    questions pertaining to the investigation and giving explanations
    for the circumstances. The district court even conceded that “the
    Detectives did not do much prodding.” While the Detectives did
    go on to ask questions such as, “Is that what happened with
    her,” and make statements such as, “We can have a discussion,”
    those statements were made after Medina’s completely
    unsolicited statements regarding his sister, his hands, the police,
    his drug usage, and his demand to know more about the
    investigation against him. Medina’s desire to “tell . . . what really
    happened,” followed by making incriminating statements about
    what happened without further prodding by the investigating
    officers, constitutes a knowing and intelligent waiver. See
    Hilfiker, 
    868 P.2d at 831
     (cleaned up). There is no indication from
    the record that Medina’s waiver was made without “a full
    awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and
    the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” See Duckworth,
    824 F.3d at 1247.
    ¶28 To the district court’s second point—that the Detectives
    did not “seek a clarification of [his] invocation of [the] right to
    counsel” after Medina initiated further discussion about the
    investigation—we conclude that such a clarification was not
    required. The Utah Supreme Court has held that if “a defendant
    makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for an attorney,
    questioning with respect to the subject matter of the
    investigation must immediately stop, and any further
    questioning must be limited to clarifying the request.” State v.
    Wood, 
    868 P.2d 70
    , 85 (Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds by
    State v. Mirquet, 
    914 P.2d 1144
    , 1147 n.2 (Utah 1996). Here, all
    parties agree Medina’s request for an attorney was not
    “ambiguous or equivocal.” Therefore, a clarification was not
    required. The request was unambiguous but Medina,
    20170328-CA                     15                 
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    State v. Medina
    immediately and unprompted, proceeded to carry on a
    discussion with the Detectives. “Police are not required to
    rewarn suspects from time to time.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
    560 U.S. 370
    , 386 (2010); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 
    451 U.S. 477
    , 485
    (1981) (“[N]othing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
    would prohibit the police from merely listening to [a
    defendant’s] voluntary, volunteered statements and using them
    against [the defendant] at the trial.”). Accordingly, the district
    court incorrectly ruled that Medina’s statement was not made
    knowingly and intelligently.
    C.     Voluntary Statement
    ¶29 Finally, the State argues that Medina’s statements were
    made voluntarily. We agree. The test of whether a statement is
    made voluntarily “is never mechanical, but must duly consider
    both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
    interrogation. The ultimate inquiry is whether physical or
    psychological force or other improper threats or promises
    prompted the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have
    done so.” State v. Hilfiker, 
    868 P.2d 826
    , 831 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
    (cleaned up); see also Moran v. Burbine, 
    475 U.S. 412
    , 421 (1986)
    (noting that a voluntary statement is “the product of a free and
    deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
    deception”). While an accused “will likely experience at least
    some anxiety as a natural incident of being arrested and
    incarcerated that may affect the accused’s psychological
    condition,” a statement is not involuntary because “an accused
    experiences some anxiety because of his arrest and
    incarceration.” State v. Moore, 
    697 P.2d 233
    , 236 (Utah 1985).
    ¶30 Here, the district court ruled that even though there was
    “no evidence of coercion,” the State had failed to present
    sufficient evidence that the statements were made voluntarily.
    The district court erred by requiring the State to present
    additional evidence, as evidence beyond the circumstances of
    the interview is not required. See id. at 237 (holding that “there
    must be some physical or psychological force or manipulation
    20170328-CA                     16                
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    State v. Medina
    that is designed to induce the accused to talk when he would not
    otherwise have done so,” and because “[n]one ha[d] been
    shown,” the statement was considered voluntary); see also
    Colorado v. Connelly, 
    479 U.S. 157
    , 164 (1986) (“Absent police
    conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis
    for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal
    defendant of due process of law.” (emphasis added)); State v.
    Mabe, 
    864 P.2d 890
    , 893 (Utah 1993) (“To be involuntary, there
    must be a causal relationship between the coercion and the
    subsequent confession.”).
    ¶31 The interrogation transcript, along with videos of the
    interrogation, constitute a sufficient basis on which to conclude
    that the statements were made voluntarily. We can presume that
    “an individual who, with a full understanding of his or her
    rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made
    a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights
    afford.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
    560 U.S. 370
    , 385 (2010).
    Accordingly, because all three conditions to the admission of
    Medina’s statements were satisfied, the district court should
    have denied Medina’s motion to suppress, and his statements in
    the first interview should have been admitted.
    II. The Second Interview
    ¶32 The State argues that “[b]ecause Medina initiated a
    conversation with the [D]etectives after invoking his right to
    counsel and validly waived his Miranda rights” during the first
    interview, the statements Medina made during the second
    interview should also be admitted. We agree. Prior to the second
    interview, the Detectives and Medina engaged in the following
    conversation:
    The Detectives: So you asked me to do a couple
    things when we last talked. I did that okay so I got
    some . . . some good news as far as that goes okay,
    but just as we get talkin I just want to make sure
    20170328-CA                     17                
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    State v. Medina
    you still are aware of your rights okay? Do you
    understand your rights too?
    Medina: Yes.
    D: That you do have the right to an attorney and
    you don’t have to talk. You can have on[e] present
    with you and all that right? So you still understand
    those?
    M: Yes.
    D: You’re still okay to talk to me then?
    M: Ya.
    ¶33 The district court concluded that the Detectives’ second
    recitation of Medina’s Miranda rights prior to the second
    interview would have been adequate if Medina had voluntarily
    waived his right to counsel in the first interview. And as
    discussed, supra Part I, the Miranda warning given in the first
    interview was sufficient. Consequently, it carried over to the
    second interview that was given only three days later. See
    Maryland v. Shatzer, 
    559 U.S. 98
    , 110 (2010) (holding that officers
    need not re-recite Miranda warnings unless fourteen days have
    passed since the break in custody). And here the Detectives
    reminded Medina of his right to counsel and confirmed that he
    understood his rights and still wanted to talk to the Detectives.
    Therefore, the Detectives did not violate Medina’s right to
    counsel in the second interview and the district court incorrectly
    granted Medina’s motion to suppress the statements made in the
    second interview.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶34 Medina initiated further communication with the
    Detectives regarding topics that were not “routine” nor
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    State v. Medina
    “unrelated to the crimes charged,” effectively waiving his right
    to counsel. Further, his waiver was made knowingly and
    intelligently, as well as voluntarily. We therefore conclude that
    the Detectives did not violate Medina’s right to counsel in the
    second interview, and we reverse the district court’s grant of
    Medina’s motion to suppress the statements made in both the
    first and second interviews.
    20170328-CA                   19                
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