United States v. Price , 164 F. App'x 404 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4426
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DANIEL WEBSTER PRICE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Malcolm J. Howard,
District Judge. (CR-04-36)
Submitted: January 4, 2006 Decided: January 31, 2006
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kelly L. Greene, STUBBS & PERDUE, P.A., New Bern, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Jennifer May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on the morning of September 30,
2002, defendant Daniel Price drove a borrowed Suzuki through a
license checkpoint that the Washington, North Carolina Police
Department had set up to check motorists for valid driver’s
licenses. Defendant sped up as he drove through the license check
station without stopping, was pursued by an officer, and pulled
over a half mile past the checkpoint. The police officer
approached defendant, smelled alcohol, and determined that
defendant’s driver’s license was suspended. The officer also
administered a field sobriety test, which defendant failed.
Defendant was placed under arrest. The police searched his vehicle
and discovered a revolver under the front passenger seat. After a
two-day jury trial, defendant was found guilty of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2000).
Under § 922(g)(1), the government must show that defendant was
a convicted felon, that he knowingly possessed a firearm, and that
the firearm had travelled in interstate commerce. See United
States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
Defendant first contends that a rational jury could not have
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed the
revolver. “[W]hen a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal, the relevant question is whether, after viewing
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the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Collins,
412 F.3d 515, 519 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This is a “heavy burden,” United States v. Hamlin, 319
F.3d 666, 672 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted),
and one that defendant has not met here. Defendant was the only
person in the vehicle, the gun was found next to him under the
passenger seat, and he accelerated through a well-marked police
checkpoint, stopping a half mile after officers gave chase. Under
these circumstances, a reasonable jury could have determined that
he knowingly possessed a firearm. While the defendant introduced
evidence suggesting the revolver did not belong to him and that he
was unaware of its placement in the vehicle, “where the evidence
supports differing reasonable interpretations,” it is for the jury
to decide which interpretation to credit. United States v. Perry,
335 F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 2003).
Defendant next argues that the district court should have
suppressed evidence of the revolver because it was the product of
a police checkpoint that violated the Fourth Amendment. Stopping
a person at an automobile checkpoint is a seizure that must satisfy
Fourth Amendment requirements, see United States v. Wilson, 205
F.3d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), but “special law
enforcement concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without
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individualized suspicion.” Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424
(2004); see also Wilson, 205 F.3d at 723 (same). In these cases,
the checkpoint stop must be reasonable. See Mich. Dep’t of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990); United States v. Brugal,
209 F.3d 353, 356 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (plurality opinion).
The driver’s license checkpoint in this case was clearly
reasonable. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38
(2000) (suggesting that a “roadblock with the purpose of verifying
drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations would be permissible”);
see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658, 663 (1979) (same);
Brugal, 209 F.3d at 357 (same). The supervisor-sanctioned
roadblock was set up near a commercial area on both sides of a wide
street. The officers positioned their squad cars to block the
outer lane on each side of the road and turned on the cars’
flashing blue lights. Several officers wearing traffic vests and
carrying flashlights stood in a center turn lane between the inside
lanes of the road. They stopped every motorist approaching from
either direction. The stops were intended to be brief, as drivers
only had to present a valid license. In light of all of these
circumstances, the checkpoint was readily apparent to passing
motorists, and did not involve discretionary behavior on the part
of police officers. Compare Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659. “States have
a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are
permitted to operate motor vehicles . . . and hence that licensing,
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registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being
observed.” Id. at 658. The checkpoint station in this case
directly advanced that interest and caused only minimal disruption
to drivers passing through.
Defendant raises other objections relating to the exclusion of
certain evidence and the absence of the jury during certain
portions of the proceedings. We have reviewed these assignments of
error and find them without merit. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before us and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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