Rickie Hill v. W. Oakley , 509 F. App'x 653 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             FEB 19 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RICKIE L. HILL,                                   No. 12-15108
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00609-RCJ-
    WGC
    v.
    W. OAKLEY; et al.,                                MEMORANDUM *
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Robert Clive Jones, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 11, 2013 **
    Before:        FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
    Nevada state prisoner Rickie L. Hill appeals pro se from the district court’s
    judgment in his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging that defendant Oakley acted with
    excessive force by striking Hill in the torso while Hill was fully restrained and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    discriminated against him. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Weilburg v. Shapiro, 
    488 F.3d 1202
    , 1205 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
    The district court properly dismissed Hill’s Fourteenth Amendment claim
    because Hill failed to allege that Oakley acted with an intent or purpose to
    discriminate against him based on his membership in a protected class. See Barren
    v. Harrington, 
    152 F.3d 1193
    , 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (explaining
    requirements for an equal protection claim).
    The district court concluded that Hill failed to state a claim of excessive
    force because Hill’s allegation that he suffered possible broken ribs is unconfirmed
    and he failed to allege that he sought or required medical attention. To state a
    claim on which relief may be granted, however, a plaintiff need only “state a claim
    to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    ,
    570 (2007). Moreover, for purposes of an excessive force claim, “[t]he absence of
    serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end
    it.” Hudson v. McMillian, 
    503 U.S. 1
    , 7 (1992). Hill’s allegations that Oakley hit
    him twice in the stomach while Hill was fully restrained, causing a sharp pain as if
    Hill’s ribs had been broken and causing him to spit up blood, is sufficient to state a
    claim of excessive force. See 
    id.
     (explaining factors a court should consider in
    2                                    12-15108
    evaluating whether force was excessive). We therefore reverse the district court’s
    dismissal of Hill’s excessive force claim and remand for further proceedings.
    We do not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. See Janes v.
    Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 
    279 F.3d 883
    , 887 (9th Cir. 2002).
    AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
    3                                      12-15108