William Cole v. Michael Astrue , 395 F. App'x 387 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                                FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                 SEP 07 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    WILLIAM L. COLE,                                  No. 09-36082
    Plaintiff - Appellant,              D.C. No. 3:08-cv-05689-BHS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
    Social Security,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted September 2, 2010**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN and BEA, Circuit Judges.
    William Cole appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner
    of Social Security’s denial of his 2006 application for social security disability
    benefits. Cole claims that he has been disabled as of January 1, 2005, due to
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    diabetes, high blood pressure, and a back condition. The Commissioner rejected
    Cole’s application, concluding Cole retained a residual functional capacity (RFC)
    that allowed him to perform some jobs available in significant numbers in the
    national economy. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and review the
    district court’s order de novo “to ensure that the [Commissioner’s] decision was
    supported by substantial evidence and a correct application of the law.” Valentine
    v. Comm’r, 
    574 F.3d 685
    , 690 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We affirm. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not repeat them here.
    Cole offers several objections related to the treatment of the medical and
    medical-related evidence. Although Cole urges the panel to adopt a different
    standard, the established standard for evaluating an ALJ’s treatment of an “other
    source” opinion, such as those from the physician’s assistant and the physical
    therapist, is whether the ALJ provided “germane” reasons for discounting that
    opinion. Valentine, 
    574 F.3d at 694
    ; Dodrill v. Shalala, 
    12 F.3d 915
    , 919 (9th Cir.
    1993); see also Jamerson v. Chater, 
    112 F.3d 1064
    , 1067 (9th Cir. 1997).
    The ALJ offered germane reasons—including the limited interaction the
    sources had with Cole and the apparent temporal nature of the physical therapist’s
    evaluation—to disagree regarding the severity of Cole’s limitations. Although the
    ALJ did not address the fact that a doctor co-signed two of the three evaluations
    2
    from the physician’s assistant, Cole does not meet his burden of demonstrating that
    the error was not harmless. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 
    129 S.Ct. 1696
    , 1706 (2009).
    Any error based on that oversight was indeed harmless, as the ALJ identified
    substantial evidence to support his findings regarding Cole’s RFC. See Carmickle
    v. Comm’r, 
    533 F.3d 1155
    , 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).
    Cole objected that the ALJ did not consider certain pieces of medical
    evidence. The ALJ is charged with the duty to weigh all of the evidence in the
    record to reach an RFC assessment, Thomas v. Barnhart, 
    278 F.3d 947
    , 954
    (9th Cir. 2002), but is not required to discuss each piece of evidence. The ALJ
    noted that Cole’s medical records confirmed Cole’s painful back condition, but did
    not provide evidence demonstrating the severely incapacitating level Cole
    described. The ALJ identified substantial evidence to support his conclusion that
    Cole retained the RFC to perform a limited range of “light” work. Further, the
    additional evidence (x-ray and treatment note) that Cole argues the ALJ should
    have discussed does not appear to add materially to the evidence the ALJ
    mentioned. The ALJ did not err by improperly considering the medical and
    medical-related evidence.
    Cole also protests that the ALJ improperly handled Cole’s subjective pain
    testimony and the lay evidence provided by two of his friends. In discounting
    3
    Cole’s symptom testimony, the ALJ provided several specific, clear and
    convincing reasons, as required. See Smolen v. Chater, 
    80 F.3d 1273
    , 1281
    (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ highlighted that (1) Cole undertook activities that did not
    comport with his supposed pain level; (2) Cole relied on only medical marijuana to
    treat his symptoms; (3) the medical evidence did not support Cole’s reported level
    of symptoms; and (4) Cole revealed to the psychological evaluator that he might
    have other motivations for seeking disability payments.
    The ALJ was required to provide “germane reasons” for not crediting the
    friends’ lay evidence. See Lewis v. Apfel, 
    236 F.3d 503
    , 511 (9th Cir. 2001). The
    ALJ specifically addressed the evidence from each friend, giving examples to
    support his findings that the evidence lacked the specificity or accuracy to be
    afforded great weight. The ALJ is charged with assessing credibility, Andrews v.
    Shalala, 
    53 F.3d 1035
    , 1039 (9th Cir. 1995), and did not err by limiting the weight
    given to the lay testimony.
    Finally, Cole argues that the ALJ erred in finding that jobs Cole could
    perform existed in the national economy in significant numbers. The ALJ was not
    required to consider the vocational expert’s testimony based on a hypothetical
    Cole created. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 
    240 F.3d 1157
    , 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2001).
    Cole highlights, correctly, that there was a discrepancy between the vocational
    4
    expert’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and that the ALJ did
    not take the required steps of identifying and resolving this inconsistency. See
    Masachi v. Astrue, 
    486 F.3d 1149
    , 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2007). The Commissioner
    concedes the error, but Cole does not meet his burden of demonstrating the error
    was not harmless. See Shinseki, 
    129 S.Ct. at 1706
    .
    There was sufficient remaining evidence in the record to support the
    conclusion that significant numbers of jobs existed that Cole could perform. See
    Masachi, 
    486 F.3d at
    1154 n.19. Unchallenged evidence in the record showed
    Cole could perform work as a table worker. Additionally, the expert testified that
    significant numbers of “sit/stand option” cashier and small products assembler jobs
    existed that Cole could perform. The expert’s testimony showed there were over
    25,000 jobs in Washington state in these three categories combined. Any error was
    therefore rendered harmless. See e.g., Barker v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
    
    882 F.2d 1474
    , 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming finding of availability of
    significant number of jobs petitioner could perform where 1266 jobs were
    identified in the local area).
    AFFIRMED.
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