United States v. Winchaus A. Hayes ( 1999 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                       No. 99-4365
    WINCHAUS ANGELO HAYES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
    Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge.
    (CR-98-91)
    Submitted: October 29, 1999
    Decided: November 18, 1999
    Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Jennifer T. Stanton, J.T. STANTON, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for
    Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Darryl J. Mitchell,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Winchaus Angelo Hayes appeals his conviction and thirty-seven-
    month sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of possession
    of ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922
    (g)(1), 924(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999). On appeal, Hayes con-
    tends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
    the ammunition, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, and
    that the court erred in calculating his criminal history category. Find-
    ing no error, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
    Hayes moved to suppress the ammunition on the ground that there
    was no articulable suspicion to support the officer's pat-down of
    Hayes. On appeal, Hayes presents a new argument as to why the dis-
    trict court should have suppressed the ammunition--that the officers
    did not have probable cause to arrest him. Hayes'"failure to preserve
    the issue properly amounts to waiver under [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 12(f)."
    United States v. Wilson, 
    115 F.3d 1185
    , 1190 (4th Cir. 1997). Hayes
    never sought relief below for his default by showing cause under Rule
    12(f) nor has he established plain error on appeal. See United States
    v. Wilkerson, 
    84 F.3d 692
    , 694-95 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing plain
    error standard); United States v. Dorlouis, 
    107 F.3d 248
    , 255 (4th Cir.
    1997) (defining probable cause).
    Next, Hayes asserts that the evidence was insufficient to convict
    him of possession of ammunition by a convicted felon because the
    Government failed to establish knowing possession. Taking the evi-
    dence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that
    the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found
    the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See
    United States v. Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    , 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
    (providing standard); United States v. Hobbs, 
    136 F.3d 384
    , 390 (4th
    Cir.) (outlining elements of § 922(g)(1)), cert. denied, 
    118 S. Ct. 2358
    (1998).
    Finally, Hayes challenges his thirty-seven-month sentence on the
    ground that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history
    score. Specifically, he asserts that two convictions on which the dis-
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    trict court relied were "related" because the state court imposed con-
    current sentences on the same day after revoking Hayes' probation on
    offenses that were committed at different times and separated by an
    intervening arrest. We find no error in the district court's calculation
    of Hayes' criminal history. See United States v. Breckenridge, 
    93 F.3d 132
    , 137 (4th Cir. 1996); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
    § 4A1.2, comment. (n.3) (1998).
    Accordingly, we affirm Hayes' conviction and sentence. We dis-
    pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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