Kristine Bistline v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 18 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    KRISTINE ANN BISTILINE,                         No.    17-55467
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
    2:16-cv-04610-MWF-PLA
    v.
    JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., a                    MEMORANDUM*
    California Corporation; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 16, 2019**
    San Diego, California
    Before: HURWITZ, OWENS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    Kristine Ann Bistline1 appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing her
    claims related to the foreclosure proceeding against her home. We have jurisdiction
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    1
    Though the caption reads “Kristine Bistiline,” the appellant’s name is
    “Kristine Bistline,” as indicated by the district court documents.
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we review de novo the district court’s dismissal under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 
    654 F.3d 892
    , 897 (9th Cir. 2011). We AFFIRM.2
    1.     The district court did not err in concluding that Bistline lacked standing
    under California law to challenge the validity of assignments of the beneficial
    interest in her deed of trust in a pre-foreclosure action.
    Contrary to Bistline’s arguments, the California Supreme Court in Yvanova v.
    New Century Mortgage Corp. expressly limited its holding to post-foreclosure sale
    situations only. 
    365 P.3d 845
    , 848 (Cal. 2016) (“We do not hold or suggest that a
    borrower may attempt to preempt a threatened nonjudicial foreclosure by a suit
    questioning the foreclosing party’s right to proceed.”); see also 
    id. at 855
    (“disallowing the use of a lawsuit to preempt a nonjudicial foreclosure, is not within
    the scope of our review, which is limited to a borrower’s standing to challenge an
    assignment in an action seeking remedies for wrongful foreclosure” (emphasis in
    original)).
    The California Court of Appeal has refused to extend Yvanova to pre-
    foreclosure cases. See, e.g., Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
    245 Cal. App. 4th 808
    , 815 (2016). Because “there is no convincing evidence that the state
    2
    This disposition does not address claims against Ditech Financial LLC
    or Ditech’s motion for judicial notice. The appeal as to Ditech has been closed for
    administrative purposes because it has filed for bankruptcy.
    2
    supreme court would decide differently, a federal court is obligated to follow the
    decisions of the state’s intermediate appellate courts.” Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen.
    Dynamics Corp., 
    249 F.3d 958
    , 960 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Lewis v. Tel. Emps.
    Credit Union, 
    87 F.3d 1537
    , 1545 (9th Cir. 1996)). 3
    2.     The district court also properly dismissed Bistline’s claim for slander
    of title based on the defendants-appellees’ recordations of the beneficial interest
    assignments. The recordation of assignments is covered by the litigation privilege
    in California Civil Code Section 2924(d), which states that “[p]erformance of the
    procedures set forth in this article” “shall constitute privileged communications
    pursuant to Section 47.” Although this privilege might not apply if a party acted
    with malice, Schep v. Capital One, N.A., 
    12 Cal. App. 5th 1331
    , 1337 (2017),
    Bistline did not plausibly allege malice.
    3.     Bistline argues that the district court improperly dismissed her
    complaint without leave to amend because she could have added a claim under the
    Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. But Bistline did not raise this issue below, nor
    did she present new facts or explain why she had failed to include the new claim in
    her earlier complaints. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
    3
    We need not consider Bistline’s argument that California Civil Code
    Section 2924.17 allows for a pre-foreclosure action because she did not raise the
    assignments as a basis for a violation of that provision in the district court. See
    Baccei v. United States., 
    632 F.3d 1140
    , 1149 (9th Cir. 2011).
    3
    dismissing without leave to amend. See Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal,
    
    10 F.3d 667
    , 677 (9th Cir. 1993).
    4.     Finally, Bistline moves the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that
    a foreclosure allegedly occurred, proffering a letter from her own trial attorney. We
    deny the motion. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (allowing judicial notice of facts that can be
    determined from sources “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”).
    Moreover, the documents do not show beyond a reasonable dispute that a foreclosure
    occurred. ECF No. 66 (letter noting that the foreclosure notice “had been ‘canceled’
    by Freddie Mac” and that “if Freddie Mac decides to restart the process you will
    contact me”).
    AFFIRMED.
    4