Zion Village Resort v. Pro Curb USA , 2020 UT App 167 ( 2020 )


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    2020 UT App 167
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    ZION VILLAGE RESORT LLC,
    Appellee,
    v.
    PRO CURB U.S.A. LLC AND PACIFIC COAST SUPPLY LLC,
    Appellants.
    Opinion
    Nos. 20190736-CA and 20190831-CA
    Filed December 17, 2020
    Fifth District Court, St. George Department
    The Honorable Eric A. Ludlow
    No. 190500078
    David W. Hunter, Nathan K. Fisher, and William A.
    Allen, Attorneys for Appellant Pro Curb U.S.A. LLC
    Bryan H. Booth, Attorney for Appellant
    Pacific Coast Supply LLC
    Matthew D. Ekins and Dayton L. Hall,
    Attorneys for Appellee
    JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and DIANA HAGEN concurred.
    HARRIS, Judge:
    ¶1     Two contractors who performed work on a condominium
    development filed construction liens against the property,
    alleging that they had not been fully paid for their work. The
    owner of the development—Zion Village Resort LLC (Zion
    Village)—filed petitions to nullify the liens, and the district court
    granted those petitions, concluding that the contractors had
    failed to file proper preliminary notices regarding their liens.
    The contractors each filed separate appeals, which we consider
    together in this opinion. With regard to the appeal filed by Pro
    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    Curb U.S.A. LLC dba Pro Landscape U.S.A. (Pro Landscape), we
    reverse on all issues, including attorney fees, and remand for
    entry of judgment and computation of an award of attorney fees
    in favor of Pro Landscape. With regard to the appeal filed by
    Pacific Coast Supply LLC (Pacific Coast), we dismiss part of that
    appeal and affirm the district court’s order nullifying Pacific
    Coast’s construction liens. We also affirm the district court’s
    determination that Zion Village is entitled to recover attorney
    fees and costs from Pacific Coast, but we reverse one minor
    aspect of the court’s attorney fee award to Zion Village, and
    remand for an adjustment of that award.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2     Both Pro Landscape and Pacific Coast were hired to work
    on the construction of a condominium development known as
    Zion Village Resort and Townhomes (the Development). As
    envisioned, upon completion, the Development is to include
    twenty-three multi-unit residential buildings as well as a
    community clubhouse and pool area. At issue here are three of
    those buildings: Building 5, Building 6, and Building 7. Each
    building contains four separate units, each of which is referred to
    as a “lot” and identified by its own specific parcel number. 1 Both
    Pro Landscape and Pacific Coast were contracted to work on,
    and did work on, the construction of Buildings 5, 6, and 7, as
    well as the clubhouse and pool area. At the time these
    contractors were hired and performed at least some of their
    work, the real property in question was owned by Zion Village.
    1. Building 5 contains Lots 17 through 20; Building 6 contains
    Lots 21 through 24; and Building 7 contains Lots 25 through 28.
    Each lot is assigned a parcel number; for instance, Lot 17 is
    assigned parcel number H-ZIVT-1-17; Lot 18 is assigned parcel
    number H-ZIVT-1-18, and so on.
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    Preliminary Notices
    ¶3     Under Utah law, any “person who desires to claim a
    construction lien on real property” must file a “preliminary
    notice . . . no later than 20 days after” the person starts working
    on the property. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-501(1)(a)
    (LexisNexis 2018). As discussed more fully below, a preliminary
    notice must include certain information, including the “name,
    address, telephone number, and email address of the person
    providing the construction work,” as well as one of four listed
    means of identifying the specific piece of real property to which
    the eventual lien will attach. See 
    id.
     § 38-1a-501(1)(h)(i), (vii). Both
    Pro Landscape and Pacific Coast filed certain preliminary notices
    within twenty days of starting their work.
    ¶4     Pro Landscape’s four preliminary notices listed the
    correct parcel numbers for the four lots contained within
    Building 5. Under the line “Person Furnishing Labor, Service,
    Equipment, or Material,” the notices listed “Chad Hansen,” and
    provided an address, email address, and telephone number.
    Under the line provided for “comments,” the notices stated that
    the “services [were] provided by Pro Curb USA LLC DBA Pro
    Landscape USA.”
    ¶5     Pacific Coast’s four preliminary notices identified “Pacific
    Supply” 2 as the entity performing the work, and listed an
    address, email address, and telephone number as required. The
    notices attempted to identify, by parcel number, the property to
    which they attached: two of the notices listed “H-ZIVT-1” as the
    relevant property, which is an incomplete parcel designation not
    2. The full business name of Pacific Coast is Pacific Coast Supply,
    LLC, and the record indicates that, for business purposes, it
    sometimes refers to itself as Pacific Supply, but it has referred to
    itself in the pleadings and briefings as Pacific Coast.
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    referring to any particular lot; one of the notices referred only to
    Lot 18 contained within Building 5; and the fourth notice listed
    Lots 5 through 8, which are contained within Building 2, and
    unconnected to Buildings 5, 6, or 7.
    Construction Liens
    ¶6       After performing work on the Development, both Pro
    Landscape and Pacific Coast believed that they had not been
    paid in full. In keeping with this belief, both recorded
    construction liens against various parts of the Development. As
    relevant here, in November 2018, Pro Landscape recorded four
    liens, 3 one against each lot in Building 5, and therein indicated
    that it sought to recover $119,668.00 ($29,917.00 against each lot
    contained within Building 5). In November and December 2018,
    Pacific Coast recorded three liens, none of which were recorded
    against the properties referred to in its preliminary notices.
    Specifically, Pacific Coast’s liens were filed against parcel
    number “H-ZIVT-1-CLUBHOUSE AND POOL AREA,” and
    against all lots contained within Buildings 6 and 7; those liens
    stated that Pacific Coast sought to recover $68,907.89 ($11,331.29
    against the clubhouse and pool area, $38,095.12 against Building
    6, and $19,481.48 against Building 7).
    ¶7     In the meantime, Zion Village appears to have sold seven
    of the eight lots in Buildings 5 and 6 on various dates on or
    before January 23, 2019, and it sold the eighth lot in March 2019.
    At some point prior to October 2019, ownership of the
    Development’s common areas—including the clubhouse and
    3. Pro Landscape also recorded construction liens against
    Buildings 6 and 7, but later released those liens voluntarily some
    two months prior to Zion Village’s filing the petition to nullify.
    Consequently, only Pro Landscape’s four liens pertaining to
    Building 5 are relevant to our analysis here.
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    pool area—was transferred to the Development’s homeowner
    associations. Zion Village asserts, however, that at some point it
    acquired assignments, from the new owners of some of the lots
    at issue, of any legal claims and defenses related to the
    construction liens at issue here.
    Zion Village’s Petition to Nullify
    ¶8      In early February 2019, and as amended in April 2019,
    Zion Village filed a petition to nullify the construction liens that
    had been recorded by both Pro Landscape (against Building 5)
    and Pacific Coast (against Buildings 6 and 7, and against the
    clubhouse and pool area). See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-805(1)
    (LexisNexis 2018) (allowing “[a]n owner of an interest in a
    project property” to “petition the district court . . . for summary
    relief to nullify” a construction lien). In its petition, Zion Village
    alleged that it was the owner of all of the real property in
    question. Zion Village asserted that the construction liens
    recorded by Pro Landscape and Pacific Coast were invalid
    because neither contractor had filed valid preliminary notices as
    required by statute. 4 In its petition, Zion Village requested an
    “expedited hearing,” pursuant to section 38-1a-805(4)(b) of the
    Utah Code, “to determine whether the liens [were] invalid.”
    ¶9     Just a few days after the petition was filed, the district
    court held an expedited hearing. At the conclusion of the
    hearing, the court took the matter under advisement, and later
    issued a written ruling nullifying all four of Pro Landscape’s
    liens on the ground that Pro Landscape had not filed any
    4. Zion Village also advanced a second claim that the liens were
    “wrongful liens” as that term is defined by Utah’s wrongful lien
    statute, see generally 
    Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-101
     to -305
    (LexisNexis 2018), but the court dismissed that claim, and Zion
    Village has not appealed that portion of the court’s ruling.
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    preliminary notices. The court determined that the notices on
    which Pro Landscape relied had been “filed by Chad Hansen,
    not Pro Landscape,” and that the notices had therefore
    “neglect[ed] to include such basic information as the identity of
    the actual lien claimant.” The court also ordered Pro Landscape
    to pay Zion Village’s reasonable attorney fees and costs.
    ¶10 With regard to Pacific Coast, the court—after the
    expedited hearing—issued an initial order nullifying its liens,
    but the parties later stipulated to setting that order aside and
    allowing Zion Village to file an amended petition to nullify.
    After holding a second hearing and considering Zion Village’s
    amended petition, the district court ruled in a subsequent order,
    dated April 20, 2019, that all three of Pacific Coast’s construction
    liens were invalid because Pacific Coast “did not file the
    requisite preliminary notices.” The court determined that “[t]he
    notices offered by Pacific [Coast] state parcel numbers that do
    not exist or are materially incomplete.” The court ordered Pacific
    Coast to pay Zion Village’s reasonable attorney fees and costs.
    Pacific Coast did not appear at either of the two hearings at
    which the court considered the validity of the preliminary
    notices, and it made no argument that Zion Village’s petition
    should be dismissed on the basis that it no longer owned the real
    property in question.
    Attorney Fee Awards
    ¶11 Zion Village later filed documentation in an effort to
    quantify its attorney fee award. It asserted that its total fees and
    costs incurred to date in the case, against Pro Landscape and
    Pacific Coast combined, were $23,523.50. Nevertheless, it sought
    an award of over $17,000 against Pacific Coast and an award of
    over $13,000 against Pro Landscape, asserting that both
    defendants were “jointly and severally liable” for certain fees
    incurred early in the case, which Zion Village believed were
    applicable to its claims against both defendants. The court
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    granted Zion Village the relief it requested, ordering Pro
    Landscape—in a judgment dated July 30, 2019—to pay
    attorney fees and costs in the amount of $13,324.73 and
    ordering Pacific Coast—in a judgment dated September 23,
    2019—to pay attorney fees and costs in the amount of $17,079.40,
    making the parties jointly and severally liable for part of the
    fees. The court later augmented the award in light of fees
    and costs incurred in connection with post-judgment motions
    (discussed below), allowing Zion Village to recover an
    additional $6,322.50 from Pacific Coast and an additional
    $12,112.19 from Pro Landscape. Pro Landscape filed a notice of
    appeal on August 29, 2019.
    Pacific Coast’s Post-Judgment Motions
    ¶12 After the district court’s initial rulings, Pacific Coast filed
    a motion, pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
    Procedure, requesting that the court revise its decision and
    order. In its motion, Pacific Coast argued that the governing
    statute allows a court to make only “a single factual
    determination—whether a preliminary notice was filed,” and
    noted that Pacific Coast had filed preliminary notices, even if
    some of the information contained in those notices was
    incomplete or inaccurate. Accordingly, Pacific Coast asserted
    that the court’s ruling nullifying its liens was incorrect. On
    September 15, 2019, after a hearing, the court entered an order
    denying Pacific Coast’s motion.
    ¶13 Shortly thereafter, on October 3, 2019, Pacific Coast filed a
    notice of appeal, challenging five of the district court’s “rulings
    and orders”: the March 8 and April 20 orders granting Zion
    Village’s petition to nullify the liens; the September 15 order
    denying Pacific Coast’s rule 54(b) motion; the September 23
    order granting Zion Village’s motion for attorney fees and costs;
    and the September 23 attorney fee judgment. Pacific Coast never
    filed a second or amended notice of appeal.
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    ¶14 A few weeks later, on October 25, 2019, Pacific Coast filed
    another post-judgment motion, this one pursuant to rule 60(b) of
    the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In that motion, Pacific Coast
    asserted, for the first time, that Zion Village had not been the
    owner of the property referred to in Pacific Coast’s liens at the
    time Zion Village filed its petitions to nullify those liens. On
    January 10, 2020, after a hearing, the district court issued an
    order denying the motion, ruling that Pacific Coast had “not
    presented a basis for relief sufficient to” justify setting aside the
    court’s order nullifying the liens, and that it had “not presented
    a meritorious defense.”
    ¶15 After obtaining its first judgment against Pacific Coast,
    Zion Village asked the district court to issue a writ of execution
    directing a sheriff or constable to seize some of Pacific Coast’s
    property in order to facilitate a sale of that property to satisfy
    Zion Village’s judgment. The specific property that Zion Village
    wanted to make subject to a writ of execution was “[a]ny and all
    of Pacific Coast[’s] legal claims, asserted or unasserted, relating
    to or arising from the Zion Village Resort Project . . . , including
    legal claims in” the pending action. The court granted the
    request and issued a writ of execution, authorizing a sheriff or
    constable to seize Pacific Coast’s claims against Zion Village. A
    few days later, the writ of execution was served on Pacific Coast,
    and thereby its legal claims against Zion Village were “conveyed
    to” Zion Village for the purposes of sale. However, no sale of
    those claims has yet taken place because Pacific Coast, by
    posting a supersedeas bond, obtained an order from the district
    court staying all efforts to enforce Zion Village’s judgment
    against Pacific Coast during the pendency of this appeal.
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶16 Pro Landscape and Pacific Coast both appeal, raising
    several issues for our review. Other than attorney fees, Pro
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    Landscape brings one issue to our attention: it challenges the
    district court’s decision, following the expedited hearing, to
    nullify its construction liens after determining that Pro
    Landscape had not filed valid preliminary notices. Utah
    appellate courts have not yet had occasion to identify the
    standard of review to be applied when reviewing a district
    court’s nullification of a construction lien via an “expedited
    proceeding” under section 38-1a-805 of the Utah Code. The
    relevant statutory provisions authorize district courts to
    “schedule an expedited hearing” to consider a properly filed
    petition to nullify a lien, but the statute does not specify whether
    the court may consider live testimony at any such hearing. See
    
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-805(4)(b), (5), (6) (LexisNexis 2018). We
    conclude that, at least in cases in which the court does not hear
    live testimony during the expedited hearing, we should review a
    district court’s decision following that hearing for correctness,
    with no deference afforded to the court’s decision.
    ¶17 In situations where a district court makes a decision based
    not on live testimony but instead on documentary evidence, oral
    argument, and statutory interpretation, the district court is in no
    better position to make that decision than an appellate court is.
    See State v. Levin, 
    2006 UT 50
    , ¶ 20, 
    144 P.3d 1096
     (stating that “a
    single [district] judge is in an inferior position to determine what
    the legal content of a legal concept should be whereas a panel of
    appellate judges, with their collective experience and their
    broader perspective, is better suited to that task” (quotation
    simplified)). In this case, the district court made its
    determination by examining copies of the liens and preliminary
    notices filed by Pro Landscape and comparing those documents
    to the statutory requirements. All of the evidence the district
    court considered is in the appellate record; the court’s decision
    was not based on “credibility determinations, the direct
    observation of witness testimony, [or] other evidence not fully
    captured in a written appellate record.” See Sawyer v. Department
    of Workforce Services, 
    2015 UT 33
    , ¶ 13, 
    345 P.3d 1253
    ; see also
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    Amundsen v. University of Utah, 
    2019 UT 49
    , ¶ 19 n.5, 
    448 P.3d 1224
     (“With respect to whether rulings based solely on
    documentary evidence generally receive deference on appeal,
    Utah law appears to lean toward correctness review.”). And in
    one similar context—reviewing district court decisions, made
    after a “summary proceeding,” see 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-205
    (3),
    (4) (LexisNexis 2018), about whether a lien is a “wrongful lien”
    under section 38-9-102 of the Utah Code—we review for
    correctness. See, e.g., Lindstrom v. Custom Floor Covering Inc., 
    2017 UT App 141
    , ¶ 8, 
    402 P.3d 171
    ; Pratt v. Pugh, 
    2010 UT App 219
    ,
    ¶ 7, 
    238 P.3d 1073
    . Accordingly, we conclude that, in this case,
    we should afford the district court’s lien nullification decision no
    deference, and review it for correctness.
    ¶18 With regard to Pacific Coast’s appeal, we address four
    issues, aside from attorney fees. First, we address—and reject—
    the arguments made by Zion Village in its motion for summary
    disposition, in which it asserted that Pacific Coast’s appeal had
    been rendered moot, or entirely subject to dismissal, based on
    certain subsequent events. We deferred a ruling on the issues
    raised in the motion for summary disposition until full
    consideration of the appeal, and Zion Village presses these
    issues in its brief. These issues present questions of law that we
    review in the first instance. See State v. Legg, 
    2018 UT 12
    , ¶ 7, 
    417 P.3d 592
     (“Appellate courts review the issue of mootness de
    novo.” (quotation simplified)).
    ¶19 Second, we address Pacific Coast’s argument that the
    district court erred by even considering whether its preliminary
    notices complied with applicable statutory requirements; Pacific
    Coast contends that, under the statutory provisions governing
    the expedited proceedings that follow the filing of a petition to
    nullify a construction lien, a district court may consider only
    whether a preliminary notice was or was not filed, and may not
    examine the substance of the document. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-805(6). This issue hinges on whether the district court
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    properly interpreted the relevant statute. “We review questions
    of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference
    to the district court’s legal conclusions.” State v. Outzen, 
    2017 UT 30
    , ¶ 5, 
    408 P.3d 334
     (quotation simplified).
    ¶20 Third, although Pacific Coast does not challenge the
    district court’s ultimate decision, on the merits, that its
    preliminary notices did not identify the same property listed in
    its construction liens, for purposes of logical continuity we
    briefly address that decision.
    ¶21 Fourth, Pacific Coast challenges the district court’s denial
    of its rule 60(b) motion. However, after oral argument in this
    case, we became aware of a potential issue with our appellate
    jurisdiction to consider this challenge, and we asked the parties
    for supplemental briefing addressing the jurisdictional issue.
    Appellate courts “have an independent obligation to ensure that
    we have jurisdiction over all matters before us,” and if we
    determine that we lack appellate jurisdiction with regard to a
    particular issue, “we must dismiss” the appeal of that issue.
    Trapnell & Assocs., LLC v. Legacy Resorts, LLC, 
    2020 UT 44
    , ¶ 31,
    
    469 P.3d 989
     (quotation simplified). Questions about appellate
    jurisdiction are “question[s] of law.” Id. ¶ 29. And because we
    determine that we lack appellate jurisdiction over this part of
    Pacific Coast’s appeal, we do not address the merits of the
    district court’s decision to deny the rule 60(b) motion.
    ¶22 Finally, both Pro Landscape and Pacific Coast ask us to
    reverse the district court’s awards of attorney fees against them.
    Under applicable statutory provisions, Zion Village is entitled to
    an award of “costs and reasonable attorney fees” if “the court
    determines that the . . . construction lien is invalid,” see 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-805(7)(a), but the lien claimants are entitled to
    an award of “costs and reasonable attorney fees” if “the court
    determines that the . . . construction lien is valid,” see 
    id.
     § 38-1a-
    805(8)(a). The identity of the party to whom an award of
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    attorney fees is owed thus depends on the outcome of the
    proceeding, and on the outcome of the merits of this appeal.
    However, a court’s decision regarding the reasonableness of an
    attorney fee award is reviewed deferentially, for “patent error or
    clear abuse of discretion.” Faust v. KAI Techs., Inc., 
    2000 UT 82
    ,
    ¶ 12, 
    15 P.3d 1266
     (quotation simplified).
    ANALYSIS
    I. Pro Landscape’s Appeal
    ¶23 In its appeal, Pro Landscape asserts that the district court
    erred in concluding that it had not filed any preliminary notices,
    and erred by, on that basis, nullifying its construction liens. It
    asserts that the preliminary notices on which it relies contained
    all of the statutorily required information, including “the name,
    address, telephone number, and email address of the person
    providing the construction work for which the preliminary
    notice [was] filed.” See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-501(1)(h)(i)
    (LexisNexis 2018). We agree with Pro Landscape.
    ¶24 Utah’s construction lien statute provides contractors with
    a remedy when they claim they were not paid for their services,
    allowing them to place a lien on properties they have worked on
    in the amount of the unpaid labor or resources contributed. See
    generally 
    id.
     §§ 38-1a-101 to -805 (LexisNexis 2018); see also AAA
    Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 
    714 P.2d 289
    , 291 (Utah
    1986) (per curiam) (“The purpose of the Utah mechanics’ lien
    law is to provide protection to those who enhance the value of a
    property by supplying labor or materials.”).
    ¶25 Under Utah law, there is an important prerequisite to
    obtaining a valid construction lien: any person wanting to claim
    such a lien must first file a preliminary notice with the Utah State
    Construction Registry (the Registry) within twenty days of
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    commencing construction work. 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-
    501(1)(a). Among other required information, a preliminary
    notice must include “the name, address, telephone number, and
    email address of the person providing the construction work for
    which the preliminary notice is filed.” 
    Id.
     § 38-1a-501(1)(h)(i).
    ¶26 In the preliminary notices on which Pro Landscape relies,
    “Chad Hansen” is listed as the “Person Furnishing Labor,
    Service, Equipment or Material,” but then, in the “Comments”
    section, the notices state that the “services [were] provided by
    Pro Curb USA LLC DBA Pro Landscape USA.” Zion Village
    argues that, because Chad Hansen rather than Pro Landscape is
    listed on the line asking for identification of the “Person
    Furnishing Labor, Service, Equipment or Material,” the
    preliminary notices were statutorily insufficient. We disagree.
    ¶27 The statute requires only that “the name, address,
    telephone number and email address of the person providing
    the construction work” be “include[d]” in the preliminary notice;
    the statute does not require that the necessary information be set
    forth in any particular order or on any particular line. See id.
    § 38-1a-501(1)(h). While Pro Landscape may have set forth the
    required information in an unconventional sequence, the
    preliminary notices it filed contained all statutorily required
    information, including the identity and contact information of
    “the person providing the construction work.” The preliminary
    notices clearly indicated that the relevant “services [were]
    provided by” Pro Landscape. We therefore disagree with the
    district court’s conclusion that the notices “neglect[ed] to include
    . . . the identity of the actual lien claimant.” 5
    5. The construction lien statute mandates the application of a
    “substantial compliance” standard, rather than a strict
    compliance standard. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-501(2)(a)
    (continued…)
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    ¶28 Zion Village resists this conclusion by pointing to the
    practical functioning and purpose of the Registry, which serves
    as a central database, allowing interested persons to search for
    preliminary notices and other documents by property owner,
    contractor, address, and parcel number. See 
    id.
     § 38-1a-201
    (LexisNexis 2018). 6 Zion Village asserts that, when it searched
    (…continued)
    (LexisNexis 2018) (“[T]he burden is upon the person filing the
    preliminary notice to prove that the person has substantially
    complied with the requirements of this section.” (emphasis
    added)). “Compliance with a few—or even many—provisions of
    a detailed statutory scheme is not the measure of substantial
    compliance”; rather, substantial compliance with the
    construction lien statute “is measured by its potential for harm
    or prejudice,” and “[a] defect in compliance may be excused as
    insubstantial if it cannot have any meaningful impact on other
    parties.” VCS, Inc. v. La Salle Dev., LLC, 
    2012 UT 89
    , ¶¶ 36–37, 
    293 P.3d 290
    . The district court professed to have applied the
    “substantial compliance” standard, yet nevertheless determined
    that Pro Landscape’s preliminary notices were “not sufficient to
    meet the burden of substantial compliance.” In our view,
    however, Pro Landscape’s preliminary notices not only
    substantially complied with the statutory requirements, but
    strictly complied with them, given that the notices included all
    required information, albeit in an unconventional sequence.
    6. The Registry is designed to “help[] keep property owners
    informed of all parties that supply services, materials and/or
    equipment to a construction project on their property.”
    SCR Guide > Owners, Utah State Construction Registry,
    https://secure.utah.gov/scr/guide/owners.html [https://perma.cc/
    5FGT-LYDU]; see also Jim Barber, There’s a New Lien Law in Town:
    Are Your Lien Rights Protected?, Utah B.J., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 46
    (stating that the Registry is “a standardized, online system for
    (continued…)
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    the Registry’s database for preliminary notices filed by Pro
    Landscape, none turned up in the search results because “Chad
    Hansen” and not Pro Landscape had been listed as the “Person
    Furnishing Labor, Service, Equipment or Material.” It asserts
    that interested persons should be able to rely on search results
    from the Registry’s database, without bearing what it perceives
    to be an onerous “burden” of “clicking individually through the
    dozens of notices, loans, permits, etc. related to each parcel
    number, and reviewing line by line the details of each entry,
    including comments.” We are unpersuaded.
    ¶29 Indeed, as already noted, the relevant statutory
    provisions do not require that the necessary information be
    listed in any particular order or manner. See 
    id.
     § 38-1a-501(1)(h).
    So long as the statutorily required information is included, the
    requirements of the statute are satisfied, regardless of whether a
    search of the Registry’s database in any given case is efficient. In
    the end, what matters is whether the statutorily required
    information is contained in the preliminary notice, and
    meaningful assessment of that issue may require examination of
    the actual notice itself, rather than just a search results page from
    the Registry’s database.
    ¶30 While it is unfortunate that Zion Village’s database search
    suggested that Pro Landscape had not filed any preliminary
    notices, our examination of the relevant notices demonstrates
    that Pro Landscape did file four proper preliminary notices, each
    of which identified the same property later referenced in the
    construction liens, and each of which included “the name,
    address, telephone number, and email address of the person
    (…continued)
    filing and managing notices of commencement, preliminary
    notices, and notices of completion, thus facilitating compliance
    with” the construction lien statute).
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    providing the construction work for which the preliminary
    notice is filed.” See 
    id.
     § 38-1a-501(1)(h)(i), (vii). The district court
    therefore erred when it determined that Pro Landscape had
    failed to file valid preliminary notices, and erred by invalidating
    Pro Landscape’s construction liens on that basis.
    II. Pacific Coast’s Appeal
    A.     Zion Village’s Motion for Summary Disposition
    ¶31 Before turning to the merits of Pacific Coast’s appeal, we
    first discuss the issues raised in Zion Village’s motion for
    summary disposition of Pacific Coast’s appeal. In that motion,
    and again in its briefing, Zion Village makes two arguments for
    disposing of the entirety of Pacific Coast’s appeal before
    reaching its merits. First, Zion Village argues that, because
    Pacific Coast did not file an action to enforce its construction
    liens within 180 days after filing its notices of construction liens
    (as required by statute), it has “failed to preserve any legal
    claim” and has thereby forfeited the right to bring this appeal.
    Second, Zion Village asserts that it now owns Pacific Coast’s
    legal claims, and seeks dismissal of them on that basis. But on
    the record before us, neither argument provides a basis for
    summary dismissal of Pacific Coast’s appeal.
    ¶32 Zion Village correctly points out that, “[i]n order to
    enforce a . . . construction lien,” a claimant is obligated to “file an
    action to enforce the lien . . . within 180 days after” recording the
    lien. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-701(2)(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2018).
    If no such enforcement action is filed within that 180-day
    timeframe, the “construction lien is automatically and
    immediately void.” 
    Id.
     § 38-1a-701(4)(a). Pacific Coast recorded
    its liens in November and December 2018, and it is undisputed
    that Pacific Coast did not file any enforcement action within 180
    days of recording the liens. However, Pacific Coast notes that, in
    April 2019, before the 180-day period expired, the district court
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    granted Zion Village’s petition to nullify its construction liens,
    and asserts that it could not have filed an action to enforce liens
    that had been nullified by court order. Citing Utah case law,
    Pacific Coast asserts that the time period within which it needed
    to file any enforcement action was tolled pending appeal of the
    district court’s nullification order. See Sittner v. Schriever, 
    2001 UT App 99
    , ¶ 17, 
    22 P.3d 784
     (stating that where “erroneous adverse
    judgments procured by the debtor prevented [the lienholder]
    from enforcing [the] lien,” the debtor is estopped from asserting
    a statute of limitations defense during the time when an adverse
    ruling prevents the lienholder from enforcing the lien); see also
    Free v. Farnworth, 
    188 P.2d 731
    , 734–35 (Utah 1948), superseded by
    statute on other grounds as recognized in Gildea v. Wells Fargo Bank,
    NA, 
    2015 UT 11
    , ¶ 30, 
    347 P.3d 385
    . However, it is unclear
    whether the principles of estoppel set forth in the cases relied
    upon by Pacific Coast apply to the statutory time periods that
    govern in the construction lien context. See AAA Fencing Co. v.
    Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 
    714 P.2d 289
    , 290–92 (Utah 1986) (per
    curiam) (in a different context, declining to apply principles of
    estoppel to mechanic’s lien statutory periods).
    ¶33 But we need not resolve this issue here, because the
    matter is not ripe for decision. If and when Pacific Coast files an
    enforcement action, 7 the court in that case will need to determine
    whether that action was timely filed and, as part of that inquiry,
    will need to determine whether the statutory time period was
    tolled in this situation. We consider it premature to weigh in on
    the timeliness of an enforcement action that has not been, and
    may never be, filed. We therefore decline Zion Village’s
    invitation to dismiss Pacific Coast’s appeal on this basis.
    7. Given our affirmance, infra ¶¶ 37–44, of the district court’s
    order nullifying Pacific Coast’s liens, it is extremely unlikely that
    any such enforcement action will ever be filed.
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    ¶34 Next, Zion Village asserts that Pacific Coast lacks
    standing because it is no longer in possession of its legal claims,
    following service of Zion Village’s writ of execution on those
    claims. Under Utah law, where one litigant is a judgment
    creditor of its litigation opponent, it is possible for the judgment
    creditor to execute upon and purchase its opponent’s legal
    claims, and then seek their dismissal. See, e.g., Bradburn v. Alarm
    Prot. Tech., LLC, 
    2019 UT 33
    , ¶ 15, 
    449 P.3d 20
     (noting that the
    defendant “secured a judgment” against the plaintiff, “sought a
    writ of execution, held a constable sale, purchased [the
    plaintiff’s] choses in action against itself, substituted itself as
    plaintiff, and extinguished all claims against itself,” and stating
    that this procedure was “authorized”); Applied Med. Techs., Inc. v.
    Eames, 
    2002 UT 18
    , ¶ 13, 
    44 P.3d 699
     (stating that “a defendant
    can purchase claims, i.e., choses in action, pending against itself
    and then move to dismiss those claims”). But execution upon
    those claims is only the first step in the process; the claims do not
    become the property of someone other than their original owner
    until purchased by another party at a duly noticed sale.
    ¶35 In this case, Zion Village has executed upon Pacific
    Coast’s legal claims, but it has not yet been able to schedule and
    hold a sale of those claims due to the fact that Pacific Coast, by
    posting a supersedeas bond, obtained an order from the district
    court staying all efforts by Zion Village to enforce its judgment.
    As things now stand, Zion Village is holding those claims
    pending sale, but neither Zion Village nor any other third party
    has yet purchased them. Until someone else purchases them,
    those claims remain the property of Pacific Coast. Accordingly,
    Zion Village does not yet have the right to substitute itself as
    plaintiff and seek dismissal of those claims.
    ¶36 Thus, Zion Village is not entitled to summary disposition
    of Pacific Coast’s appeal, on either asserted ground. We
    therefore turn to the merits of that appeal.
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    B.     The Scope of the Expedited Hearing
    ¶37 Pacific Coast first asserts that the district court exceeded
    its statutory authority by considering, in the context of the
    expedited proceeding, the contents of the preliminary notice.
    Pacific Coast contends that the relevant statute limits the scope
    of a court’s inquiry during an expedited proceeding following
    the filing of a petition to nullify, and allows a court to consider
    only whether a preliminary notice was filed at all, and thus
    forbids it from considering the contents of such notices, and in
    particular forbids it from examining whether the notices relate to
    the same property as the later-filed liens. The district court found
    this argument unpersuasive, and so do we.
    ¶38 Under relevant statutory provisions, a landowner who
    believes that a construction lien claimant has failed to “timely
    file a preliminary notice under Section 38-1a-501” “may petition
    the district court . . . for summary relief to nullify” the lien. See
    
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-805(1) (LexisNexis 2018). If the petition
    is correctly filed, the court “shall schedule an expedited hearing”
    to consider whether the “lien is invalid because the lien claimant
    failed to file . . . a preliminary notice.” 
    Id.
     § 38-1a-805(4)(b). “An
    expedited proceeding under this section may only determine . . .
    whether the lien claimant filed a notice of preconstruction
    service or a preliminary notice” and, if not, “whether the lien
    claimant’s preconstruction lien or construction lien is valid.” Id.
    § 38-1a-805(6).
    ¶39 Our “overarching goal,” in interpreting a statute, is
    “to implement the intent of the legislature.” See State v.
    Rushton, 
    2017 UT 21
    , ¶ 11, 
    395 P.3d 92
    . In attempting to
    ascertain that intent, we start with “the language and structure
    of the statute.” 
    Id.
     “Often, statutory text may not be plain when
    read in isolation, but may become so in light of its linguistic,
    structural, and statutory context.” 
    Id.
     (quotation simplified).
    “The reverse is equally true: words or phrases may appear
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    unambiguous when read in isolation, but become ambiguous
    when read in context.” 
    Id.
     For this reason, “we read the
    plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its
    provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter
    and related chapters, avoiding any interpretation which renders
    parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous in order to
    give effect to every word in the statute.” 
    Id.
     (quotation
    simplified).
    ¶40 Pacific Coast rests its argument on a strict reading of
    subsection (6), which states that, in an expedited proceeding, the
    court “may only determine whether the lien claimant filed a . . .
    preliminary notice” and, if not, whether the lien is invalid on
    that basis. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-805(6). We acknowledge
    this language, and take Pacific Coast’s point that this section of
    the construction lien statute “could have been drafted more
    precisely.” But when we consider the statute as a whole, we
    reach a different conclusion than Pacific Coast.
    ¶41 In subsection (1) of the relevant statute, the legislature
    set forth the framework for the “summary relief” that may
    be sought by filing a petition to nullify a construction lien. See
    
    id.
     § 38-1a-805(1). As applicable here, such “summary relief”
    is available where “the lien claimant did not timely file a
    preliminary notice under Section 38-1a-501.” Id. § 38-1a-
    805(1)(a)(ii) (emphasis added). In our view, this language
    empowers a court to examine the contents of the preliminary
    notice when considering a petition to nullify. For instance, the
    statute clearly provides for summary relief only if the
    preliminary notice is ”timely” filed, suggesting that a court is
    expected to assess the timeliness of the preliminary notice,
    and not just whether a notice was merely filed. See id. Moreover,
    both subsection (1) and subsection (6) direct the court to
    compare the lien and the preliminary notice, and assess
    whether it was “the lien claimant,” rather than another party,
    who filed the relevant preliminary notice. Id. § 38-1a-805(1)(a)(ii),
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    (6)(a). As demonstrated above, this inquiry—a form of which
    we conducted in connection with Pro Landscape’s appeal, see
    supra ¶¶ 23–30—necessarily requires the court to examine the
    contents of the preliminary notice. And finally, we note that the
    statute requires a court, in considering a petition to nullify, to
    assess whether the preliminary notice was filed “under Section
    38-1a-501,” see id. § 38-1a-805(1)(a)(ii), which is the section
    that sets forth the items that a proper preliminary notice
    “shall include,” see id. § 38-1a-501(1)(h). Among the items
    required under section 38-1a-501 is some identification of
    the property to which the preliminary notice is connected. Id.
    § 38-1a-501(1)(h)(vii). For all of these reasons, after considering
    the statute as a whole, we conclude that a court considering
    a petition to nullify in an expedited proceeding is not limited
    to examining merely whether a preliminary notice has
    been filed, but instead has statutory authority to assess
    whether the preliminary notice met the requirements of
    section 38-1a-501, including whether the notice refers to the
    same property identified in the later-filed construction lien.
    ¶42 And in any event, Pacific Coast’s argument, taken to
    its logical conclusion, would lead to absurd consequences.
    See Bagley v. Bagley, 
    2016 UT 48
    , ¶ 27, 
    387 P.3d 1000
     (stating
    that, where a statute can plausibly be read two different
    ways, the “absurd consequences canon” may be invoked to
    “resolve[ the] ambiguity by choosing the reading that
    avoids absurd results” (quotation simplified)). If the
    district court were limited to examining merely whether
    any preliminary notice was filed, and were forbidden
    from examining the contents of the notice to determine
    whether the notice had anything to do with the property
    that was the subject of the later-filed construction lien, then
    a lien claimant could resist a petition to nullify simply by
    pointing to a preliminary notice filed with regard to a piece of
    property in a different city or county, or even to a blank
    preliminary notice containing only the name of the claimant.
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the purpose of
    the construction lien statutes generally, see VCS, Inc. v. La Salle
    Dev., LLC, 
    2012 UT 89
    , ¶ 20, 
    293 P.3d 290
     (opining that Utah’s
    “mechanic’s lien statutes are aimed not only at fortifying the
    claim-filing system for contractors, but also at assuring clear
    notice for property owners and facilitating finality in a field—
    real estate transactions—where that policy is paramount”), as
    well as with the purpose of the preliminary notice requirement
    and the “summary” proceeding put in place to invalidate liens
    unconnected to a preliminary notice.
    ¶43 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly
    interpreted the applicable statutes, properly considered the
    contents of Pacific Coast’s preliminary notices, and
    appropriately did not limit itself to merely considering whether
    Pacific Coast had filed any preliminary notice.
    C.    The Merits of the District Court’s Inquiry
    ¶44 After considering the contents of Pacific Coast’s
    preliminary notices, the district court found them to be
    infirm, because the properties identified in the preliminary
    notices were either nonexistent or were different than the
    properties identified in the later-filed construction liens. As
    noted above, among the information that must be included
    in a preliminary notice in order for it to be valid is an
    identification of the property to which the preliminary notice is
    connected. 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-501(1)(h)(vii). The district
    court found, upon examining the preliminary notices submitted
    by Pacific Coast, that the notices “state[d] parcel numbers that
    do not exist or are materially incomplete.” Pacific Coast does not
    challenge the district court’s determination that its preliminary
    notices do not properly identify the real property in question,
    and therefore we take it as established, for purposes of this
    appeal, that the preliminary notices Pacific Coast filed are not
    sufficient.
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    D.     Pacific Coast’s Rule 60(b) Motion
    ¶45 Instead of challenging the district court’s ruling on its
    merits, Pacific Coast makes a different argument. It contends
    that, at the time Zion Village filed its petition to nullify Pacific
    Coast’s liens, Zion Village no longer owned most of the real
    property identified in those liens. But Pacific Coast did not raise
    this argument until after the district court had already entered
    final judgment in this matter, and it did so in the form of a rule
    60(b) motion filed after it had already filed its notice of appeal
    from certain specified orders in the underlying case. And after
    the district court denied its rule 60(b) motion a few months later,
    Pacific Coast never filed a second or amended notice of appeal
    purporting to include in this appeal a challenge to the court’s
    ruling on the rule 60(b) motion. Nevertheless, in its brief, Pacific
    Coast identified its challenge to the court’s rule 60(b) ruling as
    one of the issues it wanted to bring to our attention on appeal,
    and Zion Village responded to that argument on its merits,
    without raising any concerns about appellate jurisdiction.
    ¶46 After oral argument, we realized that we may not have
    appellate jurisdiction to consider Pacific Coast’s challenge to the
    district court’s rule 60(b) ruling and, recognizing our
    “independent obligation to ensure that we have jurisdiction over
    all matters before us,” see Trapnell & Assocs., LLC v. Legacy
    Resorts, LLC, 
    2020 UT 44
    , ¶ 31, 
    469 P.3d 989
    , we requested
    supplemental briefing on the question. After reviewing that
    supplemental briefing, we conclude that we have no appellate
    jurisdiction to consider Pacific Coast’s challenge to the district
    court’s ruling on the rule 60(b) motion, and we therefore dismiss
    that portion of Pacific Coast’s appeal.
    ¶47 In order to invoke our appellate jurisdiction, a party must
    generally file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the date of
    entry of the final order or judgment appealed from. Utah R. App.
    P. 4(a). In that notice of appeal, the appellant must “designate
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from.” See 
    id.
     R.
    3(d). “[R]ule 3(d)’s requirement is jurisdictional.” Jensen v.
    Intermountain Power Agency, 
    1999 UT 10
    , ¶ 7, 
    977 P.2d 474
    ; see also
    In re adoption of B.B., 
    2017 UT 59
    , ¶ 106, 
    417 P.3d 1
     (Lee, A.C.J.,
    opinion of the court on this issue) (“An order not identified in
    the notice of appeal falls beyond our appellate jurisdiction. And
    the failure to identify an order is a non-waivable (jurisdictional)
    defect.”). On October 3, 2019—within thirty days of entry of final
    judgment—Pacific Coast filed a notice of appeal that identified
    five different orders from which it was appealing. Through this
    filing, Pacific Coast successfully invoked our appellate
    jurisdiction to consider its challenges to the orders identified in
    the October 3 notice of appeal.
    ¶48 But at the time it filed its notice of appeal, Pacific Coast
    had not yet even filed its rule 60(b) motion, and of course the
    court had not issued any ruling thereon. Under applicable rules,
    and as a matter of chronology, the October 3 notice of appeal
    cannot have properly invoked our appellate jurisdiction to
    consider a challenge to any future ruling on an as-yet-unfiled
    rule 60(b) motion. Indeed, our appellate rules provide that any
    “notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment,
    but before entry of an order disposing of [a rule 60(b) motion],
    . . . is effective to appeal only from the underlying judgment,”
    and that a party wishing “[t]o appeal from a final order
    disposing of a [rule 60(b) motion] . . . must file a notice of appeal
    or an amended notice of appeal within the prescribed time
    measured from entry of the order.” See Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2).
    Indeed, a court’s “ruling on a rule 60(b) motion culminates in a
    separate, appealable order and, thus, may not be included in an
    existing appeal because the issues raised in the appeal predated
    the ruling on the rule 60(b) motion.” Dennett v. Ferber, 
    2013 UT App 209
    , ¶ 3, 
    309 P.3d 313
     (per curiam) (quotation simplified). In
    order to invoke our appellate jurisdiction to review a court’s
    decision on a rule 60(b) motion, parties generally “must either
    file a separate notice of appeal regarding those orders or, if they
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    are entered before the filing of the notice of appeal, at least
    specifically mention them in the notice of appeal being taken
    from the final judgment.” Wilson v. Sanders, 
    2019 UT App 126
    ,
    ¶ 29, 
    447 P.3d 1240
    . Thus, an appellate court “lacks jurisdiction
    to resolve issues raised in a ruling on a rule 60(b) motion unless
    a new notice of appeal has been filed.” Dennett, 
    2013 UT App 209
    , ¶ 3; see also Pon v. Brewer, 
    2020 UT App 99
    , ¶ 7, 
    468 P.3d 581
    (“[I]f a party fails to file an amended notice of appeal after denial
    of a rule 60(b) motion, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to
    consider issues raised in that motion.”). In this case, as noted,
    Pacific Coast did not file a second or amended notice of appeal
    purporting to invoke our appellate jurisdiction to consider its
    challenge to the district court’s rule 60(b) decision.
    ¶49 Pacific Coast recognizes that it failed to file a second or
    amended notice of appeal, and acknowledges that we do “not
    have jurisdiction to decide any issues from Pacific Coast’s rule
    60(b) motion that are subject to preservation and notice of appeal
    requirements.” But Pacific Coast asserts that the argument it
    raised in its rule 60(b) motion—that Zion Village did not own the
    property at the time it filed its petition to nullify—implicates the
    district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the
    petition, and thus may be considered at any time in connection
    with our “independent obligation” to examine jurisdictional
    issues. We see two separate problems with this argument.
    ¶50 First, while we have an “independent obligation” to
    assess our own appellate jurisdiction at any time, see Trapnell,
    
    2020 UT 44
    , ¶ 31, we do not have free-standing authority—let
    alone an obligation—to assess the propriety of the district court’s
    exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction, absent a timely appeal.
    We are aware of no case in which an appellate court has, sua
    sponte or otherwise, agreed to entertain an untimely appeal
    merely because that appeal implicates a district court’s subject-
    matter jurisdiction. No matter what the underlying issue is,
    litigants must file a timely and proper appeal in order for this
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    court to have appellate jurisdiction to consider the matter. See In
    re adoption of B.B., 
    2017 UT 59
    , ¶ 104 (stating that, “[w]hen a court
    enters a final order . . . , that order is binding unless and until a
    litigant successfully challenges the order’s validity,” and “[t]his
    is true even in the context of subject-matter jurisdiction”; and
    concluding that appellate courts “do not have power to sua
    sponte reconsider the premises of jurisdiction of a final judgment
    that has not been collaterally attacked by a litigant”). Pacific
    Coast did not mount a timely and proper appeal from the
    district court’s decision to deny its rule 60(b) motion, and
    therefore it has not properly invoked our appellate jurisdiction
    to consider its challenge to the rule 60(b) ruling, regardless of
    whether the rule 60(b) motion raised matters implicating the
    district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
    ¶51 Second, Pacific Coast misperceives the scope of the term
    “subject-matter jurisdiction.” It is precisely because subject-
    matter jurisdiction is “special”—and often implicates exceptions
    to our rules of preservation and waiver—that “our law has been
    careful to cabin” its definition. See 
    id.
     ¶¶ 128–29; see also id. ¶ 129
    (“We limit this concept carefully because an expansive notion of
    subject-matter jurisdiction will undermine the basic premises of
    our justice system.”). “The concept of subject-matter
    jurisdiction” is construed narrowly, and “encompasses (a)
    statutory limits on the authority of the court to adjudicate a class
    of cases, and (b) timing and other limits on the justiciability of
    the proceeding before the court (such as standing, ripeness, and
    mootness).” Id. ¶ 121 (quotation simplified).
    ¶52 Pacific Coast acknowledges that Utah district courts have
    authority to adjudicate construction lien cases—the class of case
    initiated by Zion Village when it filed its petition to nullify. See
    id. ¶ 143 (stating that “in Utah our district courts are courts of
    general jurisdiction” and “have general power to hear all matters
    civil and criminal so long as they are not excepted in the Utah
    Constitution and not prohibited by law” (quotation simplified)).
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    Pacific Coast asserts, however, that Zion Village lacked
    “statutory standing” to bring its petition because it did not own
    the property at the time the petition was filed, and posits that
    this type of “standing” implicates subject-matter jurisdiction. But
    there is ample case law indicating otherwise.
    ¶53 The type of “standing” that implicates subject-matter
    jurisdiction is “[s]tanding of the constitutional variety,” a
    concept that concerns itself with “injury, causation, and
    redressability,” see Norris v. Causey, 
    869 F.3d 360
    , 366 (5th Cir.
    2017), and asks “whether the plaintiff has alleged such a
    personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant
    his [or her] invocation” of the court’s jurisdiction “and to justify
    exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his [or her] behalf,”
    see Warth v. Seldin, 
    422 U.S. 490
    , 498–99 (1975) (quotation
    simplified). This type of standing inquiry “is not the same as
    legal capacity to sue,” Elite Legacy Corp. v. Schvaneveldt, 
    2016 UT App 228
    , ¶ 51, 
    391 P.3d 222
     (quotation simplified), and does not
    include questions about whether a plaintiff meets “statutory
    prerequisites” for a claim, see In re adoption of B.B., 
    2017 UT 59
    ,
    ¶ 124 (stating that any “deficiency in this or any other [statutory]
    prerequisite falls outside the traditional scope of subject-matter
    jurisdiction”); id. ¶ 156 (stating that “there is no such thing as a
    defect in subject-matter jurisdiction that arises only if the court
    decides an issue one way”). Indeed, our supreme court has long
    held that “[t]he objection that the plaintiff has not legal capacity
    to sue, or to maintain or prosecute an action” is “like one that the
    plaintiff is not the real party in interest,” and does not implicate
    subject-matter jurisdiction but, rather, is an objection “that,
    under all of the codes, must be taken at the proper time and in
    the proper manner or it will be deemed waived.” See Tooele Meat
    & Storage Co. v. Fite Candy Co., 
    168 P. 427
    , 428 (Utah 1917); see also
    J.B. Colt Co. v. District Court of Fifth Judicial Dist., 
    269 P. 1017
    , 1019
    (Utah 1928) (stating that an argument that a party does “not
    have legal capacity to maintain” an action is an affirmative
    20190736-CA and
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    2020 UT App 167
    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    defense that “must be timely taken by demurrer or answer, or
    such defense is deemed waived”). 8
    ¶54 Yet litigants often attempt to mislabel “capacity” or
    statutory-prerequisite questions as “standing” concerns. See, e.g.,
    Norris, 869 F.3d at 366 (noting that “the ‘standing’ label is also
    sometimes placed on [a] real-party-in-interest challenge”); Rideau
    v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    819 F.3d 155
    , 163 n.7 (5th Cir. 2016)
    8. Recently, our supreme court appeared to call into question the
    concepts set forth in this case law, but stopped short—in that
    case, at least—of fully addressing the issue on its merits. See
    Estate of Faucheaux v. City of Provo, 
    2019 UT 41
    , ¶¶ 24–26, 
    449 P.3d 112
    . Until our supreme court officially changes the
    landscape, however, we are bound to follow both Schvaneveldt—
    as binding court of appeals precedent, see In re adoption of B.N.A.,
    
    2018 UT App 224
    , ¶ 22, 
    438 P.3d 10
     (stating that “one panel of
    this court is bound to follow the previous decisions of another
    panel of this court”)—and the older supreme court cases. See
    Ortega v. Ridgewood Estates, 
    2016 UT App 131
    , ¶ 30, 
    379 P.3d 18
    (stating that the court of appeals is “bound by vertical stare
    decisis to follow strictly the decisions rendered by the Utah
    Supreme Court”). And in any event, we consider Schvaneveldt
    and the older supreme court cases not only binding but also
    persuasive, as well as jurisprudentially consistent with case law
    from other jurisdictions, including the U.S. Supreme Court. See,
    e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 
    572 U.S. 118
    , 128 n.4 (2014) (opining that “statutory standing . . . does not
    implicate subject-matter jurisdiction” (quotation simplified));
    Norris v. Causey, 
    869 F.3d 360
    , 366 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that a
    question whether a plaintiff is the proper party to bring suit is
    one of “contractual or statutory standing and does not go to a
    court’s subject matter jurisdiction”); Niemi v. Lasshofer, 
    770 F.3d 1331
    , 1346 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating that a “statutory standing
    argument does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction”).
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    (noting that “the intermingling of standing and capacity issues is
    not uncommon”); In re Unger & Assocs., Inc., 
    292 B.R. 545
    , 550
    (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2003) (“Frequently, attorneys and courts
    confuse the concepts of standing with that of capacity to sue and
    with the real party in interest principle.”). But statutory standing
    is not jurisdictional:
    Despite this cross labeling, there is a key
    jurisdictional distinction between a challenge that a
    plaintiff lacks [constitutional] standing and one
    that she is not the real party in interest. The latter
    presents a merits question: who, according to the
    governing substantive law, is entitled to enforce
    the right? It is thus like contractual or statutory
    standing and does not go to a court’s subject matter
    jurisdiction.
    Norris, 869 F.3d at 366 (quotation simplified); see also Lexmark
    Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 
    572 U.S. 118
    , 128 n.4
    (2014) (opining that “statutory standing . . . does not implicate
    subject-matter jurisdiction” (quotation simplified)); cf. In re
    adoption of B.B., 
    2017 UT 59
    , ¶ 130 n.14 (“We have routinely
    rebuffed attempts by litigants to recast merits arguments as
    issues of subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
    ¶55 The argument Pacific Coast raised in its rule 60(b) motion
    is that Zion Village cannot meet the statutory prerequisites for
    filing a petition to nullify, because at the time it filed its petition
    it did not own the real property at issue. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-805(1) (stating that “[a]n owner of an interest in a project
    property . . . may petition the district court” for lien
    nullification). But this argument does not implicate the district
    court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Utah district courts clearly
    have jurisdiction to adjudicate the class of cases—petitions to
    nullify construction liens—to which this case belongs. See In re
    adoption of B.B., 
    2017 UT 59
    , ¶ 143. And while Pacific Coast has
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    raised an issue of “statutory standing,” the question of whether
    Zion Village—or a different potential plaintiff who might
    actually own the property—meets the statutory prerequisites for
    filing suit is not a question that implicates the district court’s
    subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, even if there were an exception
    to appellate filing rules that would enable Pacific Coast to file an
    improper or untimely appeal in order to raise challenges to a
    district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, such an exception
    would not apply here, because the specific challenge Pacific
    Coast raised in its rule 60(b) motion does not implicate the
    district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
    ¶56 Accordingly, we lack appellate jurisdiction to consider
    Pacific Coast’s challenge to the district court’s denial of the rule
    60(b) motion. When we lack appellate jurisdiction, we “retain[]
    only the authority to dismiss” the appeal. See Varian-Eimac, Inc.
    v. Lamoreaux, 
    767 P.2d 569
    , 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Thus, we
    dismiss that part of Pacific Coast’s appeal that seeks to challenge
    the district court’s ruling on the rule 60(b) motion. And because
    we dismiss that part of Pacific Coast’s appeal, and reject Pacific
    Coast’s other arguments on their merits, we affirm the district
    court’s order nullifying Pacific Coast’s construction liens.
    III. Attorney Fees and Costs
    ¶57 Both Pro Landscape and Pacific Coast appeal the awards
    of attorney fees and costs entered against them. We address the
    claim of each appellant separately, in turn.
    A.     Pro Landscape
    ¶58 The district court ordered Pro Landscape to pay Zion
    Village’s attorney fees and costs based on the statutory provision
    stating that, if the court determines that “the construction lien is
    invalid,” it “shall issue an order that . . . awards costs and
    reasonable attorney fees to the petitioner.” See Utah Code Ann.
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    § 38-1a-805(7)(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2018). But, for the reasons set
    forth, see supra ¶¶ 23–30, the court erred by determining that Pro
    Landscape failed to file valid preliminary notices, and erred by
    nullifying Pro Landscape’s liens on that basis. It follows
    therefrom that we must reverse the court’s order commanding
    Pro Landscape to pay Zion Village’s attorney fees and costs.
    ¶59 But Pro Landscape asks us to go one step further, and
    remand with instructions to order Zion Village to pay Pro
    Landscape’s attorney fees and costs, pursuant to the statutory
    provision requiring a court to “award costs and reasonable
    attorney fees to the lien claimant” if the court determines that
    “the construction lien is valid.” See id. § 38-1a-805(8)(a)(ii); see
    also Federated Cap. Corp. v. Haner, 
    2015 UT App 132
    , ¶ 11, 
    351 P.3d 816
     (“In Utah, attorney fees are awardable . . . if authorized
    by statute . . . .” (quotation simplified)). This request is well-
    taken. The only argument Zion Village made for the invalidity of
    Pro Landscape’s construction liens was the one we have here
    rejected—that Pro Landscape did not file preliminary notices.
    Because we have determined that Pro Landscape did file
    preliminary notices that complied with the relevant statutory
    provisions, and because Zion Village has made no other
    argument for the invalidity of Pro Landscape’s construction
    liens, it follows that Pro Landscape’s liens are valid. Zion
    Village’s petition to nullify them should be dismissed, and Pro
    Landscape is entitled to an award of “costs and reasonable
    attorney fees,” including fees incurred on appeal.
    B.     Pacific Coast
    ¶60 The district court also ordered Pacific Coast to pay Zion
    Village’s attorney fees, based on the same statutory provision.
    See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 38
    -1a-805(7)(a)(iv). We have affirmed the
    court’s determination that Pacific Coast’s construction liens were
    invalid, and therefore we likewise affirm the district court’s
    determination that Pacific Coast should be ordered to pay Zion
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    Village’s reasonably incurred attorney fees and costs, including
    fees incurred on appeal. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
    961 P.2d 305
    ,
    319 (Utah 1998) (stating that “when a party who received
    attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled
    to fees reasonably incurred on appeal” (quotation simplified));
    accord Westgate Resorts, Ltd. v. Adel, 
    2016 UT 24
    , ¶ 33, 
    378 P.3d 93
    .
    ¶61 But Pacific Coast challenges four different aspects of the
    district court’s fee award. The first of Pacific Coast’s arguments
    relates to the sufficiency of the district court’s findings to
    support the fee awards, which arguments present “question[s] of
    law [we] review[] for correctness,” Foote v. Clark, 
    962 P.2d 52
    , 55
    (Utah 1998), while the other three arguments attack the
    reasonableness of particular aspects of the court’s award, which
    we review for an abuse of discretion, Faust v. KAI Techs., Inc.,
    
    2000 UT 82
    , ¶ 12, 
    15 P.3d 1266
    . We begin with the issue relating
    to the sufficiency of the district court’s findings.
    ¶62 Pacific Coast first argues that the district court erred by
    not requiring Zion Village to allocate its fees between its
    successful preliminary notice claim and unsuccessful wrongful
    lien claim. A party seeking fees “must categorize the time and
    fees expended for (1) successful claims for which there may be
    an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which
    there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the
    claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no
    entitlement to attorney fees.” Foote, 962 P.2d at 55 (quotation
    simplified). But what is most important is that time spent on
    either unsuccessful claims or claims for which there is no
    entitlement to attorney fees not be included in the fee request;
    parties need not take the time to allocate unrecoverable fees
    between categories (2) and (3). See Brown v. David K. Richards
    & Co., 
    1999 UT App 109
    , ¶ 15, 
    978 P.2d 470
     (finding the
    claimant’s allocation sufficient because it “set out the time and
    fees expended for successful claims for which there was an
    entitlement to fees” and “eliminated fees for all non-recoverable”
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    claims, even though it “forewent the exercise, perhaps
    meaningless in retrospect, of allocating unrecoverable fees
    between category (2) and category (3)”).
    ¶63 Zion Village’s fee application met these standards. The
    affidavit filed in support of its fee application averred that
    “[f]ees not associated with the prevailing claims have been
    adjusted and deducted from the billing statements and are not
    included in the amounts stated herein.” Zion Village’s counsel
    reiterated to the district court at oral argument regarding the
    first fee request that the “adjustment calculation” had been made
    to remove fees associated with the unsuccessful wrongful lien
    claim. Moreover, the district court made specific findings that
    “Zion Village has reduced [its attorney fees] claim as an
    adjustment for the unsuccessful claim[] for Wrongful Lien,” and
    that “[m]uch of the work performed for the successful claim to
    nullify the liens applies to the unsuccessful claim of wrongful
    lien.” Pacific Coast contests this finding, but has not carried its
    burden of demonstrating error therein. Indeed, Pacific Coast
    points to no particular time entry in Zion Village’s fee affidavits
    that it believes represents time spent in aid of the unsuccessful
    wrongful lien claim. We therefore reject Pacific Coast’s
    contention that the district court’s allocation between fees
    incurred for successful and unsuccessful claims was inadequate. 9
    9. Pacific Coast also asserts that the district court failed to
    properly allocate Zion Village’s attorney fees and costs between
    the two defendants, and erred by ordering that some of those
    fees and costs be paid by both Pacific Coast and Pro Landscape,
    jointly and severally. We need no longer reach this issue,
    however, because we have reversed the district court’s order
    commanding Pro Landscape to pay any of Zion Village’s
    attorney fees, and therefore Pro Landscape is no longer
    responsible for paying any of Zion Village’s attorney fees.
    (continued…)
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    ¶64 Pacific Coast argues that the district court abused its
    discretion in three ways. First, Pacific Coast asserts that it was
    error to approve any of the fees Zion Village incurred prior to
    March 28, 2019, because on that date Zion Village stipulated to
    set aside the district court’s initial order with respect to Pacific
    Coast and agreed to file an amended petition against Pacific
    Coast. But Pacific Coast cites no authority to support this
    assertion, and does not explain why it would be unreasonable to
    award fees for any work incurred prior to the court’s first ruling,
    even if the parties later stipulated to set it aside; it merely
    presents the conclusory assertion that doing so was
    unreasonable. Under these circumstances, Pacific Coast has not
    carried its burden on appeal to adequately challenge this aspect
    of the fee award as an abuse of discretion. See Dale K. Barker Co.
    v. Bushnell, 
    2010 UT App 189
    , ¶ 15 n.12, 
    237 P.3d 903
     (declining
    to address argument that “precomplaint attorney fees should not
    be awarded” because the “issue [was] inadequately briefed”).
    And in any event we are not persuaded by Pacific Coast’s
    conclusory assertion. It seems reasonable to us that Zion Village
    would be entitled to attorney fees for at least some of the time it
    spent in the initial stages of the case investigating the matter,
    preparing its petition, and appearing at the first hearing.
    Certainly, Pacific Coast has not persuaded us that the court
    abused its discretion in including such time in its fee award.
    (…continued)
    Nevertheless, we share Pacific Coast’s skepticism regarding the
    propriety of ordering two different defendants, defending two
    separate claims, to pay fees jointly and severally, especially
    where those defendants have not been found jointly and
    severally liable on the merits. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
    961 P.2d 305
    , 318 (Utah 1998) (mandating that fee requests be “allocated
    as to separate claims and/or parties”); see also Foote v. Clark, 
    962 P.2d 52
    , 55 (Utah 1998) (“Claims must also be categorized
    according to the various opposing parties.”).
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    ¶65 Pacific Coast next argues that the district court abused its
    discretion by awarding fees incurred for clerical tasks
    undertaken by Zion Village. Citing federal cases but no Utah
    case law, Pacific Coast asserts that “this type of administrative
    and clerical work is part of attorney overhead and is not
    properly recoverable,” and recovery is therefore disallowed in
    Utah. However, the text of rule 73 explicitly authorizes the
    recovery of fees relating to work by paralegal and administrative
    staff. See Utah R. Civ. P. 73(c) (requiring that a motion filed to
    request a fee award “must be supported by an affidavit or
    declaration that reasonably describes the time spent and work
    performed, including for each item of work the name, position
    (such as attorney, paralegal, administrative assistant, etc.) and
    hourly rate of the persons who performed the work, and
    establishes that the claimed fee is reasonable” (emphasis
    added)). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion
    by awarding fees related to administrative and clerical work.
    ¶66 Finally, Pacific Coast argues that the district court abused
    its discretion by allowing Zion Village to recover for
    unauthorized costs. Specifically, it challenges the award of
    $48.00 in costs for “obtaining a certified copy of an abstract of
    judgment and recording that abstract with the county recorder.”
    While rule 54(d) does not define “costs,”
    [t]he generally accepted rule is that it means those
    fees which are required to be paid to the court and
    to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize
    to be included in the judgment. There is a
    distinction to be understood between the legitimate
    and taxable “costs” and other “expenses[]” of
    litigation[,] which may be ever so necessary, but
    are not properly taxable as costs.
    Frampton v. Wilson, 
    605 P.2d 771
    , 774 (Utah 1980) (quotation
    simplified). In Frampton, the Utah Supreme Court held that
    20190736-CA and
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    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    “certified copies” qualify as ancillary expenses that are “not
    properly taxable as costs” that can be requested by a prevailing
    party. 
    Id.
     While the district court can certainly “exercise
    reasonable discretion in regard to the allowance of costs,” we
    cannot conclude that awarding the costs of making certified
    copies falls within that reasonable discretion when our supreme
    court has explicitly held to the contrary. See 
    id.
     at 773–74. Thus,
    the district court abused its discretion by considering “certified
    copies” to be a recoverable cost.
    ¶67 In all other respects, however, we affirm the district
    court’s award of attorney fees to Zion Village from Pacific Coast.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶68 With regard to Pro Landscape’s appeal, we conclude that
    Pro Landscape’s preliminary notices complied with the relevant
    statutory requirements, and therefore its construction liens were
    valid. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order
    nullifying Pro Landscape’s construction liens, as well as the
    court’s order requiring Pro Landscape to pay attorney fees. We
    also conclude that Pro Landscape is entitled to recover fees from
    Zion Village, including fees incurred on appeal. We remand for
    entry of judgment in favor of Pro Landscape, and for a
    quantification of Pro Landscape’s reasonable attorney fees.
    ¶69 With regard to Pacific Coast’s appeal, we reject Zion
    Village’s arguments for summary dismissal of the appeal, but we
    agree with Zion Village that the district court properly examined
    the substance of the preliminary notices during the expedited
    hearing. We also dismiss, for lack of appellate jurisdiction, that
    part of Pacific Coast’s appeal in which it asks us to review the
    district court’s decision to deny its rule 60(b) motion. We
    therefore affirm the district court’s determination that Pacific
    Coast’s construction liens were invalid, as well as the court’s
    20190736-CA and
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    2020 UT App 167
    Zion Village v. Pro Curb U.S.A.
    determination that Zion Village is entitled to recover attorney
    fees from Pacific Coast, including fees incurred on appeal.
    However, we reverse one minor aspect of the court’s fee award,
    and remand for an adjustment of that award.
    20190736-CA and
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    2020 UT App 167