Flextronics America v. Commissioner , 499 F. App'x 725 ( 2012 )


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  •                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                            DEC 03 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FLEXTRONICS AMERICA, As                           No. 11-70949
    alternative agent for C-Mac Holdings, Inc.
    and Subsidiaries consolidated group,              Tax Ct. No. 9543-07
    Petitioner - Appellee,
    MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
    REVENUE,
    Respondent - Appellant.
    Appeal from a Decision of the United States Tax Court
    Maurice B. Foley, United States Tax Court Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 19, 2012
    San Francisco, California
    Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH,** and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    Judge N.R. Smith was drawn to replace Judge Betty Binns Fletcher.
    Judge Smith has read the briefs, reviewed the record and listened to oral arguments
    that were held on October 19, 2012.
    The tax court did not clearly err in finding that C-MAC’s purchase of the
    Creedmoor inventory (in advance of acquiring the Creedmoor facility) was not a
    sham transaction. Sparkman v. Comm’r, 
    509 F.3d 1149
    , 1155 (9th Cir. 2007);
    Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 
    454 F.3d 1340
    , 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he
    transaction to be analyzed is the one that gave rise to the alleged tax benefit.”).
    Dennis Wood, CEO of C-MAC, testified that C-MAC could use the inventory in
    its other businesses. The tax court specifically identified this testimony as
    “credible.” Wood also testified that C-MAC “was” using the inventory, and that
    he didn’t “do deals for tax advantage.” Accordingly, there was a “business
    purpose for engaging in the transaction other than tax avoidance.” Bail Bonds by
    Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
    820 F.2d 1543
    , 1549 (9th Cir. 1987).
    The transaction also had economic substance because, as the Tax Court
    found, it had “practical economic effects other than the creation of income tax
    losses.” Casebeer v. Comm’r, 
    909 F.2d 1360
    , 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Bail
    Bonds, 
    820 F.2d at 1548
     (“A transaction is a sham if it has no purpose or economic
    effect other than the creation of tax deductions.”) (emphasis added). Looking at
    the “dry pages of the record,” United States v. Alston, 
    974 F.2d 1206
    , 1212 (9th
    Cir. 1992), reasonable minds could disagree with the Tax Court’s conclusion that
    the transaction was not a sham. However, we cannot say that it was clearly
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    erroneous for the tax court to conclude—based on the available evidence—that the
    transaction had some practical effects other than the creation of income tax losses.
    After acquiring the inventory, C-MAC was required to insure it and bore the
    risk of loss. Further, C-MAC pledged the inventory as collateral for loans from
    four banks. The inventory transaction also effected part of the capitalization of
    Network Systems by providing inventory that it would later use to operate the
    Creedmoor facility. Further, that capitalization happened through a series of § 351
    transactions, which permitted C-MAC to establish its desired ownership structure
    across an international web of business entities.1 Additionally, after acquiring the
    inventory, Interconnect sold $279,795.75 of it to C-MAC Quartz Crystals Ltd. in
    response to that facility’s requirements.
    Owing particular deference to “[t]he expertise that the Tax Court brings to
    bear in its consideration of these complex factual situations,” Casebeer, 
    909 F.2d at 1362
    , we cannot say the Tax Court reached a conclusion that was “(1) illogical,
    (2) implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be drawn from the
    facts in the record.” Meruelo v. Comm’r, 
    691 F.3d 1108
    , 1114 (9th Cir. 2012).
    1
    Because the inventory transactions helped C-MAC set up its desired
    operating structure and capitalize Network systems, no step appears to be
    meaningless. Accordingly, the Tax Court did not clearly err in finding the step
    transaction doctrine inapplicable in this case. See Linton v. United States, 
    630 F.3d 1211
    , 1224 (9th Cir. 2011).
    -3-
    AFFIRMED.
    Judge Hawkins concurs in the judgment.
    -4-