In Re MOTOR FUEL TEMPERATURE SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION , 641 F.3d 470 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 24, 2011
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
IN RE: MOTOR FUEL
TEMPERATURE SALES Nos. 10-3086, 10-3101
PRACTICES LITIGATION.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D. Ct. No. 07-MD-01840-KHV-JPO)
Tristan L. Duncan (Manuel Lopez, Kevin R. Corlew, and Sarah Lynn Baltzell,
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Kansas City, Missouri, Alphonse Alfano and
Robert Bassman, Bassman, Mitchell & Alfano Chartered, Washington, D.C.,
Joseph M. Weiler, Alderson, Alderson, Weiler, Conklin, Burghart, & Crow, LLC,
Topeka, Kansas, Rusty Rinehart, Rinehart Law Offices, Campbell, California,
John F. O’Connor, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, Washington, D.C., with counsel on
the briefs), Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Kansas City, Missouri, for Appellants.
Elizabeth G. Taylor (Robert A. Horn and Joseph A. Kronawitter, Horn Aylward &
Bandy, LLC, Kansas City, Missouri, with counsel on the briefs), Zuckerman
Spaeder LLP, Washington, D.C., for appellees.
Before KELLY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and TACHA, Senior Circuit
Judge.
TACHA, Senior Circuit Judge.
The appellants, who include the defendant motor fuel retailers
(“defendants” or “retailers”) and non-party, retail motor fuel trade associations
(“non-party trade associations” or “trade associations”) to which the retailers
belong, seek reversal of the district court’s discovery order directing them to
disclose information that they claim is privileged under the First Amendment. To
achieve this end, the appellants filed both an interlocutory appeal and a petition
for a writ of mandamus in this court. We DISMISS the interlocutory appeal for
lack of appellate jurisdiction, and we DENY the mandamus petition.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs filed twelve putative class actions in seven federal district
courts against the defendant retailers. The plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive
relief based on the retailers’ maintenance of a volumetric pricing system for retail
motor fuel that does not account for expansion of the fuel’s volume due to
temperature increases. The plaintiffs allege that when the temperature of motor
fuel increases, its volume expands but its energy content remains the same.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs contend that pricing mechanisms for motor fuel sales
account for temperature variations at all levels of the distribution chain except at
the retail level. Accordingly, the plaintiffs charge the retailers with conspiring to
defraud American consumers by purchasing motor fuel at wholesale under a
pricing system that compensates for temperature variations, and then selling that
fuel, after its volume has expanded and without disclosing that fact, to consumers
according to a pricing system that does not account for temperature variations. In
response to the plaintiffs’ consolidated complaint, the retailers alleged, among
other things, that it would be illegal, impractical, and impossible to account for
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temperature variations in retail motor fuel sales.
In 2007, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated and
transferred the plaintiffs’ lawsuits to the District of Kansas for discovery and
other pre-trial proceedings. The plaintiffs then served interrogatories and
document requests on the retailers, seeking information relating to their
communications with retail motor fuel trade associations, weights and measures
organizations, government agencies, and each other regarding automatic
temperature compensation (“ATC”). 1 The retailers opposed these discovery
requests on the grounds that disclosure of such information would infringe on the
their First Amendment rights to freely associate in order to pursue political,
social, and economic ends and to petition the government. The plaintiffs then
filed a motion to compel.
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs served subpoenas on the non-party retail
motor fuel trade associations seeking information relating to their
communications with the retailers, government entities, and other trade
associations regarding the implementation of ATC in the United States. A
number of the retailers, who are members of these non-party trade associations,
filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. The retailers argued, among other things,
that the disclosure of such information would infringe on the retailers’ and the
1
ATC generally refers to technology that enables retail fuel pumps automatically to
adjust the price of the fuel based on the fuel’s temperature.
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trade associations’ First Amendment associational rights. The non-party trade
associations filed motions stating that they joined in the retailers’ motion to
quash, but they did not formally seek to intervene in the lawsuit.
In subsequent briefing on both the motion to compel and the motion to
quash, as well as during a hearing before the magistrate judge, the retailers argued
for a “presumed privilege” not to disclose internal and inter-group
communications regarding ATC, which the retailers characterized as strategic
lobbying materials. In the alternative, the retailers argued that (1) they could
demonstrate a reasonable probability that disclosure of that information would
chill their First Amendment associational rights sufficient to establish a prima
facie claim of privilege; and (2) the plaintiffs had not met their resultant burden
to demonstrate a compelling need for the information that outweighed the
retailers’ and trade associations’ interests in keeping the information private.
Holly Alfano, vice president of government affairs for the National
Association of Truckstop Operators (“NATSO”), 2 provided an unsworn statement
to the court in support of the retailers’ privilege claim. Ms. Alfano gave her
opinion regarding the temporal and economic costs of complying with the
discovery requests; stated that she believed it would be unfair for NATSO to have
to disclose its past research, strategy, and deliberative processes regarding ATC
to its opponents in the ATC debate; and described what she thought the effects of
2
NATSO is one of the non-party trade associations served with a subpoena.
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a disclosure order would be. In relevant part, she stated:
You know, why should they [the plaintiffs] have everything we’ve
done, all of our internal research, all of our private conversations
with our members trying to understand this issue, you know, because
they think maybe there’s something there, you know, that’s not, it’s
nonexistent. . . .
So I just—I think it’s very unfair for us to turn over all of our work
and all of our strategy on this issue which is ongoing.
...
So if I have to plan my . . . testimony at [weights and measures] hearings,
because they’re open hearings, where they get people—they invite
interested parties to come up and speak, I’m very reluctant to call any of
my members and ask them questions knowing that it’s information that I
have to provide to my adversaries. . . .
I just don’t think I would be able to do it and I won’t be able to effectively
represent the interests of my members. So that’s a huge burden. And I
kind of feel like this is an effort really to shut down our . . . lobbying
efforts. . . .
You know, we have a right to gather those facts and present them in the
best way we can. We’re going to have a hard time doing that if . . . every
time I want to call a member . . . I’d have to say . . . if you tell me anything
and I make a note of it, I’ve got to disclose it. I don’t think I’m going to
get a lot of help from them. So that’s our big problem with this.
The retailers did not otherwise produce evidence to support their claim of
privilege.
The magistrate determined that many of the communications at issue were
privileged under the First Amendment and that the plaintiffs had not met their
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burden to overcome the privilege. 3 See generally In re Motor Fuel Temperature
Sales Practices Litig., 258 F.R.D. 407 (D. Kan. 2009). On both the plaintiffs’ and
the defendants’ motion for review, however, the district court found entirely in
favor of the plaintiffs. See In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig.,
707 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (D. Kan. 2010). In doing so, the district court concluded
that none of the requested information was entitled to a presumption of privilege
under the First Amendment and that the retailers must instead make a prima facie
showing that the privilege applies. See id. at 1155, 1158–59, 1163–64. The court
went on to hold that the retailers failed to meet that burden because they had not
presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that
disclosure of any of the information would chill their associational rights. 4 Id. at
1160, 1164.
The retailers then filed a motion to reconsider, arguing primarily that: (1)
the requested information is presumptively privileged; (2) to the extent a
3
It is unclear whether the magistrate applied a presumption of privilege to any or
all of the requested information. In addition, we note that the magistrate determined that
the First Amendment did not apply to information shared among the trade associations.
Because the district court issued its own opinion without adopting the magistrate’s
analysis, however, it is not necessary at this point to relate in detail the magistrate’s
memorandum and order.
4
In the alternative, the district court held that even if the retailers had met their
burden with respect to the discovery requests seeking internal trade association
communications, the plaintiffs demonstrated a need for the information that outweighed
the retailers’ First Amendment interests in non-disclosure. In re Motor Fuel
Temperature, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1163.
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presumption is inapplicable, the retailers satisfied their burden to make a prima
facie showing that disclosure of the information would arguably chill their
associational rights; and (3) the retailers should be permitted to supplement the
record with additional evidence of a chilling effect. The retailers also moved for
an emergency stay of the district court’s order. The district court denied both the
motion to reconsider and the motion for an emergency stay, reiterating its holding
that the retailers had failed to meet their prima facie burden and declining the
retailers’ request to supplement the record. In re Motor Fuel Temperature, 707 F.
Supp. 2d at 1166–69.
The retailers and the non-party trade associations then filed an interlocutory
appeal, a petition for a writ of mandamus, and a request for an emergency stay of
the district court’s order in this court. The plaintiffs seek dismissal of the
interlocutory appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and they oppose the
mandamus petition and the request for an emergency stay. We consolidated the
interlocutory appeal and the mandamus petition and temporarily stayed the
district court’s order pending our resolution of those matters.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The First Amendment Privilege: Right of Association 5
5
We note that, at times, the appellants appear to frame the right at issue as one
involving the right to petition the government. The essence of the appellants’ briefing
below and to this court, however, is that disclosure of the information would chill their
right of association. Moreover, the appellants fail to make any clear argument
distinguishing the right to petition the government and the right of association that would
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Before reaching the interlocutory appeal and mandamus petition, we begin
by setting forth the contours of the First Amendment privilege and how it is
implicated in the case before us. The Supreme Court has long “acknowledged the
importance of freedom of association in guaranteeing the right of people to make
their voices heard on public issues.” Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981). Indeed, the right of association guaranteed
by the First Amendment is premised in part on the notion that some ideas will
only be expressed through collective efforts. See id. at 294 (“[B]y collective
effort individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their voices
would be faint or lost.”). Moreover, because some collective efforts to express
ideas will only be undertaken if they can be undertaken in private, see NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“Inviolability of privacy in group association
may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”), the Supreme
Court has recognized a privilege, grounded in the First Amendment right of
association, not to disclose certain associational information when disclosure may
impede future collective expression. Id. (“It is hardly a novel perception that
compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may
constitute a[n] effective [] restraint on freedom of association.”). In other words,
permit us to analyze their claims as derivative of the right to petition the government.
Accordingly, this opinion refers only to the appellants’ right of association.
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the First Amendment privilege generally guarantees the right to maintain private
associations when, without that privacy, there is a chance that there may be no
association and, consequently, no expression of the ideas that association helps to
foster.
The seminal case addressing the First Amendment privilege is the Supreme
Court’s decision in NAACP v. Alabama. There, the state of Alabama brought suit
in state court to enjoin the NAACP from doing any business in the state based on
its alleged noncompliance with the state’s foreign corporation qualification
statute. Id. at 451. To support its claim that the NAACP was conducting
intrastate business in Alabama, the state moved for—and the state court
ordered—the production of the NAACP’s membership lists. Id. at 453–54. The
NAACP did not comply with the order and was held in contempt. Id. at 454. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the contempt judgment. Id. at 467. The
Court first acknowledged that the “compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups
engaged in advocacy may constitute a[n] effective [] restraint on freedom of
association” because of “the vital relationship between freedom to associate and
privacy in one’s associations.” Id. at 462. The Court then recognized that the
NAACP had made “an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation
of the identity of its rank-and file members [] exposed these members to
economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility.” Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded that,
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under the circumstances, compelled disclosure would “chill” or “affect adversely
the ability of [the NAACP] and its members to pursue their collective effort to
foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate” by “induc[ing]
members to withdraw . . . and dissuading others from joining [] because of fear of
exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the
consequences of exposure.” Id. at 462–63. The Court did not find a compelling
state interest which would justify the intrusion on the right. Id. at 466; see also
Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539–43 (1963) (Florida state
legislature’s investigation into criminal activity and communism; the legislature
sought by subpoena to obtain the entire membership list of the Miami branch of
the NAACP, which the records custodian disobeyed and was then held in
contempt and sentenced to imprisonment by state court).
The Supreme Court has not limited the First Amendment privilege to
membership lists. In DeGregory v. Atty. Gen. of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825
(1966), for example, the Supreme Court considered the right of a private
individual to refuse to answer questions from New Hampshire’s attorney general
regarding the individual’s affiliation with communist groups. In that case, the
attorney general was investigating—pursuant to his authority under a state
statute—the individual’s interest in the overthrow of the United States or in other
subversive acts. See Maynard v. DeGregory, 209 A.2d 712, 713–14 (N.H. 1965).
The individual refused to answer the questions and was held in contempt in state
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court. See id. at 714–15. The Supreme Court reversed. See 383 U.S. at 830. It
reasoned that governmental exposure of unpopular political views and
associations is objectionable and damaging, and that it is indefensible under the
First Amendment absent an overriding and compelling state interest, which had
not been demonstrated in the circumstances. See id. at 829–30.
The Supreme Court similarly faced an assertion of First Amendment
associational rights in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Candidates for
federal office and political groups challenged provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1974 and portions of the Internal Revenue Code which
established caps and reporting requirements on federal campaign contributions.
424 U.S. at 6–7. The Court recognized that the caps and reporting requirements
impinged on the freedom of association under the First Amendment and went on
to consider whether the federal government had an appropriately compelling
justification for imposing the laws. See id. at 24–25, 35–36, 44–45, 57–58,
64–65. Other cases raising the constitutionality of statutes in light of the First
Amendment associational right include NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 434–38
(1963) (Virginia law criminalizing the act of giving advice to a person that his
rights may have been violated and referring him to an attorney for help); Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480–84 (1960) (Arkansas law requiring public school
teachers to submit affidavits listing the names of all organizations to which they
belonged as a prerequisite to employment); and Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
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U.S. 516, 518 (1960) (city ordinance requiring any organization to supply its
membership and contributor list to the city upon request and requiring that the
lists be made public).
Although the First Amendment privilege has now been applied by various
courts in varying contexts, no court has directly considered its application to a
case like ours, where a court compels disclosure of trade groups’ and their
members’ strategic pre-lobbying communications in a lawsuit between private
parties. In NAACP v. Alabama, however, the Court made it clear that the First
Amendment privilege applies “whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by
association pertain to political, economic, religious, or cultural matters.” 357
U.S. at 461 (emphasis added). Moreover, in Grandbouche v. Clancy, we
expressly held that the First Amendment privilege applies to discovery orders
issued in litigation involving only private parties. 852 F.2d 1463, 1466 (10th Cir.
1987). 6 Thus, we conclude that the First Amendment privilege applies to the
6
The Ninth Circuit faced a similar situation in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d
1126 (9th Cir. 2009). Two same-sex couples filed suit challenging the constitutionality of
California’s Proposition 8, which provided that the state would only recognize marriage
between a man and a woman. Perry, 591 F.3d at 1131. The state attorney general
refused to defend in the suit. Id. at 1132. The court then permitted the official
proponents of Proposition 8 and the official Proposition 8 campaign committee, all of
whom were private parties, to intervene as defendants. Id. The plaintiffs served
discovery requests on the defendant-proponents seeking their campaign communications,
but the defendant-proponents objected on First Amendment grounds. Id. The Ninth
Circuit held that the defendant-proponents were entitled to assert a First Amendment
privilege and that the plaintiffs had to demonstrate a sufficiently justifiable interest in the
information that would outweigh the privilege. See id. at 1139–41.
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district court’s discovery order, which requires trade groups and their members to
disclose to a private party their communications regarding strategy for lobbying
against the implementation of ATC in the United States. Accordingly, we turn
now to the substance of the interlocutory appeal and mandamus petition.
B. Jurisdiction Over the Interlocutory Appeal
“Congress has the constitutional authority to define the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts, and, once the lines are drawn, limits upon federal
jurisdiction must be neither disregarded nor evaded.” Keene Corp. v. United
States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993) (internal citations, quotations, and alterations
omitted). Generally, Congress has afforded the courts of appeals jurisdiction to
review only “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A
decision is ‘final’ when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for
the court to do but execute the judgment.” S.E.C. v. Merrill Scott & Assocs., Ltd.,
600 F.3d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted).
“Implicit in § 1291 is Congress’ judgment that the district judge has the
primary responsibility to police the prejudgment tactics of litigants, and that the
district judge can better exercise that responsibility if the appellate courts do not
repeatedly intervene to second-guess prejudgment rulings.” Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985). The final judgment rule also alleviates
the substantial burden that would be imposed on the courts of appeals by the
“fragmentary and piecemeal review of the district court’s myriad rulings in the
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course of a typical case.” Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 748 (10th Cir.
1993). Moreover, deferring appellate review until the district court has finally
resolved a case promotes efficient judicial administration by “reduc[ing] the
ability of litigants to harass opponents and to clog the courts through a succession
of costly and time-consuming appeals.” Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259,
264 (1984). With these interests in mind, we have long held that “[d]iscovery
orders entered during the course of litigation ordinarily are not ‘final’ under [§
1291].” Merrill Scott & Assocs., Ltd., 600 F.3d at 1270; see also Boughton, 10
F.3d at 748.
The appellants contend that notwithstanding our general prohibition against
interlocutory appeals of discovery orders, we may exercise jurisdiction over their
interlocutory appeal pursuant to: (1) the collateral order/Cohen doctrine, see
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); (2) the Perlman
doctrine, see Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918); and (3) the pragmatic
finality doctrine.
1. The Collateral Order/Cohen Doctrine
“[I]n Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the
Supreme Court long ago held that, as a ‘practical’ matter, some interlocutory
orders can qualify as ‘final decisions’ within the meaning of § 1291 because,
while they don’t conclusively resolve the litigation, they do conclusively resolve
important questions separate from the merits.” United States v. Wampler, 624
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F.3d 1330, 1334 (10th Cir. 2010). This practical construction of the final
judgment rule, which has come to be known as the collateral order or Cohen
doctrine, permits interlocutory review of district court orders which “(1) finally
decide (2) an important question collateral to (or separate from) the merits of the
underlying proceeding, and (3) [are] ‘effectively unreviewable’ after final
judgment.” Id. “This circuit has repeatedly held that discovery orders are not
[generally] appealable under the Cohen doctrine.” Boughton, 10 F.3d at 749.
Without addressing the first two Cohen requirements, we conclude that
discovery orders adverse to a claimed First Amendment privilege are not
immediately appealable under the Cohen doctrine because they are effectively
reviewable after final judgment and by other means. See Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 869 (1994) (“[T]he failure to meet the third
condition of the Cohen test . . . would in itself suffice to foreclose immediate
appeal under § 1291.”). When analyzing the third Cohen requirement, we do not
consider whether the circumstances of the particular case before us warrant our
immediate review; rather, we examine whether the entire category of rulings to
which the claim belongs can be adequately vindicated on review of a final
judgment or by other means. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct.
599, 605 (2009). “The crucial question . . . is whether deferring review until final
judgment so imperils [a substantial public interest] as to justify the cost of
allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant orders.” Id. at 606.
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Preservation of the right to associate privately in order to pursue common
objectives is undoubtedly a substantial public interest. The appellants argue that
immediate appeals of discovery orders adverse to a claimed First Amendment
privilege justify the resultant costs because once private information is disclosed,
“the violation of privacy . . . cannot be undone.” Moreover, the appellants
contend that deferring review of such orders until final judgment will deter
association and dampen full and frank communication within associations. 7 We
do not agree that these potential harms justify the costs of allowing immediate
collateral order review of all discovery orders adverse to a claimed First
Amendment privilege.
While we readily acknowledge that no perfect remedy can be obtained once
a party discloses information which it has a right and a desire to keep private, the
absence of a perfect remedy does not justify a less-than-strict adherence to the
final judgment rule. Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 605 (“That a ruling may burden
litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a
final district court judgment . . . has never sufficed.”). Indeed, in Mohawk, the
Supreme Court rejected an argument which is nearly identical to the one
7
We are not unsympathetic to the appellants’ additional arguments that the
possibility of a settlement or defense verdict at trial, in addition to the fact that the
privilege has been asserted in multidistrict litigation, further justifies review. We are
reminded, however, that the availability of an interlocutory appeal under Cohen turns not
on the facts of any specific case but rather to the class of claims as a whole. See Mohawk,
130 S. Ct. at 605.
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appellants now propound. There, a corporation sought immediate review of a
discovery order adverse to its claimed attorney-client privilege, 8 arguing that the
privilege “provides a ‘right not to disclose privileged information in the first
place,’” id. at 607, and that “the right to maintain attorney-client confidences . . .
is ‘irreparably destroyed absent immediate appeal’ of adverse privilege rulings.”
Id. at 606. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that “[a]ppellate courts can
remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material in the same way they
remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary rulings: by vacating an adverse
judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the protected material and its
fruits are excluded from evidence.” Id. at 606–07.
Moreover, as was the case in Mohawk, there are several additional
alternatives to collateral order review of a discovery order that may adequately
remedy alleged violations of the First Amendment privilege. First, the district
court may certify an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See id. at
607. Second, parties claiming a privilege may, as the appellants in this case have,
seek a writ of mandamus. Id. Third, parties claiming a privilege may defy the
8
The fact that the privilege at issue here is derived from the First Amendment
rather than common law does not render Mohawk unpersuasive. Cf. United States v.
Wampler, 624 F.3d 1330, 1340 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that criminal defendants could
not immediately appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss an indictment on First
Amendment grounds because “First Amendment defenses like those asserted here are
adequately safeguarded by review after any adverse final judgment.”) (quotations
omitted); see also Perry, 591 F.3d at 1135 (“The constitutional nature of the right is not
dispositive of the collateral order inquiry.”) .
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discovery order, incur court-imposed sanctions, and appeal from the sanctions.
See id. at 607–08. The availability of these alternatives counsels strongly against
permitting immediate collateral order review of all discovery orders adverse to a
claimed First Amendment privilege. See id. at 609 (“We expect that the
combination of standard postjudgment appeals, § 1292(b) appeals, mandamus, and
contempt appeals will continue to provide adequate protection to litigants ordered
to disclose materials purportedly subject to [a] privilege. Any further avenue for
immediate appeal of such rulings should be furnished, if at all, through
rulemaking, with the opportunity for full airing it provides.”).
Finally, we are not persuaded by the appellants’ suggestion that the
inability immediately to appeal discovery orders adverse to a claimed First
Amendment privilege will discourage individuals and businesses from associating
to pursue common purposes and stifle full and frank communications among
members of associations. Indeed, we are skeptical that the availability of an
immediate appeal is a primary concern for an individual or business who is
considering associating with others to achieve a common purpose or considering
discussing a matter of importance with a fellow member of an association. And
we seriously doubt that such individuals or businesses will actually refrain from
associating or choose not to communicate with others in their associations simply
because they will not be permitted to immediately appeal a discovery order which
requires them to disclose allegedly privileged information. Cf. Mohawk, 130 S.
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Ct. at 607 (“[D]eferring review until final judgment does not meaningfully reduce
the ex ante incentives for full and frank consultations between clients and
counsel. . . . [because] in deciding how freely to speak, clients and counsel are
unlikely to focus on the remote prospect of an erroneous disclosure order, let
alone on the timing of a possible appeal.”).
For these reasons, we conclude that discovery orders adverse to a claimed
First Amendment privilege are not immediately appealable under the collateral
order/Cohen doctrine. 9
2. The Perlman Doctrine
Citing Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918), the non-party trade
associations seek to appeal the portion of the district court’s order compelling the
retailers to disclose documents. Specifically, the non-party trade associations
contend that some of the retailers have indicated a willingness to disclose
information in which the trade associations claim a privilege, and that the trade
associations will be powerless to protect their privileges if they are not permitted
an immediate appeal.
In Perlman, the inventor of a device, Louis Perlman, testified on behalf of
his company in an infringement suit against Firestone Tire & Rubber Company.
9
We also point out that we have not previously permitted immediate appeals of
discovery orders adverse to a claimed First Amendment privilege under the Cohen
doctrine, and we repeat our recent admonition that “any request for expansion of the
Cohen doctrine should be directed to the [judiciary’s] rules committee, not this court.”
Wampler, 624 F.3d at 1338.
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247 U.S. at 8. As part of his testimony, Mr. Perlman submitted exhibits to the
court. Id. Mr. Perlman’s company ultimately sought to dismiss its suit without
prejudice, and the court granted the motion conditioned on the exhibits being
impounded in the custody of the court clerk. Id. at 8–9. Thereafter, the United
States initiated a grand jury proceeding against Mr. Perlman and sought the
exhibits from the court clerk in support of the criminal investigation. Id. at 9–10.
Mr. Perlman objected, but the court ordered the clerk to produce them. Id. at
10–11. On Mr. Perlman’s appeal to the Supreme Court, the United States argued
that the order was interlocutory and unreviewable. Id. at 12. The Supreme Court
disagreed, stating simply:
The second contention of the government is somewhat strange, that
is, that the order granted upon its solicitation was not final as to
Perlman but interlocutory in a proceeding not yet brought and
depending upon it to be brought. In other words, that Perlman was
powerless to avert the mischief of the order but must accept its
incidence and seek a remedy at some other time and in some other
way. We are unable to concur.
Id. at 13.
In the nearly one hundred years since Perlman, this court has applied the
so-called Perlman doctrine to permit, in some circumstances, the subject of a
criminal grand jury proceeding to appeal an order of the district court compelling
a witness to provide allegedly privileged testimony or produce allegedly
privileged documents in the grand jury proceeding, despite the fact that the
subject of the proceeding is not the party to whom the order is directed. See, e.g.,
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In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1172, 1179 (10th Cir. 2010); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d 1038, 1040 (10th Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 144 F.3d 653, 657–58 (10th Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 857 F.2d 710, 711–12 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 723 F.2d 1461, 1464–66 (10th Cir. 1983). Because the subject of
the grand jury investigation will have no other opportunity to contest the order
(once the witness provides his testimony, an indictment may issue and the
defendant irretrievably loses the privilege he maintains in the testimony), we have
reasoned that Perlman provides for an immediate appeal based on the
impossibility of any other review. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 723
F.3d at 1465; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691 (1974) (the
Perlman doctrine applies only in a “limited class of cases where denial of
immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever of an
individual’s claims”) (emphasis added); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 328 (1940) (“To have denied him opportunity for review on the theory that
the district court’s order was interlocutory would have made the doctrine of
finality a means of denying Perlman any appellate review of his constitutional
claim.”).
We are aware of no case, however, and the non-party trade associations do
not cite any, that extends Perlman beyond criminal grand jury proceedings. We
decline to do so here. The underpinnings of the Perlman rule—the impossibility
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of an appeal later on—simply do not apply with equal force to a subpoena
directed at a non-party as part of discovery in civil litigation. See In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d at 1179 (“One to whom a subpoena is directed may
not appeal the denial of a motion to quash that subpoena but must either obey its
commands or refuse to do so and contest the validity of the subpoena if he is
subsequently cited for contempt on account of his failure to obey.”). And in any
event, the non-party trade associations in this case have not shown how they are
precluded from any further review. Although the trade associations claim a First
Amendment privilege in information which the district court has ordered the
retailers to disclose and which some retailers have indicated a willingness to
disclose, the trade associations readily acknowledge that the discovery order
directed to the retailers and subpoenas currently directed at themselves 10 “raise
the same First Amendment issues.” See Def.’s Pet. for Writ of Mandamus at 21
n.7. Thus, it is possible for the trade associations to obtain review of their First
Amendment claims without obtaining an immediate appeal of the portions of the
discovery order which were directed at the retailers. Namely, they may refuse to
comply with the subpoenas directed to themselves, incur contempt citations, and
appeal from the contempt orders. Accordingly, they may not invoke Perlman as a
10
The magistrate quashed as unduly burdensome the original subpoenas directed at
the trade associations, but the plaintiffs have since served the associations with revised
subpoenas. Enforcement of the revised subpoenas has been stayed, along with all other
discovery, pending this appeal.
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basis for appellate jurisdiction.
3. The Pragmatic Finality Doctrine
Unlike the collateral order/Cohen and Perlman doctrines, which have been
fairly well defined by a significant body of precedent, the pragmatic finality
doctrine is malleable, its applicability depending on the circumstances of any
given case. Indeed, under the pragmatic finality doctrine, “a practical
construction of § 1291 may generate jurisdiction through a subjective and ad hoc
balancing of the interests of the parties against the policies of an unambiguous
finality rule.” Stubblefield v. Windsor Capital Grp., 74 F.3d 990, 996 (10th Cir.
1996) (quotations omitted). The doctrine has been the subject of “increasing
criticism,” 15A Charles A. Wright, et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3913 (2d
ed.), and we have questioned its continued viability for the last fifteen years, see
Stubblefield, 74 F.3d at 996 (“[I]t is unclear whether the [pragmatic finality]
doctrine is still viable.”). We continue to question its viability after Mohawk.
We need not decide that precise issue, however, because the order at issue clearly
does not fall within bounds of the pragmatic finality doctrine.
We have applied the doctrine “only in unique or exceptional
circumstances.” Id. (quotations omitted). “‘The critical inquiry is whether the
danger of injustice by delaying appellate review outweighs the inconvenience and
costs of piecemeal review.’” Id. (quoting Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1427
(10th Cir. 1984)). In denying the appellants’ appeal under the collateral
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order/Cohen doctrine, we held that, categorically, the danger of injustice by
delaying appellate review of discovery orders adverse to a claimed First
Amendment privilege does not outweigh the inconvenience and costs of
piecemeal review of all such orders. The appellants point out, however, that in
addition to the injustices that are inherent in delaying all discovery orders adverse
to a First Amendment privilege, because this is an MDL case, the respective
actions will be transferred to multiple district courts within various circuit courts
throughout the country for trial. Thus, the appellants argue, if they are forced to
wait until after trial to rectify their First Amendment privilege claims, they will
receive a patchwork of potentially inconsistent rulings affecting their important
constitutional rights.
We do not find this sufficient to deviate from the plain construction of §
1291. In Mohawk, the Supreme Court cautioned that we are to give “full respect”
to the Rules Enabling Act, which, in part, “designat[es] rulemaking, ‘not
expansion by court decision’ as the preferred means for determining whether and
when prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable.” Mohawk, 130 S.
Ct. at 609 (emphasis added) (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S.
35, 48 (1995)). In light of this admonition and out of deference to Congress’
authority to define our appellate jurisdiction, we decline to permit an immediate
appeal in this case based on our own subjective balancing of the interests
involved.
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4. Summary
We lack jurisdiction to review appellants’ interlocutory appeal under the
collateral order/Cohen doctrine, the Perlman doctrine, and the pragmatic finality
doctrine. Accordingly, we dismiss the interlocutory appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction.
C. Mandamus
Mandamus is not the same as, nor is it a substitute for, a direct appeal. In
re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 2009). Rather, it is
“a drastic remedy, [which] is to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances.”
Id. When a petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus to reverse a discovery order
adverse to a claimed privilege, we first analyze whether: “(1) disclosure of the
allegedly privileged or confidential information renders impossible any
meaningful appellate review of the claim of privilege or confidentiality; and (2)
the disclosure involves questions of substantial importance to the administration
of justice.” Barclaysamerican Corp. v. Kane, 746 F.2d 653, 654–55 (10th Cir.
1984); see also In re Cooper Tire, 568 F.3d at 1187 n.5. Given the circumstances
of this case, we conclude that the disclosure satisfies these initial prerequisites.11
We therefore turn to the particulars of the district court’s order. In contrast
to a direct appeal of a discovery order, which is reviewed only for an abuse of
11
Our conclusion is based on the unique posture of this particular case. We do not
hold, as a blanket rule, that claims of a First Amendment privilege will always satisfy this
two-pronged test.
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discretion, see Trentadue v. FBI, 572 F.3d 794, 806 (10th Cir. 2009), a party
seeking a writ of mandamus “must have no other adequate means to attain the
relief he desires,” and “must demonstrate that his right to the writ is clear and
indisputable.” In re Cooper Tire, 568 F.3d at 1187. In addition, “[we], in
exercise of [our] discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under
the circumstances.” Id. Thus, “[a]lthough a simple showing of error may suffice
to obtain reversal on direct appeal, a greater showing must be made to obtain a
writ of mandamus.” Id. at 1186. Indeed, “[t]here must be more than what we
would typically consider to be an abuse of discretion in order for the writ to
issue.” Id.
1. The Appellants’ Claims
a. The District Court’s Refusal to Consider the Information
“Presumptively Privileged” Under the First Amendment
In support of their mandamus petition, the appellants first argue that the
district court erred in failing to presume that the information sought by the
plaintiffs is privileged under the First Amendment. According to the appellants,
disclosure of the information—which the appellants claim reflects “core
associational activity”—should be deemed presumptively privileged, with the
initial burden on the party seeking the information to demonstrate a compelling
need for it which outweighs the appellants’ interest in keeping it private.
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Contrary to the appellants’ position, however, we have generally held that
the party claiming a privilege always bears the initial burden of establishing the
factual predicate for the privilege. See, e.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v.
West, 748 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir. 1984) (“A party seeking to assert a privilege
must make a clear showing that it applies.”). We are not persuaded that this
traditional allocation of burdens should be dispensed with simply because the
claimed privilege implicates the First Amendment and the appellants’ right of
association. Indeed, the weight of existing authority instructs that the party
claiming a First Amendment privilege in an objection to a discovery request bears
the burden to make a prima facie showing of the privilege’s applicability. See In
re First Nat’l Bank, Englewood, Colo., 701 F.2d 115, 118 (10th Cir. 1983)
(“[W]hen a party makes ‘a prima facie showing of arguable First Amendment
infringement . . . the burden then [shifts] to the government to make the
appropriate showing of need for the material.’”) (quoting United States v. Citizens
State Bank, 612 F.2d 1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 1980)); Nat’l Org. for Women v. Terry,
886 F.2d 1339, 1355 (2d Cir. 1989) (“In each of the [controlling] cases the party
withholding information from a court or public agency made a prima facie
showing that disclosure would infringe its First Amendment rights . . . . [such as
demonstrating] that disclosure of members’ identities exposed these members to
economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility.”) (quotations omitted); Perry, 591 F.3d at 1140
- 27 -
(“In this circuit, a claim of First Amendment privilege is subject to a two-part
framework. The party asserting the privilege must [first] demonstrate a prima
facie showing of arguable first amendment infringement.”). Under these cases,
the burden shifts to the party seeking discovery only after the party claiming the
privilege makes this prima facie showing. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 463; Terry,
886 F.2d at 1355 (“A party resisting discovery need not make a showing of harm
or other coercion; but before the burden shifts . . . [the party] must at least
articulate some resulting encroachment on their liberties.”); Perry, 591 F.3d at
1140 (“If appellants can make the necessary prima facie showing, the evidentiary
burden will then shift to the [party seeking discovery].”). Accordingly, we cannot
say that the district court committed any error in refusing to presume that the
information at issue is privileged under the First Amendment, let alone that the
court committed the egregious error necessary for us to issue a writ of
mandamus. 12
12
In doing so, we also reject the appellants’ related contention that the magistrate’s
protection of the trade associations’ membership and financial contributor lists, in
conjunction with the district court’s refusal to presume a privilege for communications
among trade associations, suggests that the courts below “valu[e] speaker identity more
than political speech itself” and categorically deem those communications among trade
associations unworthy of First Amendment protection, all in violation of Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). To begin, the plaintiffs have never
challenged the protection afforded to the membership and financial contributor lists, so
any alleged inconsistency between that ruling and the district court’s order is simply not
before us. More importantly, however, Citizens United has no bearing on the issues
involved in this interlocutory appeal and petition for mandamus. The district court never
purported to shield trade associations’ members’ speech based on the members’ identity
as individuals and deny protection to the trade associations due to their organizational
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b. The District Court’s Application of the Prima Facie Burden
Having refused to presume a First Amendment privilege, the district court
required that the appellants “through objective and articulable facts make an
evidentiary showing of a reasonable probability of chill on an association right.”
In re Motor Fuel Temperature, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1159 (quotations omitted); see
also id. at 1164. The district court held that the appellants could meet this burden
by demonstrating “that disclosure will deter membership due to fears of threats,
harassment or reprisal from either government officials or private parties which
may affect members’ physical well-being, political activities or economic
interests.” Id. at 1160; see also id. at 1164. According to the district court,
however, the appellants failed to make this showing. See id. at 1160, 1164.
The appellants claim that even if the information at issue is not
presumptively privileged, they are entitled to a writ of mandamus because the
status. Indeed, the plaintiffs never presented such an argument to either the magistrate or
the district court in opposition to the appellants’ discovery objections. And the district
court clearly held that “[o]n the facts of this case, defendants have not shown an
objectively reasonable probability that disclosure of lobbying and legislative
communications between trade associations regarding ATC for retail motor fuel would
chill their First Amendment rights.” In re Motor Fuel Temperature, 707 F. Supp. 2d at
1164 (emphasis added). This analysis demonstrates: (1) the district court’s application of
the First Amendment analysis to communications among trade associations; and (2) the
appellants’ failure to satisfy their prima facie burden as to those communications. Thus,
we disagree with the appellants that “[t]he District Court . . . abused its discretion in
holding that the presumption only applies to protect speaker identity, i.e., membership
and contributor lists, not political speech itself” and that the court “discriminate[d] against
groups like [the] trade associations by placing extra burdens on them.”
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district court imposed too stringent a prima facie burden on them. Specifically,
appellants contend that the district court “too narrowly limit[ed] the type of
consequences that suggest a chill on First Amendment rights,” and that it
“overstat[ed] the [prima facie] burden.”
With respect to the appellants’ contention that the district court too
narrowly construed the type of potential chilling effects which can satisfy the
prima facie burden, the appellants argue that they adequately showed the
following consequences of disclosure, which objectively suggest a probable chill
on their First Amendment rights: (1) the plaintiffs will gain an unfair advantage in
the policy debate over the implementation of ATC in retail motor fuel sales in the
United States; and (2) complying with the plaintiffs’ discovery requests will cost
several hundred thousand dollars and therefore interfere with the trade
associations’ internal operations.
As discussed earlier in this opinion, the First Amendment privilege at issue
in this case generally ensures privacy in association when exposure of that
association will make it less likely that association will occur in the future, or
when exposure will make it more difficult for members of an association to foster
their beliefs. These are the “chilling effects,” or consequences of disclosure, that
the First Amendment privilege seeks to avoid. But the appellants in this case fail
to explain how their main contention on this point—that the information sought as
part of this litigation will give the plaintiffs an unfair advantage in the policy
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debate over the implementation of ATC—will hinder their associational rights
(e.g., lobbying efforts, ability to communicate among themselves regarding
legislative policy, or maintenance of members within the trade associations).
Instead, the appellants appear simply to argue that a chill can be “inferred” in this
case without describing how the disclosure of information would degrade their
ability to associate. 13 Furthermore, the appellants do not cite any case which
supports their assertion that “mak[ing] . . . political opponents privy to . . .
internal strategies” is “alone” sufficient to demonstrate a chilling effect on their
First Amendment rights. 14
Likewise, we reject the appellants’ contention that they sufficiently
demonstrated a chilling effect by showing that they will have to devote time and
money to comply with the discovery requests. To begin, this argument seems
better suited to a burdensome, not a First Amendment, challenge. To the extent
that the appellants suggest that the cost of compliance decreases the amount of
available lobbying funds, we do not agree that this is sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of chill on the right of association. As the district court pointed
out, no court has construed the First Amendment privilege so broadly. Indeed,
13
Moreover, and contrary to the appellants’ suggestion, one might equally infer
that the appellants’ incentive to associate might be heightened by such disclosure.
14
Although Perry recognizes that the compelled disclosure of campaign
communications can deter activities protected under the First Amendment, the campaign
committee in that case also presented evidence in support of their assertion of a chill on
future campaign communications. See Perry, 591 F.3d at 1163. Moreover, the dispute
before us does not involve campaign communications regarding a public referendum.
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taken to its logical extreme, this argument would render all discovery prima facie
privileged under the First Amendment because any time or money spent
complying with a discovery request could conceivably be spent petitioning the
government or engaging in other activities which are protected under the First
Amendment.
Finally, we disagree that the appellants have demonstrated the requisite
entitlement to mandamus based on the evidence of a chill that they did, in fact,
present to the district court. Unlike their assertions related to a competitive
disadvantage and the cost of compliance, the appellants purported to present
evidence that disclosure of the requested information would discourage
membership in the trade associations and stifle full and frank discussions within
and among the trade associations—a type of chill which, if properly supported by
evidence, would satisfy the appellants’ prima facie burden. The “evidence”
presented, however, was minimal and equivocal, consisting only of the following
unsworn statement of Ms. Alfano:
You know, why should they [the plaintiffs] have everything we’ve
done, all of our internal research, all of our private conversations
with our members trying to understand this issue, you know, because
they think maybe there’s something there, you know, that’s not, it’s
nonexistent. . . .
So I just—I think it’s very unfair for us to turn over all of our work
and all of our strategy on this issue which is ongoing.
...
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So if I have to plan my . . . testimony at [weights and measures] hearings,
because they’re open hearings, where they get people—they invite
interested parties to come up and speak, I’m very reluctant to call any of
my members and ask them questions knowing that it’s information that I
have to provide to my adversaries. . . .
I just don’t think I would be able to do it and I won’t be able to effectively
represent the interests of my members. So that’s a huge burden. And I
kind of feel like this is an effort really to shut down our . . . lobbying
efforts. . . .
You know, we have a right to gather those facts and present them in the
best way we can. We’re going to have a hard time doing that if . . . every
time I want to call a member . . . I’d have to say . . . if you tell me anything
and I make a note of it, I’ve got to disclose it. I don’t think I’m going to
get a lot of help from them. So that’s our big problem with this.
Although we have not articulated the precise quantum of proof necessary to
establish a prima facie case of privilege under the First Amendment, we also have
not held that one single unsworn statement is sufficient. Rather, we have held
that a party claiming a First Amendment chilling affect meets its burden by
submitting, for example, affidavits which “describe harassment and intimidation
of [a group’s] known members, and the resulting reluctance of people sympathetic
to the goals of [the group] to associate with [it] for fear of reprisals.” In re First
Nat’l Bank, 701 F.2d at 116–17. Furthermore, other courts, including the
Supreme Court, have held that the prima facie burden is satisfied by similar proof
of a chilling effect. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462 (“Petitioner has made an
uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its
rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public
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hostility.”); see also Perry, 591 F.3d at 1143 (quoting one of multiple
declarations from group’s members that “I can unequivocally state that if the
personal, non-public communications I have had regarding this ballot initiative . .
. are ordered to be disclosed through discovery in this matter . . . I will be less
willing to engage in such communications . . . [and] I . . . would have to seriously
consider whether to even become an official proponent again.”); see also Terry,
886 F.2d at 1355 (“Absent a more specific explanation of the consequences of
compliance with discovery, [such as alleging that access to documents would
discourage potential members from joining the organization for fear of
government retaliation], defendants failed to make the required initial showing of
potential First Amendment infringement.”).
To be clear, we do not purport, in this opinion, to create a bright-line rule
delineating the minimum proof necessary to satisfy the prima facie burden.
Nevertheless, we cannot say that the district court clearly and egregiously erred in
concluding that Ms. Alfano’s single statement was insufficient. The appellants
presented significantly less evidence of a chilling effect than what has been
deemed sufficient in prior cases. They presented only one witness who presented
only an unsworn statement. The substance of the statement is ambiguous,
appearing to reflect Ms. Alfano’s sense of unfairness in having to share her
association’s work as much as her concern that any court-ordered disclosure in
this case will actually prevent the associations from gathering facts for their
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lobbying efforts. Indeed, her statement appears to mischaracterize the extent of
the disclosure to which the appellants might be subject and which, accordingly,
would be the cause of their “chill”: Ms. Alfano suggests that she will now, as a
matter of course and apparently for an indefinite timeframe, have to automatically
turn over any “note” she makes after a discussion with a NATSO member, and
she comments on the impact that would have on NATSO’s fact-finding and
lobbying efforts. We, however, do not understand the issue to be so broad;
instead, the issue is whether a trade association or one of its members will refrain
from communicating regarding lobbying efforts based on their fear that in the
future, a litigant might seek discovery relating to those communications and a
court might order the disclosure of them. Ms. Alfano’s statement does not touch
on that issue.
Accordingly, the appellants have not demonstrated a “clear and
indisputable right” to a writ of mandamus, see In re Cooper Tire, 568 F.3d at
1187, based on the district court’s holding that they had not satisfied their burden
to establish a prima facie case of First Amendment chill. See id. (“It is not
appropriate to issue a writ when the most that could be claimed is that the district
courts have erred in ruling on matters within their jurisdiction.”). 15
15
Because we uphold the district court’s determination that the appellants failed to
satisfy their prima facie burden, we need not address the appellants’ claim that the district
court incorrectly applied the second prong of the First Amendment privilege
inquiry—that is, whether the party seeking the information has a sufficiently compelling
need for the information that outweighs the other party’s interest in keeping it private. As
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c. Appellants’ Request to Supplement the Record
Having concluded that the district court did not err in applying the prima
facie burden, we easily decline to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the district
court to permit appellants to supplement the record with further evidence of a
chilling effect. The appellants devoted the majority of their briefing and
argument below to their contention that a First Amendment privilege should be
presumed. As discussed above, however, the weight of authority regarding the
First Amendment privilege has always required the party asserting the privilege to
initially demonstrate a reasonable probability that disclosure will chill its
associational rights. The appellants are not entitled to a second opportunity to
establish their privilege simply because they made the unwise strategic decision
to seek a presumption rather than meet their evidentiary burden. The time for the
appellants to support their privilege claim with evidence has passed.
III. CONCLUSION
We DISMISS the appellants’ interlocutory appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction, and we DENY the appellants’ mandamus petition. Additionally, we
lift the stay of the district court’s discovery order which we issued on April 30,
2010.
discussed above, the court only reaches the second prong of the First Amendment
privilege inquiry if the party claiming the privilege satisfies its prima facie burden.
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